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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an empirical study of responses to domestic abuse in marriages between civilian 
women, and men serving in the British Armed Forces. It draws on 45 in-depth interviews with 
victim-survivors and perpetrators of abuse and with support workers in both military and civilian 
roles. The thesis is informed by feminist theorisations of domestic abuse which identify the 
gender inequalities at its roots. I explore the ways in which aspects of everyday militarism shape 
responses to domestic abuse in this context, including the impact both of hegemonic forms of 
military gendered identity, and of the structural violences which shape the lives of civilian women 
married to servicemen in the British military. In addition, I draw attention to some of the 
depoliticising ways in which the causes of domestic abuse have been understood within the 
British military community, and point to the impact that these depoliticising notions have on 
broader attempts to engage politically with domestic abuse and with militarism. The thesis 
highlights the linkages which exist between multiple forms of gendered violence which occur on 
different ‘scales’ from the intimate to the global. I draw connections between the gendered 
project of militarism and the everyday gendered relations of inequality which shape the social 
contexts in which the individuals who participated in the study responded to abuse. I argue that 
the common failure to recognise and to respond to domestic abuse as a gendered social and 
political problem in this context serves to both depoliticise and to reproduce everyday forms of 
militarism and thus, that it plays a role in the enabling of the use of armed violence on the 
geopolitical stage. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Responses to Domestic Abuse in the British Armed Forces 
 
 
This thesis is a feminist-informed study of domestic abuse in the British military. I focus in 
particular on responses to the domestic abuse perpetrated by men serving as regulars across the 
three services of the British Armed Forces against their civilian wives. The thesis approaches 
domestic abuse as a political and a social issue as well as an individual and interpersonal one, and 
draws upon feminist perspectives to argue that it is underpinned by gendered social inequalities. 
Moreover, I draw connections between the multiple forms of gendered violence and inequality 
which occur on different ‘scales’ from the intimate to the global, and understand these forms of 
violence to be mutually constitutive - that is, the violences of the intimate are both productive of, 
and formulated through, the violences of the geopolitical, and vice versa. As such, I present an 
analysis of domestic abuse in the British military which situates it in the social and political 
context of militarism - defined as the normalised, everyday, gendered social relations of the 
preparation for, and conduct of, political domination and control for which the use of organised 
violence is a viable option (see Stavrianakis and Selby 2013: 3).  
 
The primary site for analysis in this thesis is responses to domestic abuse in the British military - as 
opposed to, for example, the prevalence of abuse, the factors which cause its perpetration, the 
physical or psychological acts which constitute it, or the long-term impact it can have upon those 
who are subjected to it. Within this, the responses of victim-survivors - the ways in which they 
make sense of their experiences of abuse and seek to make themselves safe - is of particular 
importance because of the implications that this has for women’s safety and wellbeing. As I 
explore in Chapter Two and throughout this thesis, however, individual victim-survivors’ 
responses to abuse cannot be understood in the abstract. Rather, making sense of such responses 
requires an understanding of the ways in which they are shaped by the structures and discourses 
which characterise the complex social contexts in which they are enacted. I therefore approach 
responses to abuse in the British military community in two primary ways; the first focused on the 
ways in which victim-survivors themselves negotiate their abusive relationships and their 
interactions with support services, and the second more broadly upon the ways in which 
domestic abuse is made sense of within the military space and therefore in which broader work 
to prevent and deal with it can be imagined. These two levels, of course, are deeply 
interconnected; as the ways in which abuse is perceived by policy-makers, support workers, and 
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victim-survivors shapes the services that they make available, recommend, and access. The thesis 
explores the “barriers” to help-seeking experienced by victim-survivor participants in the British 
military community; that is, the social factors which make it difficult for victim-survivors to make 
particular choices or to access particular support services in their attempts to end the abuse and 
to make themselves safe. I identify ways in which these barriers are shaped in particular ways by 
the gendered, everyday social relations which constitute militarism. In addition, I draw attention 
to the dominant ways in which domestic abuse is perceived in the military context; arguing in 
particular that dominant narratives depoliticise abuse by obscuring the social inequalities through 
which it is underpinned and relying instead upon individualised, a-political explanations. I argue 
that this depoliticisation undermines the potential for a broader political engagement with the 
inequalities through which militarism is constituted and, as such, is one of the many sites at which 
militarism is naturalised and reproduced on an everyday basis. This study therefore contends that 
military domestic abuse - in particular, the ways in which it is made sense of and responded to - 
should be approached as part of the gendered practices through which militarism is reproduced 
and, thus, through which wars are fought. 
 
The thesis sets out to engage with the following research questions:   
      
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by discourses of 
gender identity? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by the material 
structures of life in this context? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
• How is the causality of domestic abuse perpetrated by servicemen in the British military 
perceived by participants in this study? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in these 
perceptions? 
 
This study responds to a pronounced lack of research knowledge on domestic abuse in the British 
military, about which this is the first piece of in-depth, qualitative research. That domestic abuse 
is a serious and widespread social problem around the world and in British society is well 
recognised. Globally, an estimated 30% of women who have been in a relationship have 
experienced physical or sexual abuse from a partner
1
 and, according to World Bank data, women 
between the ages of 15 and 44 are more at risk from rape and domestic abuse than from cancer, 
                                                           
1
 www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs239/en, last accessed 10 April 2015. 
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car accidents, war, and malaria
2
. In contemporary Britain, it is estimated that one woman in four 
will experience domestic abuse at some point in her lifetime (Walby and Allen 2004: 12), and an 
average of two women are murdered every week by a partner or former partner in England and 
Wales
3
. Women in Britain are five times as likely as men to be murdered by an intimate partner or 
former partner (Harne and Radford 2008: 40), and 53% of female homicide victims, as opposed to 
4% of their male counterparts, are killed by a partner or former partner (Westmarland 2015: 10). 
While not all of the behaviour which constitutes domestic abuse is criminal, and while less than 
24% of criminal incidents of abuse are reported to the police (Walby and Allen 2004: x), the 
British police receive a call about domestic abuse every minute (Stanko 2001: 219) and domestic 
abuse accounts for 16% of all recorded violent crime in Britain (Richards et al. 2008: 16). In 2014, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women completed a mission to the United 
Kingdom and expressed alarm at the ongoing high rates of such violence, the growing 
governmental tendency to frame violence against women in gender-neutral terms, the 
disproportionate impact of austerity measures on support for women who have experienced 
gender-based violence, and the lack of access to justice with which many victim-survivors are 
faced
4
.  
 
Research from overseas - in particular the US - has suggested that domestic abuse may be a 
quantitatively more prevalent, and qualitatively differently inflected, issue within military 
institutions. Estimates of the prevalence of domestic abuse in the US military vary widely due to 
definitional and methodological differences between studies (Jones 2012: 150); in their review of 
the literature, for example, Marshal et al. report studies finding perpetration rates ranging from 
13.5% to 58% of the military and veteran population (2005; see also Campbell et al. 2003). 
However, studies which compare prevalence rates across US military and civilian populations 
consistently suggest that domestic abuse is significantly more prevalent in military families - in 
many studies, between one and three times higher (Cronin 1995; Griffin and Morgan 1988; 
Heyman and Neidig 1999; Marshall et al. 2005; Pan et al. 1994; Rentz et al. 2006; Rosen et al. 
2002) - and that military abusers are more likely than their civilian counterparts to use severe 
forms of physical violence against their spouses
5
 (Rentz et al. 2006: 103). In addition, as I explore 
in Chapter Two, studies in the US and Canada suggest that there may be a range of factors which 
qualitatively alter domestic abuse in military institutional contexts - both in terms of the motives 
                                                           
2
 www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/endviol/index.shtml, last accessed 10 April 2015. 
3
www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-articles.asp?section=00010001002200410001&itemid=1280, 
last accessed 10 April 2015. 
4
 www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/displaynews.aspx?newsid=14514&, last accessed 21 July 2015.  
5
 http://nsrc.sfsu.edu/article/domestic_violence_troops_military, last accessed 19 November 2011. 
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for its perpetration
6
 (e.g. Bell et al. 2004; Brewster et al. 2002; Byrne and Riggs 1996; Caliber 
Associates 1994; Carroll et al. 1985; Chemtob et al. 1997; Finley et al. 2010; Glenn et al. 2002; 
Graves and Moriarty 2000; Harrison and Laliberté 1994; Harrison 2002, 2006; Hoge et al. 2007; 
Hurlbert et al. 1991; Jones 2012; Jordan et al. 1992; Klostermann et al. 2012; Marshall and 
McShane 2000; Martin et al. 2010; Mercier 2000; Monson et al. 2009; Orcutt et al. 2003; Savarese 
et al. 2001; Sharps et al. 2000; Sherman et al. 2006; Taft et al. 2011; Taft et al. 2013; Verbosky 
and Ryan 1988), and, although this is less well researched, in terms of the ways in which it is 
experienced by victim-survivors (e.g. Erez and Bach 2003; Harrison and Laliberté 1994, 2008; 
Harrison 2002, 2006; Savitsky et al. 2009)
 7
. As I discuss in Chapter Two, with a few notable 
exceptions much of this scholarship is limited in the depth of analysis which it is able to offer, 
because it has failed to take into account insights generated by feminist scholarship on domestic 
abuse more broadly, and by critical military scholarship on forms of sexual and gender-based 
violence in conflict and post-conflict settings.  
 
In comparison to the fairly substantial body of scholarship on domestic abuse in the US (and, to a 
lesser extent, also the Canadian) context, there is a distinct lack of research on domestic abuse in 
the British Armed Forces. There are no studies which specifically set out to estimate the 
prevalence of domestic abuse in the British military; however, two studies focused more broadly 
on the criminality of and violence perpetrated by British military personnel suggest that domestic 
abuse is likely to be a prevalent issue in this context. MacManus et al. (2012) surveyed post-
deployment violence perpetrated by 4,609 personnel, of whom 581 (12.6%) reported 
perpetrating physical violence in the weeks after their return from Iraq - 493 towards someone 
outside of their families, 186 towards someone in their families, and 98 towards both. In addition, 
a 2009 National Association of Probation Officers report stated that among the relatively high 
proportion of ex-service personnel in the criminal justice system, the most common convictions 
related to crimes in the domestic setting. According to the report: “many staff believe that 
military service enhances the risk of domestic violence” (NAPO 2009: 2). While it is not known, 
therefore, whether domestic abuse in the British military presents a statistically more prevalent 
issue than abuse in civilian families, the limited information which is available does suggest that 
abuse is likely to be a significant issue in this context which warrants scholarly attention. Despite 
this, there is only one piece of research prior to this study which sets out specifically to engage 
with experiences of domestic abuse in the British military - a pilot project by Williamson and Price 
(2009; see also Williamson 2011). This pilot project uses a survey methodology to collect mainly 
                                                           
6
 http://nsrc.sfsu.edu/article/domestic_violence_troops_military, last accessed 19 November 2011. 
7
 www.civicresearchinstitute.com/dvr_military.pdf, last accessed 19 November 2011. 
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quantitative data, along with some brief, written qualitative information, intended to ascertain 
the impact of deployment upon domestic abuse. The study provides some useful information, in 
particular around the ways in which elements of military life might lead to difficulties and 
disagreements between service personnel and their spouses. However, as I discuss in Chapter 
Two, it is limited in its capacity to provide in-depth information on the experiences which are of 
interest to this study both by its methodology and by its largely “problem-solving” (see below), 
gender-blind approach, which does not take a critical approach to the military as an institution or 
to militarism more broadly. As such, my study is the first to collect in-depth, qualitative data on 
domestic abuse in the British military from a range of perspectives, as well as to make sense of 
this data through a feminist-informed, critical approach to militarism.  
 
This thesis draws on 45 in-depth, qualitative interviews which I conducted with victim-survivors 
and perpetrators of military domestic abuse as well as with support workers who have experience 
of working with either or both of these groups in civilian, quasi-military, and military roles. 
Interviews focused upon responses to abuse. As I note above, the responses of victim-survivors - 
the ways in which they negotiated their relationships and tried to make themselves safe - is of 
particular importance, and as a result a significant portion of the interview discussions centred 
around the ways in which victim-survivors seek support in order to end the relationship, to end 
the abuse while remaining in the relationship, or to better cope with the abuse experienced. 
When I began the research, I imagined that a focus on the ways in which victim-survivors respond 
to abuse would be a fairly narrow one, which would provide me with an angle through which I 
would be able to map the help-seeking pathways and behaviours of victim-survivors and to 
gather accounts of women’s resistance and agency in relation to domestic abuse. As I had hoped, 
my focus on victim-survivors’ responses to abuse, and in particular on the ways in which they 
sought help, has shed light on how individual victim-survivors perceive abuse, which things they 
classed as sufficiently abusive to seek help, which they did not, and what triggered certain help-
seeking actions. In addition, it has helped me to understand what kind of help is available, in what 
ways it is accessible, and why certain avenues were disregarded. It has also enabled me to discuss 
the particular barriers and opportunities for help-seeking which arise from the military context. 
Moreover, as the research has progressed, I have come to understand responses to abuse as a 
particularly effective window through which to make sense of the social context in which abuse is 
experienced in the British military which, I argue, can tell us important things more broadly about 
abuse and about militarism in contemporary Britain. That is, narratives of responses to abuse can 
act as a tangible ‘hook,’ a lens through which to make statements about gendered social relations 
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and inequalities in the British military more broadly. As I argue in Chapter Two, understanding 
how and why victim-survivors respond in particular ways to abuse requires a wide lens: it requires 
paying attention to the gendered structural inequalities as well as the ideas about gender, 
romance, relationships, and domestic abuse which characterise a particular social context. As a 
result, as I illustrate throughout this thesis, an empirical focus on responses to abuse in the British 
military context, and in particular on the ways in which victim-survivors of abuse seek help, does 
not only tell us narrowly about how victim-survivors decide to respond to abuse - it tells us about 
how these decisions are limited by, and how they negotiate, the gendered structures and 
discourses at work in this space. This allows me to think about gender relations in the British 
military, and about how these are implicated in the political project of militarism more broadly. 
As such, this thesis does not map victim-survivors’ responses to abuse in the sense of charting the 
individual decisions which particular women make; instead, it explores the general trends which 
emerged from discussions of responses and in order to explore the key social factors which shape 
experiences of domestic abuse in the British military setting.  
 
It should be noted that this study does not seek to provide a comparison between responses to 
abuse in the military context and those in the civilian community, and nor does it offer an 
evaluation of military welfare services themselves. Rather, this study is self-consciously “critical” 
rather than “problem-solving” in its approach to the study of domestic abuse in the British 
military. For Cox, problem-solving work “takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social 
and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given 
framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving research is to make these relationships 
and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble.” In 
comparison, critical scholarship “stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how 
that order came about. Critical theory [...] does not take institutions and social power relations 
for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and 
whether they might be in the process of changing. It is directed toward an appraisal of the very 
framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters” 
(Cox 1981: 88-89, cited in Whitworth 2007: 25-26). Critical scholarship recognises the political 
nature of research and of theory making itself, while problem-solving approaches are often 
positivist in approach (Whitworth 2007: 26). In taking a critical approach to my study of domestic 
abuse in the British military, I am setting my work up against much of the existing literature on 
domestic abuse in the US military in particular which, as I demonstrate in Chapter Two, tends to 
focus on specific issues and difficulties which are thought to produce, enable and/or shape 
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military abuse in particular ways - such as the mental ill-health effects of combat - and to try to 
remedy those issues in order to enable the more efficient operation of military institutions. In 
contrast, the critical approach which I take seeks instead to take a step back; to draw attention to 
and to question the inequalities which are woven into the bases of those institutions themselves. 
Because this is a feminist-informed study, this generally means drawing out the gendered 
meanings and inequalities which underpin militarism in the contemporary British context. As 
such, this thesis is less likely to be able to offer concrete suggestions for changes in policy or in 
practice directed at remedying the problem of domestic abuse in the military context than it 
perhaps would have been if I had taken a comparison, evaluation, or otherwise “problem-solving” 
approach. This is not to suggest that no policy-relevant discussions or explorations of support 
practice will emerge from this research. Indeed, as I explore in Chapter Three, the relationship I 
have established with the Army Welfare Service requires that I produce a report tailored towards 
exploring the ways in which the research can contribute to policy discussions and to the 
improvement of support practice, and moreover I consider it part of my ethical duty to my 
interview participants to try to use this study to improve the help-seeking options available to 
victim-survivors if I am able to do so. These discussions, however, are largely beyond the scope of 
the thesis itself. Rather, as I argue in the concluding chapter, the issues raised by the critical 
approach of this thesis are rooted in gendered inequalities which are deeply woven into the 
foundations of militarism itself, and as such, policy recommendations which tinker around the 
edges with minor changes in support practice are unlikely to get to the heart of the problems I 
identify. This, therefore, is a more broadly political than policy-orientated piece of scholarship, 
one which seeks to trouble some of the taken-for-granted assumptions about militarism in 
contemporary Britain.  
 
 
Context: The British military, its families, and its welfare provision  
The social setting with which this thesis is concerned is that of the British Armed Forces. The 
British military is made up of the three services of the Army, the Royal Navy, and the Royal Air 
Force (RAF), all of which fall under the civilian control of the elected government and the Ministry 
of Defence (MOD). The three services have a broadly similar structure: each is divided into 
sections of varying sizes - called Regiments in the Army, Squadrons/Stations in the RAF, and 
Ships/Stations in the Navy - which each have their own subdivisions and command structures as 
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well as histories and traditions
8
. All three services have both a regular and a reserve force - the 
regulars serving full time and reservists part-time, usually around other employment. The three 
services are structured by rank, and while the ranks themselves are labelled differently in the 
Army, Navy and RAF, each is characterised by a binary division between ‘officer ranks’ and ‘other 
ranks.’ The ‘other ranks’ comprise the majority of soldiers, sailors, and airmen/airwomen, who 
enter the military after a period of initial training and who can move up within the ‘other ranks’ as 
they gain more experience and seniority. Those who enter as officers must first complete officer 
training at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth, 
or the Royal Air Force College Cranwell, after which they begin at the lowest officer rank and, 
similarly, work their way up throughout their career. In some cases, those who serve in the ‘other 
ranks’ may enter the officer ranks later in their career, although this is not usual
9
. All three forces 
have begun restructuring in recent years under the Future Force 2020 plan, a process which 
developed from the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). This has entailed, among 
other things, a reorganisation of the locations of military bases across the country and a closure 
of British Army bases in Germany, as well as significant cuts in the numbers of regular personnel 
across the three services
10
 and an increasing reliance on reservists
11
. 
 
While deployment is not the focus of this thesis, it is important to note that the British military is 
one which has fought in recent years in difficult and costly wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
war in Afghanistan began in October 2001 and the last of the British fighting troops withdrew in 
October 2014, although some training elements remain in Kabul
12
. The Iraq War began in 2003 
and British troops left the country in 2011 - although again, smaller numbers are now being 
redeployed to train local forces in the fight against the so-called Islamic State
13
. Between 1 
January 2001 and 31 March 2014, 220,550 individuals were deployed as British military personnel 
across the three services to Iraq, Afghanistan, or both
14
. In addition to countless Afghanis, Iraqis, 
                                                           
8
 www.army.mod.uk/structure/structure.aspx; www.raf.mod.uk/organisation/index.cfm; 
www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/where-we-are/navy-command-hq, last accessed 2 May 2015. 
9
 www.army.mod.uk/structure/32321.aspx; www.raf.mod.uk/recruitment/about-the-raf/structure/; 
www.royalnavy.mod.uk/brochures/royal-navy/ranks-and-roles, last accessed 2 May 2015. 
10
 www.army.mod.uk/structure/33834.aspx, last accessed 22 July 2015.  
11
 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30033506, last accessed 22 July 2015.  
12
 www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/10399386/Afghanistans-Sandhurst-in-the-Sand-
opens-its-doors.html, last accessed 22 July 2015. 
13
 www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/iraq-britain-to-send-an-extra-125-troops-to-provide-training-
to-security-forces-david-cameron-announces-10303527.html, last accessed 22 July 2015 
14
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/360627/PUBLIC_1411731267.p
df, last accessed 22 July 2015. 
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and significant numbers of allied troops, 453 British forces and MOD employed civilian personnel 
died while serving in Afghanistan
15
, and 179 in Iraq
16
. 
 
Military personnel and their families  
While the British military has traditionally been populated by white, (presumed) heterosexual 
men, this profile has begun to gradually change in recent years, and I offer here a brief 
exploration of these changes in order to provide some demographic context on the institutional 
space which is my focus in this thesis. After the institution faced serious criticism for its racism in 
the late 1990s, changes in policy led to a marked increase in the representation of ethnic 
minorities among military personnel. At present, ethnic minority personnel make up 2.4% of 
officers and 8.1% of other ranks across the three services - a total of 7.1% of all regular personnel  
(10.3% of the Army, 3.5% of the Navy, and 2.1% of the RAF) (Rutherford and Berman 2014: 8-9). A 
significant portion of ethnic minority personnel in the British military are not British citizens, but 
citizens of the 54 Commonwealth nations
17
 who, between 1998 and 2013, were eligible to enlist 
directly from their countries of origin (Dandeker and Mason 2001: 221-24; Ware 2012: 39-41, 85-
86; Woodward and Winter 2006: 49, 53). In 2002/2003, around 60% of black and minority ethnic 
recruits were ‘Foreign and Commonwealth’ (F&C) personnel (Mason and Dandeker 2009: 398). At 
present, Commonwealth citizens have to have lived in the UK for five years before they are 
eligible to join the British military, and while serving they are exempt from UK immigration 
control under Section 8(4)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971. They can apply for Indefinite Leave to 
Remain - a permanent immigration status which allows an individual to access employment and 
benefits without restriction - after they have been serving for four years, and can apply for British 
citizenship after they have served for five years (there are some exceptions to this rule, for 
example if they leave the forces as a result of injury in the line of duty)
 18
. In the Army, the service 
with the highest representation of F&C personnel, Commonwealth soldiers made up around 7% 
of regular personnel in 2014, the majority of whom were citizens of the Republic of Fiji
19
. 
 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) individuals have been allowed to serve openly in 
the British military since 2000, after the European Court of Human Rights ruled against the MOD’s 
policy of discrimination. Since then, the military has won praise for becoming a supportive 
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employer of LGBT personnel, and at the beginning of 2015 all three services were recognised by 
campaign group Stonewall in its list of Britain’s top 100 LGBT-friendly workplaces
20
. Since the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004, LGBT couples have been able to access the institutional services and 
facilities discussed below on the same basis as their heterosexual counterparts (Ball 2010: 22-24). 
The military began asking recruits about their sexual orientation and gender identity at the end of 
2014 in an attempt to support greater diversity in the Armed Forces
21
; at present, however, there 
are no available statistics on the numbers of LGBT personnel in the British military. Despite 
evident progress, scholars have suggested that the British military remains a presumptively 
heterosexual space in which homophobia is a significant problem. Basham suggests that LGBT 
identity has since 2000 been cast as a private matter, irrelevant to military service, in a move 
which protects and sustains the heteronormativity of military culture (Basham 2009; see also 
Dandeker and Freedman 2002: 473), and others have argued that heteronormativity remains a 
central tenet of “fratiarchal” unit-bonding practices (Higate 2012; see also Basham 2008: 158-
159). In 2009, Atherton’s soldier-participants suggested that the Army remains as homophobic as 
it was twenty years previously (Atherton 2009: 826). 
 
The proportion of women in the British military has been gradually increasing over recent years. 
In 1980, women made up 4.8% of officers and 5.0% of other ranks in the regular military forces; 
by 1990 that number had risen to 5.9% of officers and 5.6% of other ranks. By 2014, women 
accounted for 12.7% of officers and 9.4% of other ranks - a total of 10% across the regular forces 
for the first time (Rutherford and Berman 2014: 9). At the time of writing, women remain 
officially excluded from certain roles within the Armed Forces, including those in the infantry 
battalions and armoured regiments in the Army, as well as some in the Royal Marines and in the 
RAF Regiment. In the Army - which has a greater proportion of male-only roles than the RAF or 
the Navy - women remain excluded from “ground close combat” roles - that is, “Roles that are 
primarily intended and designed with the purpose of requiring individuals on the ground to close 
with and kill the enemy.
22
” In recent years, the rationale for continuing to exclude women from 
these roles has focused less on whether women would be able to do the job than on the 
disruptive effect on unit bonding that their presence might have
23
; that is, less on women’s 
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physical or psychological abilities - on what women can do - than on an essentialised notion of 
their presence as women - on what they are (Woodward and Winter 2007: 54-56). At present, 
this exclusion is undergoing a further review
24
 in the wake of the US military lifting its similar ban 
in 2013
25
 
26
, and it seems to be largely felt, in large parts of the British media at least, that the ban 
is likely to be lifted
27
.  
 
While the profile of the British military is changing, then, this is a slow process and the institution 
remains, in Basham’s words, one which “continues to privilege white, heterosexual male ways of 
being over those of ‘others’” (Basham 2009: 412). Basham contends that military policies frame 
“diversity” as an external force which must be properly managed in order to ensure that those 
from non-traditional recruitment pools can be absorbed into the forces without challenging their 
traditional practices and values (Basham 2008: 729). As a result, while change is happening, 
Basham argues that the normative British serviceperson remains white, male, and (presumed) 
heterosexual, and those who do not fit this mould continue to be cast as ‘other;’ to be 
hypervisible; and to have their motivations for service questioned more than their white, male, 
(presumed) heterosexual counterparts (ibid.: 151-52). As such, “[w]hen the military defends its 
right to maintain a distinctive identity, it is guarding a white, masculine heterosexual one” (ibid.: 
152).  
 
In December 2014, 43.7% of British regular forces personnel were married or in a civil 
partnership
28
. While statistics on the gender of the non-serving spouses of personnel are not 
available, it is not controversial to state that the overwhelming majority of these non-serving 
spouses are (presumed heterosexual) women; indeed the ‘military wife’ - whether singing in a 
choir
29
, or mourning a husband killed in action
30
 - has become an easily recognisable cultural 
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figure. Civilian women married to servicemen are not themselves members of the Armed Forces; 
however, they are recognised by both civilian and military authorities as part of the military 
community. The Armed Forces Covenant, for example, defines the “Armed Forces Community” as 
“Serving Personnel, Families, Veterans, and Bereaved” (Ministry of Defence 2011a: 3). Moreover, 
the Covenant notes that “Service families give up certain freedoms and choices in order to 
support the Service” (ibid.: 8) and additionally that “the whole nation has a moral obligation to 
the members of the Naval Service, the Army, and the Royal Air Force, together with their families” 
(ibid.: 1, emphasis mine).  
 
Reflecting the recognition, perhaps, that families form an important part of the military 
community, the institution offers a range of services and facilities to the immediate families of its 
personnel - defined as married or registered civil partners, along with dependent children (Higate 
and Cameron 2004: 212). One of the most important of these is the provision of family housing 
known as Service Family Accommodation (SFA). SFA is provided either ‘behind the wire’ on the 
serving person’s duty station (the military base to which they are posted) or in a ‘patch’ - an area 
of military housing within 10 miles of the duty station. The type of house, sometimes referred to 
as a ‘quarter’ or a ‘pad,’ to which a service member is entitled depends on multiple factors 
including both family size and rank
31
. Personnel who are eligible for SFA are those who are 
registered on the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system as Personal Status Categories 
(PStat Cat) 1 or 2
32
 - those who are legally married or in a civil partnership and who are not 
separated, and those who are the primary carers for dependent children. Those who fall into 
PStat Cats 3, 4 or 5 - who are not in a legally recognised marriage or civil partnership - are not 
entitled to SFA, but instead are eligible for Single Living Accommodation (SLA); a single room with 
an en suite bathroom and access to a shared dining facility usually provided in a Mess or an 
accommodation block ‘behind the wire’ of the duty station itself (Ministry of Defence 2015 b). 
While not all personnel who are entitled to SFA take it up, a significant proportion do: in August 
2014, 70% of Army families, 55% of RAF families, and 35% Naval families lived in SFA at least 
during the week (Ministry of Defence 2014: 3). The difference in levels of take-up across the 
services is largely explained by the differential career and service patterns across the three 
Forces, as Army and RAF careers tend to require more regular geographical relocations - in some 
cases, every two or three years - than their Navy equivalents (ibid.: 3).  
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In addition, the British military also offers various services to its personnel and their families, 
including policing services and a broad range of welfare provision, which victim-survivors of 
domestic abuse in this context may draw upon in seeking help. Indeed, when families are posted 
abroad, for example to Germany or to Cyprus, it is likely that the services proved by the military 
will be the only ones available to victim-survivors of abuse. When they are stationed in the UK, 
however, civilian women married to servicemen are able to access a broader range of military, 
civilian, and quasi-military sources of support. For context, therefore, these three groups of 
services are briefly mapped below.  
 
Military support services  
The three services of the Army, Navy, and RAF all operate what the institution refers to as a ‘two 
line’ system of welfare - the first line dealing with straightforward matters, and the second with 
those that are more complex. Domestic abuse may come to the attention of either or both of 
these lines of welfare provision - although, when it comes to the attention of first-line providers it 
should usually be referred on to second-line services. First-line welfare provision - which handles 
simple matters such as problems with SFA - is primarily provided by Divisional Officers in the 
Navy, Personnel Staffs in the RAF, and Unit Welfare Officers (UWOs) in the Army. These are all 
serving personnel, who are part of the unit of which the serving spouse is a member and who 
remain part of the Chain of Command. Divisional Officers and Personnel Staffs function like line 
managers, and their taking care of the basic welfare of those who serve below them is seen as 
part of this line management role
33
. Similarly, Unit Welfare Officers in the Army are not welfare 
specialists, but take on the welfare role for one posting as part of their path to promotion, and in 
most cases will have other, more minor roles in addition to the welfare one (personal 
communication, quasi-military support worker). Unit Welfare Officers receive a two-week training 
course run by the Army Welfare Service before they take up their post, providing knowledge on 
how welfare issues should be dealt with (Hyde and Gray 2015). Other first-line welfare providers 
include chaplains
34
 and the HIVE information centres
35
.The broader Chain of Command is also 
considered to be a first-line welfare service, as “The Commanding Officer’s duty to maintain the 
operational capability of his/her unit requires them to be responsible for the discipline and 
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welfare of his or her personnel” (Ministry of Defence 2011b: 11). In addition, Commanding 
Officers also have a disciplinary role in relation to the personnel in their command. In cases where 
servicemen have been found to have perpetrated domestic abuse, Commanding Officers exercise 
considerable discretion - depending on whether a criminal conviction has been obtained and on 
the severity of the office - about whether to enforce an administrative punishment in addition to 
any criminal punishment which may be imposed
36
 (Ministry of Defence 2011b: 19).  
 
The second line of military welfare support is primarily provided by the specialist welfare 
providers of the Army Welfare Service (AWS), Royal Naval and Royal Marines (RNRM) Welfare 
(previously known as the Naval Personnel and Families Service), and the SSAFA (previously called 
the Soldiers, Sailors, Airman and Families Association) Personal Support and Social Work Service 
(RAF). These services deal with more complex and/or ongoing welfare issues such as relationship 
problems, mental health concerns, and substance abuse. Personnel in these three services 
operate alongside and in support of, but importantly outside, the Chain of Command. This gives 
these services a greater degree of independence from the military institution and from the 
Commanding Officers in the unit of the personnel in question, and a greater ability, therefore, to 
prioritise the focus on the individual over those of the military. It is important to note, however, 
that the reason d’être of these organisations remains the support of the military institution itself. 
The Army Welfare Service mission statement, for example, is:  
 
To provide a comprehensive, professional and confidential welfare support service 
responsive to the needs of individuals, families, and the Chain of Command in order 
to maximise the operational effectiveness of servicemen and women.  
 
(Research interview with military support worker) 
 
Organisationally, the AWS and RNRM Welfare are fairly similar, so much so that those who join 
them train together on a seven-month intensive course. The course consists of a supervised 
placement sandwiched between two shorter periods of residential, classroom based learning. 
75% of the AWS, and 50% of the RNRM Welfare, are military personnel who have chosen to train 
as welfare workers, and who will progress in rank within the welfare team from that point on and 
remain in a welfare role for the remainder of their military careers. The remaining 25% of the 
AWS and 50% of RNRM Welfare are civilians. Both organisations offer support similar to a generic 
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social work service, with the exception that they do not have a statutory responsibility, which 
means, for example, that while they do work with some forms of child protection, there are some 
cases such as those concerning serious child protection issues in which they would have to liaise 
with the local authority (research interview with military welfare worker). Personnel and their 
families may be referred to these organisations by any of the first-line welfare providers or by 
other organisations, or alternatively they may refer themselves. Unlike the Army and the Navy, 
the RAF does not run its own specialist welfare provision but instead outsources its second-line 
welfare to SSAFA, a military charity which provides a range of support to military families more 
broadly. This service is called the SSAFA Personal Support and Social Work Service (RAF), and it 
provides a UK based, confidential personal support and social work service to RAF personnel and 
their families. The support is provided on a regional basis, and all RAF stations above a certain size 
have a SSAFA worker. Military personnel and their families may be referred to this service by a 
range of agencies, or they may self-refer by accessing their local support team directly
37
.  
 
Quasi-military support services  
Military personnel and their families may also be able to access second-line welfare support from 
organisations which I refer to as ‘quasi-military’ - that is, those which are outside the military 
institution and are staffed by civilians rather than by serving personnel, but which work 
exclusively with military personnel and their families. These include military charities such as 
SSAFA, the Royal British Legion (RBL), the Army Benevolent Fund, and Combat Stress. Some of 
these organisations, including SSAFA and the RBL, may be able to offer support to victim-survivors 
of abuse in the form of small grants which help them to move away from the abusive situation 
and rebuild their lives elsewhere
38
. Military families can also turn for support to the Army, Navy, 
and RAF Families Federations - independent organisations who can offer information and advice 
and who also lobby the institutional hierarchies for change
39
. One of the most relevant quasi-
military organisations in relation to domestic abuse is SSAFA; a large military charity which runs a 
wide range of services including family support groups, mentoring programmes, bereavement 
support, and a confidential telephone and email helpline service called Forcesline
40
. SSAFA runs 
two Stepping Stones Homes in secret locations within the UK which can function for victim-
survivors in a similar way to refuges (see below). Stepping Stones Homes offer temporary housing 
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to women (and their children) with a military connection who find themselves temporarily 
homeless. This includes former servicewomen and others who have come upon hard times, but 
residents mostly consist of civilian women whose relationship with a service person has broken 
down, often as a result of domestic abuse, leaving them with nowhere to go upon leaving their 
SFA quarter
41
 (personal communication with quasi-military support worker). Importantly, unlike 
mainstream refuges, the SSAFA Stepping Stones homes are able to support women with no 
recourse to public funds - those who, because of their immigration status, are unable to access 
benefits (see Chapter Two). Referrals to SSAFA Stepping Stones homes can only be made by a 
welfare agency of some kind; victim-survivors cannot self-refer
42
.  
  
Civilian support services  
Military personnel and their families may also seek second-line welfare support through civilian 
agencies, of which there are a multiplicity. As noted above, it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
provide a comparison between military and civilian services in response to domestic abuse, and 
moreover, as I discuss in Chapter Six, the overwhelming majority of victim-survivors in this study 
chose to access military or quasi-military rather than civilian support services when seeking help 
for the abuse they experienced - as a result, the scope for thorough exploration of civilian services 
here is limited. It is, however, worth offering a very brief outline of some of these support 
services for the purposes of context, and because military welfare services do at times operate in 
connection with these organisations.  
 
Many victim-survivors of abuse seek support through what Coy et al. refer to as “specialist” 
services - those “whose primary work is supporting women who have experienced violence” 
(2011: 406). Specialist violence against women services emerged from the Women’s Movement 
in the 1960s and 1970s and are orientated not only towards offering support to an individual 
victim-survivor of abuse but also towards the broader goals of widespread social change and the 
prevention of gendered violence (Coy et al. 2011; Dobash and Dobash 1992: 16, 29). In 2009, Coy 
et al. identified a total of 835 specialist services concerned with violence against women in 
England, Scotland, and Wales, of which 73.3% were domestic abuse services. The study found 
that, largely because of insufficient sustainable funding, service provision was lacking - in 
particular in relatively under populated rural areas. 26.5% of local authorities did not provide any 
specialist support services at all, 31.3% had no domestic abuse services, and 89% had no 
specialised domestic abuse services for black and minority ethnic women (Coy et al. 2011: 407-
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409). Where they do exist, specialist services include refuges, outreach support, and Independent 
Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVAs). Refuges are safe houses for women and children
43
 fleeing 
abuse. Their locations are secret in order to protect the safety of their residents, and in addition 
to this physical safety they offer emotional support and formal counselling, safety planning, help 
with accessing benefits, healthcare services, and support in finding permanent housing
44
. Refuge 
services are largely funded through state benefits claimed on behalf of the women staying in 
them
45
. Outreach (also known as Floating Support) services offer support to women who are not 
staying in refuge accommodation, whether they remain in the abusive relationship or not. 
Outreach workers meet with women either in their homes or in another convenient and discrete 
location to help them to plan for their safety, to give them information about their rights and the 
options available to them, to support them in going to court if they choose to do so, and to offer 
emotional support
46
. Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVAs) support women at the 
highest risk of serious assault to navigate the legal system and to stay safe
47
. Finally, the National 
Domestic Violence Helpline is a free-phone, 24 hour telephone service which is run in partnership 
by national charities Women’s Aid and Refuge, and which offers emotional support, practical 
information, and referrals to any of the services listed above
48
. While specialist service provision 
has focused mainly on offering support to victim-survivors of abuse, there also exist specialist 
domestic abuse perpetrator programmes which aim to help male perpetrators of abuse to change 
their behaviour. Some perpetrator programmes - known as Integrated Domestic Abuse 
Programmes (IDAPs) - can be court-mandated as an alternative to other forms of punishment or 
as part of probation (Bullock et al. 2010); while others are undertaken on a voluntary basis. These 
are not anger management programmes, but instead are based on feminist principals and aim to 
change the attitudes and behaviours of abusive men, helping them to build healthy and respectful 
relationships in order promote the safety and wellbeing of women and children (Phillips et al. 
2013; Westmarland et al. 2010). In addition to these specialist services, victim-survivors of abuse 
may also come into contact with more generic, statutory services which may support them 
through abuse. Examples of these may include the police - discussed below - Victim Support, and 
local authority children’s services.  
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Policing  
Victim-survivors and perpetrators of domestic abuse may also come into contact with policing 
services at some point - and depending on where they are stationed, military personnel and their 
families may have access to multiple police services. All of these police forces have a duty to take 
domestic abuse seriously, and are expected to take “positive action” in response to incidents of 
domestic abuse - that is, to make an arrest when there is grounds to do so (National Policing 
Improvement Agency 2008: 26; Ministry of Defence 2011b: 18). Personnel and their families who 
are stationed in the UK can access their local Home Office police force in the same way as any 
civilian would be able to. It should be noted that while Home Office forces have improved their 
practice in recent years and many now have specialist Domestic Violence Units or Community 
Safety Units made up of officers specially trained to respond to domestic abuse, there remain 
serious inadequacies in many forces, as was reflected in the highly critical 2014 report of Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (HMIC 2014). 
 
In addition to the Home Office police, military personnel and their families may also come into 
contact with the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP), and the Service police - the Royal Military 
Police (RMPs) in the Army, the Royal Navy Police (RNP), and the Royal Air Force Police (RAF 
Police). The MDP are civilians who have the same powers and training as Home Office police 
officers. In addition, many have specialist training and duties related to their specific role as MDP 
- the majority, for example, are firearms trained. This police force operates across the country 
and in some military missions overseas to protect military people, assets, information, and 
estates. Their jurisdiction covers any land and property in the UK which is owned by the MOD or 
being used for defence purposes, and any individuals who are employed by the MOD or subject 
to Service law. Primarily, the MDP provides specialist policing at MOD sites around the UK, 
including military bases, atomic weapons sites, and the MOD headquarters in Whitehall
49
. 
Members of the RMP, RNP and RAF Police, by comparison, are all military personnel who are 
members of the policing corps within their chosen service. They are part of the rank system, and 
can expect to climb the ranks of the military police as their career progresses. The Service Police 
take on many of the same functions as civilian Home Office police, doing day to day policing work 
in base and patch communities. However, technically the Service police only have jurisdiction 
over serving personnel themselves and not over their civilian families. That is, while the RMP, RNP 
or RAF Police would have the jurisdiction to act if abuse was being perpetrated by one military 
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service person against another, they would not have jurisdiction over the civilian wife of a serving 
person who committed a crime - and the perpetration of abuse by serving personnel against their 
non-serving spouses seems to be somewhat of a grey area (research interview with military 
support worker). In practice, the most readily available of the police forces should respond when 
a criminal offence is reported in order to take immediate action, and responsibility for taking the 
case forward should be decided after discussions between whichever forces operate in the 
particular area in question (Ministry of Defence 2011b: 18). Work to standardise the working 
relationships between military and civilian police forces is currently underway, following the 
model of a joint working protocol signed in 2012 between civilian and military police forces in 
Hampshire (research interview, civilian support worker). Overseas, however, there is no access to 
Home Office police, and the service police must therefore take jurisdiction over the civilian 
families of service personnel (Ministry of Defence 2011c: 5).  
 
Institutional responses to domestic abuse  
The British military is not ignorant of domestic abuse, and has taken steps to respond to abuse 
within its ranks. The official policy on domestic abuse - the Tri-Service Policy on Domestic Abuse 
and Sexual Violence, known as JSP913 (Ministry of Defence 2011c) - was written under the 2010 
wider governmental approach to End Violence against Women and Girls
50
. JSP913 provides the 
policy framework within which the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defence, and the welfare 
institutions working within the military community both in the UK and overseas operate in 
relation to domestic abuse. It applies to anyone subject to Service Law, as well as to civilians 
subject to Service Discipline overseas. The policy takes a strong rhetorical stance, stating that the 
military takes a “zero tolerance” approach to domestic abuse and that “Domestic abuse by 
Service personnel is not to be tolerated” (ibid.: 9). The policy echoes broader governmental 
approaches to and definitions of domestic abuse, although in comparison to the terminology 
used in the governmental programme End Violence against Women and Girls (British Government 
2014) under which it was written, it takes a somewhat more gender-neutral approach. While 
JSP913 recognises the statistically higher victimisation of women and girls and indicates that 
male-dominated culture may play a role (Ministry of Defence 2011c: 4), it is gender neutral in 
tone and is careful to point to the potential for men and boys also to become victims of domestic 
abuse, stating that “Domestic violence occurs irrespective of actual or perceived ethnicity, class, 
sexuality/sexual orientation, age, rank, religion, gender, gender identity and mental or physical 
ability” (ibid.: 5). In many ways, the document reflects broader governmental approaches to 
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 www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118150/vawg-paper.pdf, last 
accessed 22 April 2015. 
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domestic abuse - it echoes, for example, broader policies on child safeguarding
51
 and calls for the 
participation of military welfare personnel in local domestic abuse forums (ibid.: 10-12, 17-18). In 
addition, JSP913 also recognises some of the ways in which individuals within the service 
community may experience abuse differently to their civilian counterparts; noting for example, 
that commanders may need to be especially vigilant around the time of major deployments 
(Ministry of Defence 2011c: 9-10) (for discussion, see Chapter Seven). Finally, the document 
outlines the various agencies which might play a role in supporting service personnel and their 
families who experience domestic abuse - such as those outlined above - including those within 
the institution as well as mainstream civilian services and quasi-military organisations.  
 
Efforts have been made within this policy framework at both a single service and a tri-service 
level to increase awareness of abuse and to support victim-survivors and perpetrators in seeking 
help.  In 2012, the British Defence Film Library produced a short film aimed at service personnel, 
their families, the Chain of Command, line managers and welfare specialists, which outlines what 
domestic abuse is, emphasises that it is not to be tolerated within the Armed Forces, and maps 
out some of the services which are available to victim-survivors and to perpetrators - including 
civilian and quasi-military services, but with an emphasis on military sources of support (British 
Defence Film Library 2012). Following this, in March 2015 the Ministry of Defence launched a new 
website developed with funding from the Armed Forces Covenant (LIBOR) fund to provide 
information on support and guidance to those in the Armed Forces community who experience 
domestic abuse
52
. The website provides information on what domestic abuse is, the effects it can 
have, and the kinds of support available, and once again emphasises that “Domestic abuse is not 
tolerated within the Armed Forces.” It also provides a useful handbook for civilian services 
working with military perpetrators and victim-survivors of domestic abuse, which notes some of 
the barriers to seeking support which may be particularly relevant to this group as well as 
introducing the key military support services and offering tips on how best to work with the 
military community
53
. Other positive initiatives at the tri-service level include the creation in 
September 2014 of a new post of Domestic Abuse Champion at the Headquarters of British 
Forces Germany. The aim of introducing the post was to create a multi-agency response to 
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suffer significant harm - likely to include those living in households where domestic abuse is taking place - 
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domestic abuse, improving training and mirroring best practice in the UK (personal 
communication, quasi-military support worker). Finally, at the single-service level, the Army in 
particular has shown an interest in and a willingness to speak out about domestic abuse in recent 
years. In August 2014, for example, an Army Briefing Note was sent to all Army personnel to 
reinforce its position on abuse, reminding personnel of their duties under child safeguarding 
legislation and noting once again that “domestic abuse is NOT to be treated as a purely private 
matter” (British Army 2014, emphasis in original). 
 
 
Sequence of Chapters 
This thesis explores domestic abuse in the British Armed Forces over a total of eight chapters. 
Chapter Two reviews the main bodies of literature which are of interest to this thesis - feminist-
informed literature on domestic abuse and, in particular, on help-seeking in response to abuse; 
literature on sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings; and literature 
specifically concerned with domestic abuse in military institutions. I identify two main gaps in the 
literature which this study begins to redress. The first, an empirical gap, consists of a lack of 
literature which focuses specifically on responses to abuse in the British military context. In 
particular, I illustrate the lack of empirical knowledge about the barriers to help-seeking which 
limit victim-survivors’ ability to respond to abuse in ways which make themselves safe - 
something which civilian scholarship on domestic abuse has highlighted as particularly important. 
In addition, I also illustrate a conceptual gap in the literature in that, with a few exceptions, there 
is a lack of scholarship on domestic abuse in military institutions which takes seriously the role of 
gender and of gendered militarism in shaping responses to domestic abuse in military contexts. I 
draw on the insights of feminist scholarship on domestic abuse, and on scholarship on sexual and 
gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings, to argue that the application of these 
lenses to studies of domestic abuse in military institutions would be beneficial. This chapter also 
lays out the research questions which the study seeks to answer.  
 
Chapter Three offers an exploration of the methodological approach of this study. The chapter 
outlines the feminist-informed, qualitative, post-positivist approach which I take to the research. 
It explores my personal investment in the study and the impact this has had upon the questions I 
have sought to ask and the types of knowledge I have sought to produce; noting in particular that 
the research begins from a political start-point, one which encourages me to centre the 
experiences of victim-survivors and to approach the study in a critical as opposed to a problem-
 29 
 
solving manner. I discuss the processes through which I gained access, sampled participants, and 
conducted and analysed in-depth, qualitative interviews with victim-survivors and perpetrators of 
abuse and with support workers in military, quasi-military, and civilian roles, and reflect upon 
how the decisions I made throughout the process of the study have shaped the findings and the 
analysis presented. One of the main focuses of this chapter is the ethical balancing processes 
which I have undertaken throughout the course of the research, in particular the steps taken with 
the aim of ensuring the safety and wellbeing of participants.  
 
Chapter Four moves to a discussion of the theoretical framework through which I make sense of 
the interview narratives collected for this study, focusing in particular on a theoretical 
engagement with gender, power, domestic abuse, and militarism. The chapter lays out the dual 
approach to power and to gender - combining structural and post-structural approaches - which 
helps me to build a nuanced understanding of the complex experiences of participants in this 
study. I explore the interest of this thesis in forms of violence and abuse on both the intimate and 
the geopolitical stage, and argue for a model for understanding the two as innately intertwined 
together. The chapter takes care to emphasise the political nature of domestic abuse and of 
militarism, suggesting that both are socially constructed phenomena which work through and 
function to reproduce social inequalities. I argue that the use of violence in both domestic abuse 
and militarism is motivated towards the acquisition and maintenance of dominance and control 
over an ‘other.’ Domestic abuse is therefore theorised not in terms of incidents of violent or 
abusive behaviours, but as the gendered patterns of abusive behaviour which perpetrators build 
up in order to establish control over their intimate partners. Similarly, I conceive of militarism as 
the normalised, everyday, gendered social relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, 
political domination and control for which the use of organised violence is a viable option (see 
Stavrianakis and Selby 2013: 3). The chapter finishes with an exploration of the British military 
institution as a heteronormative space in which there exists particular idealised models of 
masculinity and femininity which are, in important ways, formulated through and in support of 
the norms of gendered militarism.  
 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven offer analyses of the empirical materials collected for this thesis; 
with Chapters Five and Six focused on the barriers to help-seeking faced by victim-survivors in this 
context, and Chapter Seven zooming out somewhat to explore the depoliticised ways in which 
abuse is understood - and therefore responded to - within the military community more broadly. 
Chapter Five draws upon post-structural approaches to explore how victim-survivor participants 
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in this study make sense of their experiences through their understandings of their gendered 
identities and those of their abusers. Paying attention to the affective attachment which many of 
the victim-survivor participants in this study expressed towards their identities as ‘military wives,’ 
I investigate how their responses to abuse were shaped by the ways in which they are held 
accountable through the workings of disciplinary power to military ideals of gender identity. In 
particular I focus on the norms of stoicism and strength and on the expectation that civilian 
women married to servicemen will offer support to the military career, and show how these 
ideals act as a barrier to help-seeking by discouraging victim-survivors from reaching out for help. 
Similarly, I explore the dominant ways in which the gender identities of military servicemen are 
understood. I draw upon the interview narratives collected for this thesis to demonstrate that 
these understandings, too, produce barriers to help-seeking by making it difficult to recognise 
abuse as abuse and, in some cases, by producing particular levels of fear about the possible 
repercussions of seeking help. I emphasise the rootedness of the norms of gendered identity in 
the British military context in the political project of militarism writ large, noting that these norms 
are not merely coincidental but play important roles in enabling and legitimating militarism itself.  
 
Chapter Six employs a structural approach. It seeks to understand the impact upon victim-
survivors’ responses to abuse of the structural inequalities between servicemen and the civilian 
women who are married to them. The chapter argues that civilian women married to servicemen 
are positioned by the structures of military life in a precarious situation in liminal space on the 
borders of the military community. Through a discussion of the provision of housing and of 
welfare support, I illustrate that the structures by which these services are provided 
simultaneously bring civilian women married to servicemen into the military community and 
prevent them from occupying a full and equal status within it. As such, these women occupy a 
disempowered, precarious space on the borders of the community, which produces particular 
barriers to seeking help in response to domestic abuse. Specifically, I suggest that the threat of 
homelessness, and the difficulty of finding welfare support which prioritises the needs of victim-
survivors themselves, prevents many from seeking help. Again, I emphasise that the structures 
through which civilian women married to servicemen find themselves thus disempowered are not 
random or coincidental, but are rooted in important ways within, and are constitutive of, the 
social relations of inequality which constitute militarism. 
 
Chapter Seven steps back somewhat from the empirical focus on specific barriers to help-seeking 
which is offered in the preceding two chapters, and instead draws attention to some of the ways 
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in which domestic abuse is understood within the British military community more broadly. This 
does, of course, have an important impact upon responses to abuse, because the ways in which 
abuse is perceived shapes the ways it is responded to, both by individual victim-survivors and on 
a wider scale. However, my analysis in this chapter is primarily concerned with the 
depoliticisation of domestic abuse in the British military - that is, the ways in which it is 
understood not as a political issue rooted in gendered social inequalities which is requiring of 
political solutions, but as an individual, pathological, ‘cultural’ or otherwise non-political concern. 
The chapter explores three clusters of depoliticising narratives which emerged from my 
interviews: ‘cultural’ narratives which ‘other’ domestic abuse from the mainstream culture of the 
British military by identifying it as overwhelmingly perpetrated by Fijian personnel; pathologising 
narratives which treat abuse as extraordinary by attributing it to the mental health effects of 
combat; and gender-neutral narratives which strip the gendered politics from understandings of 
abuse. These three clusters of narratives, I argue, make it difficult to engage politically with 
domestic abuse in this context. Moreover, I suggest that while a political analysis of military 
domestic abuse could threaten the naturalisation of the social relations of militarism by exposing 
the everyday inequalities through which they are constituted, depoliticising approaches which 
abstract this abuse from the everyday gendered relations of militarism serve to naturalise these 
very social relations. As a result, I identify depoliticised responses to military domestic abuse as 
one of the many sites through which militarism is reproduced on an everyday basis.  
 
The final chapter in this thesis returns to the gaps in the literature identified in Chapter Two to 
reflect upon the three main arguments and clusters of findings produced by the thesis and their 
wider implications, and to highlight the empirical and conceptual contributions which this study 
makes to the literature. I begin by reflecting on the empirical contribution that the study makes 
to the literature by providing in-depth, qualitative data on the lived experiences of domestic 
abuse in the British military context; in particular, on the barriers to help-seeking with which 
victim-survivors in this context are faced. Next, I discuss the conceptual interventions which my 
study makes in taking seriously the role of gender and of gendered militarism in shaping 
experiences of domestic abuse in the British military. I draw together the arguments presented in 
the preceding chapters to argue that the particular ways in which domestic abuse is experienced 
in the British military context are neither coincidental nor apolitical, but rather, are shaped and 
produced by the gendered social relations of militarism. Moreover, I argue that experiences of 
domestic abuse in this context are not only shaped by militarism in a unidirectional fashion, but 
rather that the ways in which domestic abuse is understood and responded to in this context 
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function to reproduce militarism. Therefore, I suggest that domestic abuse is something which is 
implicated in the production of militarism - and therefore of war - itself. Finally, the chapter 
reflects on some of the weaknesses of the research, pointing towards the gaps it leaves and the 
questions it poses for further study.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review:  
The gap in knowledge  
 
This chapter reviews the main bodies of literature to which my thesis contributes and which 
provide the grounds from which my research questions emerge. By identifying gaps in the existing 
literature, it illustrates the process through which the questions which drive this research have 
been developed, and thus lays the ground from which the rest of the thesis will grow. The chapter 
engages with three bodies of literature. The first two - feminist-informed literature on domestic 
abuse, and literature concerned with sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-
conflict settings - are important to this thesis because the insights they provide inform my 
approach to the study. Moreover, they also point to weaknesses and gaps in the third body of 
literature with which I engage in this chapter: that specifically concerned with domestic abuse in 
military institutions. Very little research has been conducted on domestic abuse in the British 
Armed Forces. There is, however, a small amount of work in the Canadian context, and a large 
body of scholarship on the United States military
54
. By way of an introduction, I begin to map 
below the existing research on domestic abuse in these three military institutions. I pay particular 
attention to British scholarship, and limit myself to a sketch of the parameters of work on the US 
and Canadian Forces. 
 
There exists very little research into domestic abuse in the British military. Aside from the two 
broader studies on criminality and violence perpetrated by military personnel mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis, which suggest that domestic abuse occurs at significant levels within 
British military families (MacManus et al. 2012; NAPO 2009), this literature review has identified 
only one empirical study focused on domestic abuse in the British Armed Forces. This is a pilot 
project, by Williamson and Price, from which two publications have emerged (Williamson and 
Price 2009; Williamson 2011). Williamson and Price’s study was commissioned by the North East 
Hampshire Domestic Abuse Forum, a group of civilian and military support providers which meets 
in Aldershot. The research was tasked with investigating “(i) the nature and extent of abuse 
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perpetrated by serving men against their female partners, it is worth briefly noting that there is some 
research which deals with abuse perpetrated by female service personnel in the US military (e.g. Campbell 
et al., 2003; Fogey & Badger, 2006; Coyle & Wolan, 1996). This literature suggests that female service 
personnel are significantly more likely to be the victims than the perpetrators of abuse (Campbell et al., 
2003; Forgey and Badger, 2006), and it points to particular barriers which may discourage servicewomen 
from seeking support (Campbell et al., 2003, 1081). I have not been able to find any research which focuses 
specifically on domestic abuse perpetrated by/against LGBT personnel in the military.  
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experienced by military families, (ii) service use and (iii) service needs of both perpetrators and 
victims of abuse in this context” (Williamson 2011: 5). Aspects of the study’s findings are 
discussed later in this chapter. The principle research method used was an online survey, 
designed with the help of focus groups, but unfortunately the researchers struggled to recruit the 
hoped for numbers of participants. The survey collected 5 responses from servicemen and 
women, and 179 from female partners of military personnel (Williamson and Price 2009: 3-4, 7). 
It did not specifically sample participants who had experienced domestic abuse, and eight 
participants self-identified as having experienced physical abuse, 43 verbal abuse, and 22 bullying 
behaviour from their partner (ibid.: 12). Although mainly interested in quantitative data, the 
study did collect brief, written qualitative information in specific sections of the survey (ibid.: 13-
17), however the depth of this data is of course limited as Williamson herself recognises (2011: 6). 
Moreover, the study is largely problem-solving in approach and offers little critical analysis of the 
role of either gender or militarism in shaping domestic abuse. While Williamson’s 2011 article 
does point very briefly to the importance of gender (ibid.: 2-3, 15-16), this discussion is very 
limited and the original report does not offer any gender analysis. In addition, the research does 
not take a critical approach to the military as an institution or to militarism more broadly. While 
combat deployment is thought to impact upon abuse, for example, deployment itself is taken as 
an unfortunate but unquestionable inevitability. That is, the research aims to mitigate the 
negative effects of military action upon intimate relationships without problematising that 
military action itself (Williamson and Price 2009: 3). There is, therefore, a lack of in-depth, 
qualitative research on domestic abuse in the British military which approaches it with a critical 
approach to militarism and a gender lens. 
 
In comparison to the British example, there exists a large amount of research which deals with 
domestic abuse in the US Armed Forces - this study cites 38 relevant articles and book chapters. I 
also identified six published works which discuss domestic abuse in the Canadian military. There 
are a number of reasons why domestic abuse in the US military in particular has received high 
levels of research, public, and policy interest in comparison with the British example, and, while I 
do not explore this in any depth here, also the Canadian example. Firstly, such interest is no 
doubt underpinned by the size of the US military, which is one of the largest employers in the 
country (Klostermann et al. 2012: 54). In 2010, there were 1,431,000 active duty personnel 
serving in the US military
55
 and an additional 1,102,863 reservists
56
. In 2007, almost 13% of the 
U.S. population over the age of 18 were military veterans (Bradley 2007: 197). In comparison, in 
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2014 the entire strength of the British military was 163,670 personnel, of which 157,490 were 
regulars and 3350 were reserves
57
 (Rutherford and Berman 2014: 5). While clearly the US 
population is much larger than that of the UK - around 319 million people in comparison to 64 
million - the US military represents a larger (although still small overall) percentage of the 
population. In addition, the US Forces occupy a higher profile in US public life than can be said of 
their British counterparts, with politicians frequently citing militarised identity as a way to gain 
legitimacy (Belkin 2012: 2) and a more visible everyday appreciation for the work of military 
personnel among ordinary citizens
58
. Moreover, high profile incidents of military domestic abuse - 
such as the murders of four women by their servicemen-husbands within six weeks at Fort Bragg 
in North Carolina in 2002
59
, as well as media reporting of the high levels of abuse (Mercier 2000: 
4) - have encouraged widespread public, media, and political interest. Furthermore, Enloe 
suggests that the hardships of multiple overseas postings during the Cold War have meant that 
US military officials have had to work harder than their British counterparts to retain the support 
of servicemen’s families (Enloe 2000: 160-61). Reflecting this, Mercier (2000: 6) argues that the 
US military authorities pay particular attention to family problems because they recognise that 
such issues compromise “preparedness by reducing the readiness and performance of individual 
military members." That is, the US military has been the site for so much research into domestic 
abuse at least partially because such research supports the needs of military effectiveness, and as 
a result the majority of this research is expressly problem-solving rather than critical in its 
approach.  
 
The overwhelming majority of published studies into domestic abuse in the US military are 
primarily concerned with causality. As I explore below, there are a small number of feminist-
informed studies which take a critical approach (e.g. Enloe 2000; Jones 2012: 154); however most 
of this body of scholarship focuses on somewhat reductionist explanations - such as mental illness 
and alcohol abuse - and ignores the broader, gendered social factors within which domestic abuse 
is rooted. A much smaller body of scholarship pays attention to the types of support available to 
US military personnel and their families, and to the barriers which they may experience to 
accessing it. While there is some variety within this large body of work, most of the US research is 
quantitative and broadly positivist in approach. In the Canadian context, the work which is of 
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most interest to this thesis is that by Harrison, alone (2002, 2006) and together with Laliberté 
(1994, 2008) into the lives of civilian women married to Canadian servicemen, and into such 
women’s experiences of domestic abuse more specifically. This work focuses on the experiences 
of victim-survivors of abuse, pays attention to military support services and barriers to help-
seeking, and discusses causal factors which may be relevant to military populations. It is of 
particular interest to my study because, unlike much of the US scholarship, it is qualitative, 
broadly critical in its approach to the military, and informed by feminist understandings of abuse.  
 
While US and Canadian literature has informed my research in important ways, its overseas 
location means that it cannot be easily transposed to the British context. There are of course 
many similarities between the British, Canadian, and United States militaries; however, important 
differences also remain. For Zamorski and Weins-Kinkead, “Data from other military organizations 
may not apply, due to differences in the military population, the particular stresses and strains 
faced by military families, the supports and services available, and the overall preventive strategy 
used by each military organization” (2013: 2). Similarly, in Williamson’s words, “[i]n terms of 
culture, we know very little about the differences that might exist between different military 
forces and how this might impact on military families” (2011: 3). Even a cursory glance at the 
contextual differences in which the military institutions and their associated families operate 
gives some indication that US and Canadian scholarship cannot be unproblematically applied to 
the British case. As I note above, the US military is significantly larger and occupies a more visible 
cultural position within its nation than can be said of the British Armed Forces. Moreover, the lack 
of a comprehensive welfare state in the US is another significant factor, as it means that victim-
survivors in the British and United States contexts are likely to have access to significantly 
different levels of civilian support provision. In addition, the Canadian case illustrates effectively 
the importance of geographical differences between contexts. Harrison and Laliberté (1994: 131-
32) highlight particular difficulties which apply to spouses posted to isolated bases - while some 
UK bases are more isolated than others, none can compare to the isolation of some of the 
northerly rural Canadian postings. Considerable care must therefore be taken when applying 
scholarship from overseas to the British case, and studies specifically focused on Britain are 
necessary.  
 
As I demonstrate throughout this chapter, this thesis contributes to the literature in some 
important ways. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, it provides data on a significantly under-
researched topic: domestic abuse in the British military. Specifically, it provides in-depth 
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qualitative data - which is missing from Williamson and Price’s study - and which is likely to be 
more appropriate than quantitative information for understanding the ways in which abuse is 
perceived and responded to. It brings a gendered lens to the study of military domestic abuse, 
one which is frustratingly missing in much of the literature from the US. Moreover, learning from 
general feminist literature on domestic abuse and help-seeking, the study takes seriously the 
normal, everyday social structures, ideologies, and understandings of masculinities and 
femininities, intimate relationships, domestic abuse and help-seeking which circulate in the 
military context  - something which is often difficult to find in the existing literature on military 
domestic abuse. Learning from the literature on military sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) 
more broadly, the thesis also pays attention to the gendered underpinnings of militarism, 
militarised identity, and militarised violence which have been identified in that literature as 
centrally important in understanding violence in military settings. I take learning from these two 
bodies of literture to insist on the political nature of military domestic abuse - something which is 
again notably absent from much of the work which has emerged from the US, as well as from 
Williamson and Price’s British study. This thesis thus contributes towards understanding 
responses to domestic abuse in the British military context in important and original ways.  
 
This chapter proceeds in two main sections, the first of which explores literature which seeks to 
explain the causality of domestic abuse and the second, in two smaller sub-sections, which moves 
to literature focused on the ways in which victim-survivors seek help in response to domestic 
abuse. It should be noted that this organisation is reversed in the arrangement of my empirical 
chapters, which begin with an individualised consideration of victim-survivors’ responses to abuse 
before widening the lens to discuss more broadly the perceptions of, and the potential for 
political engagement with, domestic abuse and gendered militarism writ large. This decision has 
been taken for ease of reading, as the literature on help-seeking which I present here is best 
approached by readers with knowledge of broader feminist understandings of the gendered 
social underpinnings of abuse. In each of the sections of this chapter which follow, I begin with a 
discussion of the bodies of literature which have provided the ground within which my approach 
to the research has arisen. I then follow each of these discussions with an exploration of the 
existing literatures on domestic abuse in military institutions in order to draw attention to the 
gaps in the literature which my study contributes towards filling. This allows me to illustrate the 
process by which my research questions have been developed.  
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The literature on causality: patriarchy and the continuum of violence  
This thesis focuses on responses to abuse, and as such it does not attempt to come to any kind of 
conclusions about the causality of abuse within the military. Despite this, throughout the course 
of conducting interviews it became clear that it is not possible to neatly cleave responses from 
causality - or perhaps more accurately, from the broad perceptions of the causality of abuse 
which circulate in a given context. Participants interviewed for this project made multiple 
references to their understandings of the causes of abuse in explaining their responses to it, and 
such perceptions have been more broadly recognised as informing policy, the work of 
professional support agencies, and the views of both perpetrators and victim-survivors in relation 
to abuse (Hearn 1996: 33; see also Ferraro 2005: 191). Divergent perceptions of causality are the 
kernel of divergent approaches to abuse more broadly - including in the way that abuse is 
responded to by victim-survivors, their communities, support workers, and law enforcement 
authorities. 
 
There is a point, here, of potential slippage and confusion, because while my empirical interest in 
this thesis is in perceptions of causality, the literatures I describe below aim to describe the actual 
causality of domestic abuse. This is an important distinction; however, in the absence of an 
existent literature on the ways in which the causality abuse is perceived in various military 
settings, the literatures outlined below provide important groundwork for the discussions of 
perception which follow throughout the thesis. Scholarship is neither neutral nor apolitical (see 
Chapter Three), and the ways in which scholars choose to study the causality of abuse - the causal 
associations for which they search through their research - are based upon their theoretical 
assumptions and, indeed, on their own perceptions of that causality. This general statement, of 
course, also applies to my own work - although this study does not attempt to establish causality, 
my approach to studying responses to abuse is underpinned and shaped in important ways by my 
own theoretical understandings of what domestic abuse is and how it is caused. The explorations 
of the literatures on causality which follow, then, have two functions. First, they serve to situate 
my study within the broader literature on forms of violence against women in both civilian and 
military/conflict settings, allying my work with feminist-informed and critical military scholarship, 
and positioning it against more reductionist, “problem-solving,” and positivist pieces of research. 
Second, they sketch out the dominant ways in which the broad causality of abuse has been 
understood within the literature, thus laying the groundwork for my subsequent discussions of 
the perceptions of causality.  
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Literature on domestic abuse  
There exist a range of explanations for domestic abuse, many of which are not underpinned by 
feminist approaches. These include biological explanations focused on the hormonal production 
of aggression; socio-biological explanations which emphasise the defence of “territory;” 
psychological explanations focused on “personality types” and “disorders;” and psychoanalytical 
approaches centred on “projection” and “displacement” (Hearn 1998: 17; see also Gondolf 1985; 
Hearn 1996: 29). Much of this scholarship has been criticised for being reductionist and overly 
focused on the individual, for failing to offer an account of power, and for ignorance of the 
gendered nature of abuse (Hearn 1996: 29; Sev’er 2002: 45). As I explore further in Chapter Four, 
this thesis draws upon feminist-informed theorisations as it is these which best enables me to 
make sense of abuse as a gendered social issue and to pay attention to the power relations by 
which it is underpinned.  
 
The large and well-developed body of feminist scholarship on domestic abuse which began to 
emerge during the ‘second wave’ feminist movement of the 1960s-1980s has understood abuse 
as a gendered social issue: one which is rooted in the patriarchal organisation of society (e.g. 
chapters in Hanmer and Itzin 2000; Hoff 1990; Kelly 1988; Loseke and Cahill 2005; Pizzey 1974; 
Renzetti and Bergen 2005; Westmarland 2015; Yllö 1993). This is an intrinsically political approach 
to domestic abuse, one which highlights the social and political inequalities which underpin men’s 
violences towards women. In 1979, Dobash and Dobash argued that while “[t]he legal right of a 
man to beat his wife is no longer explicitly recognised in most western countries [...] the legacy of 
the patriarchy continues to generate the conditions and relationships that lead to a husband’s use 
of force against his wife” (1979: ix). More recent scholarship has echoed these arguments. For 
Harne and Radford (2008: 17), domestic abuse is a “problem with roots in women’s subordinate 
gender status in all cultures, and is reflected in the beliefs, norms, morals, laws and social 
institutions that legitimise and normalise it, and, in so doing, perpetuate this violence.” Similarly, 
Pain argues that within heteronormative societies, “[c]ultural expectations around the roles of 
women and men, financial inequalities between them, and the predominant forms of masculinity 
and femininity [...] both create and sustain [domestic] abuse” (2012: 18). Moreover as this 
scholarship has developed, a greater recognition of the multiplicity and intersectional formulation 
of women’s experiences of domestic abuse and of help-seeking has emerged. Intersectionalities 
are now widely understood to “colour the meaning and nature of domestic violence, how it is 
experienced by self and responded to by others, how personal and social consequences are 
represented, and how and whether escape and safety can be obtained” (Bograd 1999: 276; see 
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also Crenshaw 1991; Kanuha 1996; Sokoloff and Dupont 2005). By locating the roots of domestic 
abuse in social inequalities, this body of scholarship locates its causal factors not in the indiviudal 
space of a single couple but in the broader society in which such couples are embedded. That is, 
while indiviudal perpetrators exercise agency in making a choice to abuse their partners, these 
choices are, in diverse and intersectionally mediated ways, produced within and enabled by 
women’s disempowered structural position in society relative to men. Importantly, this means 
that the roots of domestic abuse are firmly identified in the normal gendered arrangements of 
social life, and not in out of the ordinary, the disordered, or the pathologised. As such, neither 
victim-survivors nor perpetrators of abuse are understood as aberrant or inexplicable; rather, 
such violence is woven deeply into the arrangement of contemporary societies (Hearn 1996: 34).  
 
Feminist work has pointed to the connections which exist between domestic abuse and other 
types of violence against women, such as sexual harassment, rape and sexual assault, stalking, 
trafficking for the purposes of the sex trade, and female genital mutilation. In 1988, Kelly 
identified a “continuum” of diverse forms of violence against women, all of which are 
underpinned by “the abuse, intimidation, coercion, intrusion, threat and force men use to control 
women” (Kelly 1998: 76, emphasis in original). For Kelly, the concept of a continuum does not 
imply a hierarchical ranking of severity in forms of gendered violence against women; rather, it 
identifies both the connections between various forms of violence and “how ‘typical’ and 
‘aberrant’ male behaviour shade into one another” (ibid. : 75). Several scholars have either 
explicitly taken up the concept of a continuum of violence against women (see, for example, 
chapters in Brown and Walklate 2012) or have otherwise recognised the connections between 
various forms of violence against women, for example, through the production of academic 
volumes which deal with its multiple forms (e.g. Fawcett et al. 1996; Lombard and McMillan 
2013; Radford et al. 2000; Renzetti and Bergen 2005; Westmarland 2015). This approach is very 
useful in enabling scholars to make sense of domestic abuse as part of wider arrangements of 
gendered social power and inequality.  
 
Literature on sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings  
Scholarship on SGBV in conflict and post-conflict settings has a more recent history than that on 
domestic abuse more broadly, and much of it - although not all - is informed by the insights of 
earlier feminist work. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this chapter to offer anything but a 
brief and targeted discussion of this literature. Indeed, for the purposes establishing the ground 
from which my thesis develops, there are just two major observations that I want to make here.  
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First, feminist-informed literature on the various forms of SGBV which occur in conflict settings 
has changed the way in which much of this violence is understood. Previously, SGBV in conflict 
and post-conflict settings was largely considered to be irrelevant to the conduct and to the 
understanding of war and militarism
60
 - a side effect, perhaps, or a form of “collateral damage,” 
but of no consequence in making sense of war and of international relations more broadly (UNDP 
2008). Feminist scholarship and campaigning, however, has challenged this, and some forms of 
SGBV - in particular rapes which occur in conflict zones - are now widely understood as an integral 
and significant part of war itself, relevant to the study of foreign policy, of conflict, and of 
international relations (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; Kirby 2012; UNDP 2008). Scholars 
interested in wartime SGBV have drawn attention to the ways in which the perpetration, 
experience, and meaning of SGBV is shaped in particular ways in war and post-war settings. 
Scholars working on wartime rape have argued that this form of violence may be motivated and 
shaped through the militarised forms of masculinity which characterise times of war. In this 
understanding, soldiers rape because the institutional culture of militaries, and the norms of 
masculinity which they promote, are conducive to rape; and moreover, rape itself is a site at 
which perpetrators performatively construct themselves as soldierly subjects (Boesten 2014: 53-
63; Enloe 2000: 108-52; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009; Goldstein 2001; Kirby 2012: 811-13; Morris 
1996). Morris, for example, argues that military masculinity revolves around “attitudes of 
hypermasculinity, adversarial sexual beliefs, sexual promiscuity, rape myth acceptance, 
acceptance of violence against women, hostility toward women, and sex-role stereotyping” - and 
this is “correlated with rape and rape proclivity” (1996: 700-701). Similar arguments have been 
made about servicemen’s use of prostitutes as a site at which militarised forms of masculinity are 
both expressed and performatively constructed (Enloe 1989: 81; 1992; 2000: 51-62; Sturdevant 
and Stoltzfus 1992; Yuh 2002). Moreover, scholars who identify rape as a “weapon of war” have 
discussed soldiers’ rape of enemy women in particular as a part of warfare specifically aimed at 
the humiliation and demoralisation of a whole ethnic or national collective through the use of 
sexual violence against the bodies of its women - that is, these scholars have argued that rape can 
take on different meanings in conflict zones (Benshoof 2014; Buss 2009; Cain 1999: 284; Card 
1996; Diken and Lausten 2005; Goldstein 2001; Kirby 2012; Maedl 2011; Meger 2010; Rehn and 
Sirleaf 2002; Salzman 1998; Trenholm et al. 2011). Similarly, scholars have uncovered an 
increased prevalence of domestic abuse in conflict and post-conflict settings (e.g. Rehn and Sirleaf 
2002: 14-15), and some have argued that this can be attributed to the militarisation of 
                                                           
60
 ‘War’ and ‘militarism’ are not the same, although they are closely related. The relationship between the 
two will be explored in Chapter Four.  
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masculinity and the exaggeration in inequalities between women and men which occurs during 
conflict (e.g. Adelman 2003; Albanese 2001; Copic 2004; Horn et al. 2014; Korac 1998; Zannettino 
2012). For Albanese, for example, conflict functions to “repatriarchalize” social and gender 
relations more broadly, and thus leads to an increasing risk of domestic abuse in affected 
societies (2001). The first point I want to make about this diverse body of literature on forms of 
conflict-related SGBV which is relevant to my own study, then, is that draws attention to the ways 
in which war and militarism reshape gender norms and thus, reshape the perpetration, 
experience, and meaning of forms of SGBV in particular ways. This scholarship demonstrates the 
importance of paying attention to the interconnections between war, militarism, and SGBV: an 
insight which is important for my study because it suggests that the gendered, military context in 
which it occurs is likely to be of relevance to understanding domestic abuse in the British military.  
 
Second, while a significant amount of work recognises the connections - the “continuum of 
violence” - between various forms of militarised and peacetime SGBV (Boesten 2014: 152; 
Cockburn 2004; Kelly 2010; Leatherman 2011: 63-64; Pankhurst 2007: 3-8, 32-35), without 
painting too neat or homogenised a picture of this body of literature, I want to argue that there 
remains, to a certain extent, a broad divide within it. On the one hand, forms of violence which 
are perpetrated against women of ‘enemy’ ethnic or national collectives, such as rape in war, 
have been understood as part of the gendered pratices of war fighting; often, as an act of war. 
For example, while there are diverse literatures on rape in war which explain it in a range of ways 
- from “war booty,” or the lawlessness of war, to the result of psychological trauma, or the 
militarisation of masculinity (for an overview, see Pankhurst 2007: 44-53; 2010: 152-56) - the 
dominant narrative in contemporary scholarship and activist work understands rape in war as a 
strategic tool which aims to achieve instrumental purposes in the pursuit of military objectives 
(Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013: 2; Kirby 2012). Much of the literature which describes rape as a 
strategic weapon of war draws upon feminist theorisations of nationalism (e.g. Elshtain 1987: 67; 
McClintock 1995; Yuval-Davis 1997) to argue that the “ultimate targets” of such rapes are not the 
individual victim-survivors themselves but “entire peoples” (Card 1996: 7; see also Albanese 
2001; Benshoof 2014, 146; Buss 2009: 148-49; Cain 1999: 284; Diken and Lausten 2005, 111; 
Goldstein 2001; Kirby 2012: 807-08; Maedl 2011; Meger 2010; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, 2; Salzman 
1998; Trenholm et al. 2011). That is, rape in war is not only an attack on a woman’s body, but an 
attack on the group to which she belongs - “a message passed between men” (Brownmiller 1975: 
13) which intends to “destroy the morale of [the victim’s] family and ethnic community” (Sharlach 
2000: 89). In this understanding, rape is not only a side-effect of or a co-occurrence with war, it is 
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part of the gendered practices through which wars are fought. On the other hand, forms of 
violence which are perpetrated against women of the same ethnic or national collective as the 
perpetrator are not generally understood as an act of war or as part of the gendered pratices of 
war fighting, even when they occur within periods of armed conflict, and even when the acts of 
violence perepetrated are similar. In what is perhaps the most dominant narrative, the increasing 
prevelence of domestic abuse in conflict and post-conflict settings is understood as a side effect 
of the impact of the war itself - which has militarised masculinities, normalised violence, 
traumatised perpetrators, or broken down systems of accountability (Adelman 2003: 1132; Al-
Krenawi et al. 2007; Albanese 2001; Annan and Brier 2010; Catani et al. 2008; Copic 2004; 
Enarson 1999; Haj-Yahia and Clark 2013; Horn et al. 2014; Korac 1998; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 11-
16; Rydstrøm 2003; Saile et al. 2013; Usta et al. 2008; Zannettino 2012). Rehn and Sirleaf, for 
example, identify a number of factors which contribute to an increase in domestic abuse in the 
post-conflict period, including “the availability of weapons, the violence male family members 
have experienced or meted out, [and] the lack of jobs, shelter, and basic services” (2002: 14). In 
these arguments, domestic abuse is understood as a ‘knock-on effect’ of war, a form of ‘collateral 
damage,’ which is caused by war, but which does not itself play a role in the gendered practices of 
war fighting. The second point I want to make about the literature on SGBV in conflict and post-
conflict settings, then, is that while forms of SGBV perpetrated against women of an ‘enemy’ 
ethnic or national collective may well be understood both as shaped by war and as a part of the 
gendered practices of war fighting, forms of SGBV perpetrated against women of the same ethnic 
or national collective are more likely to be understood as shaped by war but not as part of the 
gendered practices of war fighting. That is, the notion that domestic abuse itself might play a role 
in the gendered practices of war fighting has not received serious attention in the literature or in 
activist work focused on conflict and post-conflict SGBV. This point is important because I go on 
to argue in this thesis that viewing domestic abuse in military settings as an enactment of 
gendered militarism is a very useful lens for making sense of how such abuse is experienced.  
 
Literature on the causality of abuse in military institutions  
As I show above, there exist significant and dynamic bodies of feminist-informed work on 
domestic abuse and on SGBV in conflict/post-conflict settings. It is, however, fairly striking that 
only a very small amount of the published literature on the causality of domestic abuse in military 
institutions shows recognition of these broad and influential bodies of literature. As I explore 
below, the literature on domestic abuse in militaries tends to attribute it to gender-neutral, 
individual factors - those which feminist scholarship has long argued against. Some of this 
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literature - which does not, generally speaking, draw on a gender analysis - attributes the higher 
rates of perpetration of domestic abuse among military personnel to non-military specific factors 
such as the over-representation of young men of relatively low-economic status in military 
populations (e.g. Caliber Associates 1994; Graves and Moriarty 2000: 31; Jones 2012; Marshall 
and McShane 2000; Mercier 2000: 4-5; Sharps et al. 2000: 76) or the use of alcohol or drugs by 
military personnel (Bell et al. 2004; Brewster et al. 2002; Hurlbert et al. 1991; Martin et al. 2010). 
However, the larger body of work, and that which is of most interest to this thesis, is that which 
identifies military-specific causal factors. Most-often, these factors are related to the out-of-the-
ordinary impacts of deployment, and in general, this scholarship does not draw upon a critical 
approach to militarism. 
 
Williamson and Price’s study of domestic abuse in the British military began from the premise 
that abuse is likely to increase when personnel return from deployment, and that this is caused 
by the traumas of the deployment itself and/or the difficult process of servicemen’s reintegration 
back into family life (Williamson and Price 2009: 3). The authors suggest that “Sometimes the 
stresses of [reintegration], potentially coupled with PTSD and flashbacks (which can affect sleep 
patterns) can exacerbate issues of domestic abuse, coercion and control” (ibid.: 3). The work 
points to two types of tension which may occur in the post-deployment period and cause or 
worsen abuse - tensions which arise because returning personnel find it difficult to negotiate a 
significant role in a family which has been coping without them, and the exacerbation of 
controlling behaviour by combat-related mental health problems such as PTSD (ibid.: 3). 
Williamson’s later article based on the study provides somewhat more of an emphasis on 
domestic abuse as control (see Chapter Four), and also points very briefly to the impact of 
gendered roles and expectations on the process by which power and control within a relationship 
is renegotiated following a period of deployment separation, although a focused and in-depth 
consideration of these issues is absent from the published work (Williamson 2011: 14-16). 
Moreover, while it recognises the potential impact of military service upon domestic abuse, 
Williamson and Price’s article does not discuss the impact of militarism or take a critical approach 
to the military. Military service and the realities of life in the military community are taken in the 
research report as a given, something which happens and which should be coped with, but which 
is not itself open to question or to political analysis. For example, there is some discussion of the 
difficulties which civilian women married to servicemen experience in coping with their roles in 
the family as their serving partners come and go on deployments, but no critical discussions of 
the position of these women in the military family and the military institution more broadly 
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(Williamson and Price 2009: 14-16). This limits the depth of understanding which the study can 
provide. Williamson and Price’s first key focus - on immediate deployment-related factors - is 
mirrored in some of the research into domestic abuse in the US military. Hoge et al. (2007) found 
that couples report decreased marital satisfaction, increased intention to divorce, and domestic 
abuse in the periods before, during and up to a year after deployment to Iraq. Similarly, military 
domestic abuse support organisation the Miles Foundation reported an increase in calls from 
bases at which units were deploying or returning
61
. However, other studies, including survey-
based research conducted by McCarroll et al. (2003) and Newby et al. (2005), found no significant 
increase in incidents of domestic abuse in the months following deployment.  
 
Williamson and Price’s second key focus, on the causal relationship between combat-related 
mental health problems and domestic abuse, has received much greater attention in US research. 
Indeed, studies which focus on combat-related mental health problems - most commonly post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
62
 -make up probably the largest body of literature on domestic 
abuse in the US military, to the detriment of other potentially significant deployment-related 
factors such as number and length of deployments, military occupational status, and exposure to 
combat (Rodrigues et al. 2015: 236). A considerable number of studies note an association 
between PTSD diagnosis and increased perpetration of abuse (e.g. Byrne and Riggs 1996; Carroll 
et al. 1985; Finley et al. 2010; Glenn et al. 2002; Jordan et al. 1992; Klostermann et al. 2012; 
Monson et al. 2009; Sherman et al. 2006; Verbosky and Ryan 1988), or increased levels of 
physical violence in abuse (e.g. Chemtob et al. 1997; Finley et al. 2010: 738; Monson et al. 2009: 
708; Orcutt et al. 2003). Authors generally note that what these studies are identifying is a 
correlation and that this does not, of course, prove a causal relationship. However, while there 
are exceptions - Monson et al. (2009: 711), for example, suggest that poor quality intimate 
relationships can worsen negative reactions to traumatic experiences - most studies posit that a 
causal relationship does exist and that it is unidirectional: that PTSD causes domestic abuse.  
Although the nature of this causality is not always clearly explained, when it is explored it is often 
the hyperarousal symptoms of PTSD, such as aggression and disinhibition, which are identified as 
causal. These symptoms are thought to inhibit sufferers’ ability to process information and cause 
to them to act impulsively, lose control, and lash out (Savarese et al. 2001; Taft et al. 2011: 23; 
Taft et al. 2013: 226). Finley et al. additionally suggest that the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD 
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 There are some exceptions to this trend - Pan et al (1994), for example, note an association between 
depressive symptoms and domestic abuse among US Army soldiers. The overwhelming majority of such 
studies, however, focus on PTSD.   
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may also play a role in causing personnel to use abuse against their intimate partners, in 
particular “amplified anger, disassociation or flashbacks, and sleep disturbance” (2010: 740). 
While much of the literature only looks at male servicemen, that which draws on broader samples 
suggests that the correlation between PTSD and domestic abuse is mediated by factors such as 
gender and military service itself. Studies cited in the literature review by Taft et al. (2011: 23) 
suggest that PTSD is more strongly associated with anger, hostility, and intimate relationship 
problems in military as opposed to civilian samples (see Chemtob et al. 1997; Orth and Wieland 
2006), and that this is rooted in the particularly violent experiences likely to be at the root of 
military, but not civilian, PTSD (Chemtob et al. 1997). Additionally, studies such as that by Kirz et 
al. (2001) and Miller and Resick (2007) suggest that men and women respond differently to 
trauma, with men more likely to become violent and aggressive and women more likely to 
‘internalise’ their problems.  
 
Scholarship which attributes military domestic abuse to military-specific factors makes useful 
contributions in drawing connections - albeit sometimes implicitly - between intimate and 
geopolitical forms of violence. This opens up a useful space for how thinking about the 
connections between domestic abuse, militarism, and war - something which I think is productive 
ground for analysis. However, there remain significant problems with this body of literature. 
Firstly, the studies cited above largely conceptualise domestic abuse in terms of incidents of 
violent or abusive behaviour, which both obscures the patterns of controlling behaviour which 
constitute abuse (see Chapter Four), and which also largely ignores its gendered nature. Even 
those studies which recognise a difference in outcome by gender or by military experience do 
not, in general, provide an analysis of how military and gender ideologies and cultures, or the 
structures of military life, might help to explain these differential outcomes. Secondly, despite 
approaching military experience as a potential causal factor in abuse, these studies do not take a 
critical approach to militarism: rather, military deployments, military culture, and the military 
itself are assumed to be unchangeable political constants; something which has to be worked 
around and learned to cope with rather than questioned or challenged. ‘Militarism’ is not a 
concept which this literature employs, as the military itself is not understood to be a political and 
social construct in the ways that this term would imply (see Chapter Four). As such, in the terms 
introduced in the previous chapter, these are “problem-solving” rather than “critical” pieces of 
work (Cox 1981: 88-89). Connected to this, because of its focus on out-of-the-ordinary 
experiences - and, significantly, on out-of-the-ordinary, pathologised perpetrators - this literature 
abstracts abuse from the normal and the everyday, and thus obscures the ways in which it is 
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shaped by the everyday gendered inequalities which shape life in the British military institution 
(see Chapter Four). This literature thus disregards the compelling insights of feminist scholarship 
both on domestic abuse and on forms of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-
conflict settings.  
 
There are a small number of important exceptions to this dominant gender-blind approach in the 
literature on the causality of domestic abuse in military institutions - studies which have more in 
common with my own approach and which inform the present study. Jones (2012: 154) points 
very briefly to feminist scholarship in her review of the literature in US and Canadian militaries. 
She describes the military as “a male dominated field, in which individuals are socialised in an 
environment that condones a hypermasculinity or macho persona,” and draws on classic feminist 
work such as that by Dobash and Dobash (1979) to suggest that "Within this gender role belief 
system, use of force is one way in which male dominance can be supported." However, Jones 
does not cite any empirical research to back up her suggestions. In the Canadian military context, 
Harrison and Laliberté’s work specifically points to the gendered underpinnings of both domestic 
abuse and the military. For Harrison and Laliberté, “To say that the military community is 
gendered would be to state the very obvious” (1994: 11). These scholars argue that domestic 
abuse in the military must be understood in relation to the gendered culture of militarism, and 
that the patriarchal nature of military communities is a causal factor in such abuse (ibid.: 13, 52). 
More explicitly, Harrison talks specifically about elements of life in the Canadian military which 
may cause domestic abuse, and places particular focus on the violence and control endemic in 
military life and in military training (2002: 14-22), as well as the gendered inequalities inherent in 
military culture. She draws on Dobash and Dobash (1979) to argue that in the hyper masculine 
military community in particular, men who abuse their wives are merely living up to masculine 
social roles (Harrison 2002: 2), and that while the Canadian military does not approve of using 
physical violence against one’s spouse, “control of female partners appears to be at least 
informally fostered” (ibid.: 19). While Harrison and Laliberté’s work in particular clearly underpins 
my approach in this thesis, as I argue above, its location in the Canadian context limits its 
applicability to the British military community.  
 
This section has explored some of the literature which deals with broad questions of causality in 
relation to domestic abuse, and sexual and gender-based violence, in civilian, conflict/post-
conflict, and military-institutional settings. As I note above, there is a potential for confusion and 
slippage here because the literatures above deal directly with the causality of abuse, whereas my 
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empirical interest is in the responses to abuse, including the dominant perceptions of causality 
which circulate in the British military setting. However, the literature explored above constitutes 
a crucial part of that from which the approach of this thesis, and its research questions, emerges, 
and thus is necessarily included here. This discussion has both situated my study within the 
various approaches to domestic, sexual, and gender-based violence in civilian, military, and 
conflict/post-conflict settings, and introduced some of the ways in which the causality of abuse 
has been understood by scholars in these various settings, thus laying the groundwork for my 
discussions of the perceptions of causality which are to come.  
 
I have identified the main insight which I take from feminist-informed literature on domestic 
abuse - that such abuse is part of a continuum of violence against women which is rooted in 
gendered social inequalities of power - and I have demonstrated that, for the most part, this 
insight is missing from scholarship which deals specifically with domestic abuse in military 
institutions. In addition, I have drawn upon feminist-informed literature on SGBV in conflict and 
post-conflict settings to argue that war and militarism reshape gender norms and thus, that 
militarism needs to be taken into account in making sense of gendered forms of violence such as 
domestic abuse. With the exception of the work by Harrison and Laliberté, there is a lack of 
scholarship on the causality of domestic abuse in military institutions which approaches such 
abuse both as a social issue rooted in gender inequalities and as enmeshed in the gendered social 
relations of militarism. My study is, of course, limited in its capacity to fill this gap, because my 
discussions focus not on causality itself but on the ways in which perceptions of causality shapes 
responses to abuse. Whilst recognising it limits in this area, my research will begin to provide a 
greater understanding of some of the issues at stake in discussions of the causality of domestic 
abuse in the military and begin some productive conversations in this area. My research 
questions relating to the issues raised above, which will be tackled in Chapter Seven of this thesis, 
are as follows: 
 
• How is the causality of domestic abuse perpetrated by servicemen in the British military 
perceived by participants in this study? How, if at all, does militarism impact upon these 
understandings? 
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The literature on victim-survivors’ responses: “victims,” “survivors,” and 
“barriers” 
In what remains of this chapter, I move to a discussion of scholarship which has focused more 
specifically on victim-survivors’ responses to abuse - in particular, on the ways in which they seek 
help. Feminist work in this area is generally well-developed and insightful, and my discussions 
here aim less to critique this literature itself than to show, once again, that its insights are largely 
absent from research which looks specifically at military domestic abuse. In the sections which 
follow, I begin by exploring the ‘victim’ versus ‘survivor’ debates which have shaped feminist 
discussions of victim-survivors’ responses to abuse. I then move onto two sections which explore 
some of the “barriers” to help-seeking which scholars and activists have identified. I delve into 
the literature on military domestic abuse to illustrate that there is a lack of knowledge about the 
barriers to help-seeking which shape victim-survivors’ experiences in the British military context.  
 
‘Victims’ or ‘survivors’?  
Feminist literature on victim-survivors’ responses to domestic abuse is shaped by an important 
debate about how the identities of women who experience abuse should best be understood - 
are these women ‘victims’, or ‘survivors’? This debate is important because it shapes how 
women’s responses to abuse and their decisions about whether and how to seek help are 
understood by the women themselves, by those tasked with supporting them, and by the general 
public. 
 
Those who construct women who experience abuse purely as ‘victims’ do so in an attempt to 
undermine tendencies towards victim-blaming and to elicit sympathy and support (Creek and 
Dunn 2011: 312). Perhaps the most significant strand of the ‘victim’ side of the debate comes 
from scholars who draw on psychological approaches to suggest that women become so broken 
by abuse that they are unable to seek help. Walker’s influential work on “battered women’s 
syndrome” in the 1970s suggested that women who experience repeated abuse suffer from a 
kind of “learned helplessness” whereby they become passive and psychologically incapable of 
seeking appropriate help for their situation (Walker 1988; 1979; 1984). Walker - who identified as 
a feminist and acknowledged the importance of gender inequalities in allowing abuse to occur - 
argued that the continuous, life threatening experience of violence within a relationship produces 
a situation where women become passive, unable to seek help, and bound to their abusive 
partners “just as strongly as ‘miracle glue’ binds inanimate substances” (Walker 1979: xvi). While 
Walker’s work was perhaps the most influential (Stark 2007: 119), other psychological theories 
 50 
 
have similarly sought to explain women’s inability to resist violent relationships in ways which 
identify them as helpless victims (see, for example, Clements and Sawhney 2000; Fleming 1979). 
These approaches cast victims of abuse as innocent of any wrong-doing because of their 
weakness: they are not to blame for the ongoing abuse because they are psychologically 
incapable of doing anything to stop it (Dunn 2005: 3-4).  
 
‘Victim’ approaches have political utility, as they have allowed for women who experience abuse 
to be understood as legitimate victims who are worthy of sympathy and support (Creek and Dunn 
2011: 312). For example, “battered women’s syndrome” has been used as a psychological 
defence against criminal charges in cases where women have killed their abusive partners (Chiu 
2001: 1243-44). However, approaches which emphasise ‘helpless’ victimhood have been criticised 
as disempowering in that they essentialise women’s victimhood, obscure (and thus fail to 
support) their active resistance and survival, and deny their agency and ability to make decisions 
(Dunn 2005: 13; Kelly 1988: 159-164; Madriz 1997). In some cases, this has lead to policies which 
disempower women further by taking decisions out of their hands (Chiu 2001: 1245-49). 
Moreover, the psychological approaches outlined above identify not society but the psychology of 
individual women as the appropriate target of change, as it is women’s failure to respond 
appropriately to the situation, rather than the situation itself, which is the site of intervention. By 
placing emphasis on individual coping, this approach obscures, and therefore reduces the 
possibility for action to change, the social inequalities which both underpin domestic abuse and 
which shape responses to it in particular ways, as I explore below.  
 
Those on the ‘survivor’ side of the debate emphasise women’s agency. Lempert (1996: 281), for 
example, reinterprets the apparent passivity often associated with victim-survivors of abuse as an 
active survival strategy which women use to protect themselves and to maintain their sense of 
self in the face of abuse. Similarly, Sev’er explores a range of everyday ways in which women try 
to negotiate their safety and ability to cope on a day-to-day basis: from using employment as a 
form of respite, to taking alcohol or drugs to numb their pain (Sev’er 2002: 119-34). While some 
of these strategies can be understood as self-destructive, they are also evidence of women’s 
agency. These are not helpless victims, but women who “made choices, came up with plans and 
strategies and sheltered their children the best way they knew” (Sev’er 2002: 135: see also Anitha 
2010: 469; Baly 2010: 2298-300; Chantler 2006: 31; Hage 2006: 83-87; Samelius et al. 2014). As 
Kelly notes, a focus on agency helps to avoids the pitfalls of assuming that women are inherently 
passive and vulnerable to victimisation (Kelly 1988: 163; see also Renzetti and Bergen 2005: 9). 
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Paying attention to the everyday strategies that women pursue to manage, minimise, cope with, 
and escape abuse is important in order to recognise the whole range of women’s responses to 
abuse.  
 
An over-emphasis on women’s agency, however, is also problematic, as it leaves victim-survivors 
open to criticism and even to sanctions for making the ‘wrong’ choices. While feminist 
researchers and support agencies tend to assume that ending the relationship is the only 
appropriate choice an abused woman can make, victim-survivors do not always agree (Chiu 2001: 
1251-53; Lewis et al. 2001: 109). Some support workers struggle to live up to their own ideals of 
honouring women’s decisions, and find themselves frustrated and limited in their capacity to fully 
support those who make what they consider to be the ‘wrong’ choices of remaining in or 
returning to the relationship (Dunn 2005: 4; Dunn and Powell-Williams 2007: 991-98; Thapar-
Björkert and Morgan 2010: 45). For example, Westmarland has observed support workers who 
insist on reporting victim-survivors with children to social services if they do not end relationships 
with men who they find out have been violent in previous relationships, which may leave women 
feeling that they are being punished for their choices (2015: 27; see also Hartley 2004; Terrance 
et al. 2008: 879-80; Weisz and Wiersma 2011). An exclusive focus on women as survivors without 
a full recognition of their victimisation can also obscure the real dangers involved in resistance 
(Chantler 2006: 31), and belittle the devastating impact that domestic abuse can have (Thapar-
Björkert and Morgan 2010: 49). Indeed, it can also erase the fact that not all women do survive 
their partner’s violence (Sev’er 2002: 17). Further - and of particular importance for the purposes 
of this thesis - by again focusing on the resilience of the individual, ‘survivor’ approaches divert 
attention from the social structures of inequality which allow domestic abuse to occur and which 
shape help-seeking decisions in particular ways (Dunn 2005: 23). That is, an emphasis on the 
ability of the individual to cope with abuse marginalises broader questions about the social 
structures and ideologies which produce particular subjects as vulnerable. The critique of victim-
focused approaches outlined above - that a focus on the psychology of individual women diverts 
attention from social inequalities - is thus reflected here. I therefore want to suggest that 
whether victimhood or agency are centred, an approach which emphasises the (lack of) capacities 
of the individual to resist without a concurrent consideration of the social factors which produce 
both abuse itself and those very capacities for resistance is necessarily limited and partial and, 
moreover, runs the risk of individualising and depoliticising the problem of domestic abuse itself.  
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More nuanced literature combines these two approaches and understands women who 
experience domestic abuse as both victims and agents (e.g. Ritchie, in Bograd 1999: 825; Chantler 
2006: 30; Chiu 2001: 1257-60). This literature both recognises the active decisions which women 
make on a daily basis to keep themselves safe and situates these decisions within the limited 
conditions of possibility which are imposed upon them by the abuse they experience and by 
gendered society more broadly. That is, victimisation and agency are understood not as binary 
opposites but as co-existing conditions. As Jenkins puts it, “these women are victims, but they are 
also active participants in their own lives. They have lived in fear, but they have also worked 
consistently to save their own lives” (Jenkins 1996: 110). In the hope of reflecting the co-existence 
of victimisation and agency, I use the term ‘victim-survivor’ throughout this thesis to describe 
women who experience domestic abuse.  
 
Thapar-Björkert and Morgan suggest that this coexistence of victimhood and agency “draws 
attention to the importance of understanding the social contexts and social worlds in which 
violence and victimisation are understood and conceptualised” (2010: 32). That is, in Baly’s 
words, “[d]ealing with the abusive situation requires women to address a complex and fluid set of 
circumstantial factors, including the abusive and manipulative behaviours expressed by their 
partners, their own economic and family circumstances, and the availability and perceived 
effectiveness of external support” (2010: 2298). While victim-survivors continually resist the 
abuse to which they are subjected, their ability to be successful - however ‘success’ is defined - 
will depend on their access to particular resources and forms of social support (Gondolf and 
Fisher 1988). Furthermore, responding to abuse in particular ways has costs and often involves 
“trade-offs” in which victim-survivors have to give up certain desired things in order to obtain 
safety from abuse (Thomas et al. 2015). Feminist work has discussed the conditions of possibility 
in which victim-survivors respond to abuse in terms of “barriers” to help-seeking (e.g. Burman 
and Chantler 2005; Fugate et al. 2005; Wolf et al. 2003) - the social factors which make it difficult, 
or even impossible, for certain victim-survivors to make particular choices or to access particular 
services. Dunn and Powell-Williams (2007: 987-989) suggest that such barriers can be both 
“internal” and “external.” For the purposes of this discussion, “internal” barriers include women’s 
understandings of the abuse and, more broadly, of themselves as gendered subjects. “External” 
barriers are often closely related to structural inequalities and/or to a lack of the material 
resources necessary to cope independently outside of the relationship.  
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“Internal” barriers to help-seeking 
Romantic partnership, and intimacy itself, are social constructions which are specific to a given 
temporal and cultural location (Evans 1998: 273; Langan and Davidson 2004) and are embedded 
in social structures such as marriage as well as in a broad range of cultural productions including 
fairy tales, pop music, television, and religion (Jackson 2001: 573; Sueffert 1999: 220; Towns and 
Adams 2000). Dominant discourses of intimacy in the contemporary West are largely 
heteronormative, assuming not only that the need for intimacy is innate but that its most natural 
home is in a monogamous, gendered, heterosexual relationship (Langan and Davidson 2004: 53, 
67). Such discourses occupy a central place in our cultural consciousness, where “falling in love” is 
understood as an essential human experience, an inherently positive process, and the natural 
basis for the monogamous relationships which we expect to provide fulfilment of our emotional 
needs, knowledge of “who we really are” (Langford 1999: xi), and a refuge from the difficulties of 
everyday life (Fraser 2003: 279; Santore 2009: 1203). Heterosexual romance has been presented 
to women in particular as “the great female adventure, duty, and fulfilment” (Rich 1980: 654), 
one in which women are expected to invest considerable “intimacy work” (Langan and Davidson 
2004: 62-66; see also Pearce and Stacey 1995). 
 
Domestic abuse is experienced and made sense of within these culturally constructed, gendered 
ideas about romance. Walker and Goldner argue that women experiencing domestic abuse 
rationalise their experiences and their relationships with reference to cultural narratives of 
romance and of gender - “Each of us makes meaning out of our lives by situating our own 
particular family drama into these available story-lines” (1995: 45; see also Boonzaier and De La 
Rey 2003). For Towns and Adams, “perfect love discourses” play a role in trapping women into 
abusive relationships by shaping the ways in which they respond to early signs of abuse. They 
suggest that culturally produced ideals of romantic love encourage female victim-survivors in 
particular to understand their partner’s abusive behaviour as separate from their true character - 
as a temporary affliction which can be overcome with love and support (Towns and Adams 2000: 
573). In what they call a “gender twist,” they suggest that women come to feel that must “rescue 
[the perpetrator] from his atrocious behaviour by providing the perfect-love,” and that if they fail 
in this task, “they cannot be loving them enough and [...] they should try harder” (ibid.: 573-75). 
Similarly, Hoff suggests that “having internalised the cultural norm that women are largely 
responsible for the success or failure of human relationships,” victim-survivors are likely to 
interpret the abuse as their own fault and to try to improve the relationship through loving 
behaviour - and that not to do so feels, to many women, like a failure (Hoff 1990: 43). Several 
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other studies have made similar arguments (see, for example, Boonzaier and De La Rey 2003: 
1011-14; 2004; Borochowitz and Eisikovits 2002; Browne 1991; Jackson 2001: 307; Kearney 2001: 
275; Sueffert 1999). Multiple studies have identified a sense of shame and a fear of being judged 
on the part of victim-survivors as one of the most significant barriers to seeking help (e.g.Fugate 
et al. 2005: 299-301; Harne and Radford 2008: 47; Wolf et al. 2003: 121), and close connections 
can be drawn here. Women who feel ashamed and think that abuse is caused by their own 
failures are less likely to name the abuse as abuse or to reach out for help from others. As Towns 
and Adams suggest, “perfect love discourses may silence women’s talk about male partner 
violence, prevent change in the relationship, and in so doing, prevent change in patriarchal 
practices” (2000: 560). Dominant gendered discourses about romance therefore produce 
significant barriers to help-seeking in response to domestic abuse.  
 
It should be clear from the discussions above that while I and others have referred to these 
barriers as “internal” they are not entirely specific to or produced within the individual, but 
rooted in dominant gendered social norms about intimacy which exist prior to, and which shape 
the formation of, the individual (see Chapters Four and Five). As such, feminist literature on 
“internal” barriers to help-seeking is useful because it enables us to contextualise victim-
survivors’ help-seeking decisions within the discursive contexts in which they take place. This 
helps us to consider help-seeking decisions in context and thus to approach women who 
experience domestic abuse as both victims and agents whose decisions make sense within the 
social settings in which they are made.  
 
Turning to the research on domestic abuse in military institutions, only a small amount of the 
available scholarship recognises the role of cultural ideas about gender and romantic 
relationships in shaping victim-survivors’ responses to abuse, and as a result scholars know little 
about how the militarisation of these ideas shapes experiences of domestic abuse and of help-
seeking. Work in the Canadian military context by Harrison and Laliberté (1994) and Harrison 
(2002) has offered the most convincing intervention here. These scholars argue that civilian 
women married to Canadian servicemen experience considerable pressure to embody a 
particular kind of militarised femininity centred on stoicism, self-reliance, and deference to their 
husbands (Harrison and Laliberté 1994: 83, 172-73). In Harrison’s terms, being a ‘military wife’ 
requires “significant self-effacement” (Harrison 2002: 96). Civilian women married to servicemen 
who fail to behave ‘appropriately’ risk both damaging their husband’s military career and being 
ostracised within their own communities (Harrison 2002: 110-11). This risk of damaging their 
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husband’s military career is, for Harrison and Laliberté, at the root of a reticence which they 
identify among victim-survivors in the Canadian military context to disclose abuse and to seek 
help from agencies (Harrison and Laliberté 1994: 197, 209). Harrison and Laliberté’s work 
develops the insights of the literature explored above in important ways, drawing attention to the 
specific ways in which women married to servicemen may make sense of their experiences of 
abuse through the normative constructions of gender identities and roles, and romance and 
marriage, which circulate within the military context.  
 
However, as I note in the introduction to this chapter, it is not necessarily possible to 
unproblematically apply research conducted overseas to the British context, and as a result there 
is a need for scholarship based in this country. In Williamson and Price’s survey research with the 
partners of British servicemen, the most significant reported barrier to accessing military support 
services was a concern about the impact this would have upon their partner’s career (Williamson 
and Price 2009: 18). While this suggests that the help-seeking decisions of civilian women married 
to servicemen may be shaped by their desire to provide support for their serving husbands in 
similar ways to those suggested by Harrison and Laliberté in the Canadian case, Williamson and 
Price’s survey methodology and resultant lack of in-depth, qualitative data limits the depth of 
understanding which can be drawn from this study. This is an area in which my own study will 
provide further knowledge. The research questions through which I begin to make sense of these 
issues, which will be discussed in Chapter Five, are:  
 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by discourses of 
gender identity? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
 
 “External” barriers to help-seeking 
Feminist scholarship on victim-survivors responses to domestic abuse has also drawn attention to 
external, structural barriers which make it difficult - or even impossible - for certain victim-
survivors to take particular help-seeking decisions. This is a larger body of literature than that 
focused on internal barriers, and in order to keep the focus of this chapter within the scope of the 
thesis I limit my discussions here to literature concerned with two illustrative examples which 
emerge as particularly relevant in Chapter Six of this thesis: economic barriers, and those 
constituted through a victim-survivors’ insecure immigration status. 
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A significant proportion of scholarship on structural barriers to help-seeking has focused on the 
economic factors which raise the costs for victim-survivors of seeking help and, in particular, of 
leaving abusive relationships. Scholars have drawn attention to the economic dependency of 
many victim-survivors upon their abusive partners, and have suggested that this is both a feature 
of gendered society in which men continue to have, on average, more economic power than 
women, and the result of economic forms of domestic abuse through which perpetrators attempt 
to control their victims by increasing that victim’s financial dependence upon them (Harne and 
Radford 2008: 7; Sharp 2008: 12-15). As such, while economic factors are likely to shape the 
experiences of women from low-income backgrounds and from higher-income backgrounds in 
significantly different ways, the greater relative economic power of men in comparison to women 
across class divides means that economic barriers to help-seeking are experienced by a diverse 
spectrum of women.  
 
A number of scholars have shown that many women who leave abusive relationships risk losing 
their main source of income, their home, and, if they have to move in order to find safety, their 
job (Fugate et al. 2005: 299; Harne and Radford 2008: 46; Kirkwood 1993; Resko 2010; Rusbult 
and Martz 1995; Wolf et al. 2003: 124-26). Because of the economic dependency of many women 
upon their husbands, while men are likely to enjoy an improvement in their economic 
circumstances in the year immediately following family breakdown, women are more likely to 
face degradation in theirs during this time period (Westaway and McKay 2007). In the US, Baker 
et al. found that 25-50% of abused women who had ended their abusive relationships experience 
housing problems after separation, and 38% had become homeless (2003: 775). Similarly, 
domestic abuse is one of the leading causes of women’s homelessness in the UK (Malos and 
Hague 1997: 400). For many victim-survivors, then, “the escape from violence opens up further 
insecurity and uncertainty” (ibid.: 398). As a result, victim-survivors may find themselves 
balancing the potential harms of remaining in the abusive relationship with the economic costs of 
leaving, and some may avoid responding to abuse in ways which might impact their economic 
wellbeing (Sharp 2008: 7; see also Correia 2000; Davis 1999; Fender et al. 2002). Worries about 
access to money, and in particular to housing, often emerge from studies as one of the most 
significant structural barriers to leaving abusive relationships (e.g. Jaffee et al. 2002), and these 
issues are likely to be particularly pertinent for women in poorer households (Walby and Allen 
2004: 74-77; see also Bell 2003; Kaukinen et al. 2013: 594; Moe and Bell 2004). Scholars have thus 
identified economic dependency upon one’s abuser as an important factor which “suppresses 
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women’s ability to get out of relationships” which are characterised by domestic abuse (Anderson 
2007: 191-93).  
 
Insecure immigration status - which intersects closely with financial insecurity - has also been 
identified by scholars as a significant structural barrier to help-seeking for the victim-survivors 
who it affects. Recent migrants into the UK may, as Anitha points out, be subject to a range of 
barriers to help-seeking which are not experienced by those with a longer history of living here: 
they are more likely to lack English language proficiency, for example, and also experience greater 
social isolation and a greater degree of financial dependence upon their partners (Anitha 2011: 5, 
13). Moreover, those whose immigration status is insecure or dependent upon their partner may 
experience additional hardships. In the context of domestic abuse, British scholarship and 
activism has focused on the experiences of non-European Economic Area (EEA) nationals
63
 who 
enter the UK as the spouse of a British citizen
64
 (Burman and Chantler 2005; No Recourse to 
Public Funds Network 2009). Foreign nationals who enter the UK on a spouse visa must remain in 
the relationship for five years before they are able to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR); a 
more secure immigrations status which is independent of their relationship with their spouse. If 
the relationship breaks down before this, the non-British spouse loses their right to be in the UK 
and may be deported. In addition, during this five year period, those on a spouse visa have ‘no 
recourse to public funds’: they are not able to access the provisions of the welfare state such as 
housing benefit and income support
65
 (Anitha 2010: 464). Without recourse to public funds, 
women can access neither refuge accommodation provided by specialist domestic violence 
services nor emergency accommodation provided by local authorities (Burman and Chantler 
2005: 67-68), and as a result, for many, the “independent housing and income that would enable 
them to escape ongoing abuse are unobtainable options” (Coy et al. 2008: 43). Largely as a result 
of the campaigning by women’s organisations, the system as it relates specifically to victim-
survivors of domestic abuse has been reformed and significantly improved in recent years. As of 
2002, the Domestic Violence Rule has allowed those who could prove that their marriage had 
broken down as a result of domestic abuse to apply for Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) before 
the mandated probationary period (which at the time was two years, and is now five years) has 
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elapsed
66
. In addition, in 2012 the Destitution Domestic Violence (DDV) Concession was 
introduced, which allows those on a spouse visa access to public funds for up to three months 
while they apply for ILR under the Domestic Violence Rule
67
. 
 
While there have been significant improvements in recent years, some barriers do remain. Firstly, 
the Domestic Violence Rule and the DDV Concession apply only to those who enter the UK on a 
spouse visa; victim-survivors of abuse who are here under different immigration rules, for 
example those who come to study on a student visa and then enter an abusive relationship, are 
still unable to access public funds. In addition, in order to access the DDV, victim-survivors must 
obtain specific, recognised forms of proof of the abuse
68
. Acceptable forms of evidence include 
the criminal conviction of the perpetrator, a civil injunction such as a non-molestation order, a 
medical report from a doctor, a police report which confirms attendance at a domestic abuse 
incident, a letter from social services, or a letter from a domestic abuse support agency
69
. 
Scholars have suggested that given the hidden nature of domestic abuse, victim-survivors - and in 
particular minoritised women - may find it difficult to access these forms of evidence, as all 
require the victim-survivor to have made previous contact with an external authority figure in 
relation to the abuse (Burman and Chantler 2005: 66). This may be a particular issue for victim-
survivors who have avoided reporting to official agencies for fear that their own future 
immigration status may be undermined by doing so (Gill 2004: 478). Moreover, perpetrators 
whose victims have insecure immigration status often use this to control them - for example by 
giving them false information, preventing them from complying with immigration rules, and 
threatening to have them deported - and such victim-survivors are likely to be unaware of the 
legal concessions available (Harne and Radford 2008: 49-50). Insecure immigration status is thus 
likely to remain a barrier to help-seeking for significant numbers of women.  
 
The above discussions of the economic and immigration-status related barriers to help-seeking 
which victim-survivors may experience demonstrates the importance of paying attention to 
structures of inequality in making sense of victim-survivors’ responses to abuse. Without 
understanding the economic costs of particular responses, or the rules which make it difficult for 
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women with insecure immigration status to access alterative accommodation, the decisions 
which some women make not to draw on particular services and resources would not make 
sense. Despite this insight, scholarship on domestic abuse in military institutions has paid only 
limited attention to the particular structural factors which delimit victim-survivors’ responses to 
abuse in this context. In the US, military domestic abuse support organisation the Miles 
Foundation highlighted gendered structural elements of life as a ‘military wife,’ such as financial 
dependence and social isolation, which they argued must be taken into account in studies of 
abuse
70
. However, my review of the literature has not been able to unearth in-depth, qualitative 
data which indicates how this is experienced in the US military context. Other barriers to help-
seeking identified in the literature include the economic, social, and visa-status dependency 
which is experienced specifically by women who enter the US from abroad as the wives of US 
servicemen. Erez and Bach provide qualitative interview data which explores the barriers such 
women face, highlighting their fears about losing their visa rights, social isolation, language 
difficulties, lack of knowledge about available support systems, and racially discriminatory 
responses from military welfare staff (Erez and Bach 2003: 1106, 10-11). In addition, Savitsky et 
al. (2009) explore difficulties which US military personnel and their families may have in accessing 
civilian social work services, which may not always understand their particular needs and 
experiences. Similarly, in the Canadian case, Harrison and Laliberté also highlight structural 
barriers which are specific to military life. They identify the social isolation and financial 
dependency upon the serving spouse which is engendered by the mobility of military life as 
factors which shape and delimit victim-survivors’ responses to domestic abuse (Harrison and 
Laliberté 1994: 24-25, 133-38; Harrison 2002: 32, 37-38). While this scholarship once again 
provides important insights which guide my research, as I argue above, care must be taken in 
applying research findings from overseas to the British case. Turning to the British military, 
Williamson and Price’s study implicitly points towards factors which may produce particular 
barriers to help-seeking in this context. Most significantly, the demographic information they 
provide on their survey participants states that 83% of them live in accommodation provided by 
the military. However, despite the wealth of feminist work which has pointed to the significance 
of housing in shaping victim-survivors’ responses to abuse, the analysis provided by the study 
does not make any mention of this. My study will begin to fill the gap in the literature which this 
leaves by drawing on in-depth qualitative data to discuss some of the ways in which structural 
inequalities shape victim-survivors’ responses to abuse in the British military context. As such, the 
research questions with which I engage in Chapter Six are: 
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• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by the material 
structures of life in this context? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has demonstrated the gaps in the literature on victim-survivors’ responses to 
domestic abuse in the British Armed Forces, which this thesis begins to fill. My review of the 
literature revealed a significant lack of studies which take domestic abuse in the British military as 
their empirical focus. Only one study - a small scale, survey-based pilot project - has collected 
empirical data specifically on domestic abuse in this context. My discussions in this chapter have 
pointed to useful insights which have emerged from this study; such as its indication that victim-
survivors’ concern for their husbands’ careers is likely to constitute as significant barrier to help-
seeking. However, I have also illustrated some of its conceptual and methodological limitations: in 
particular, the small number of participants who self-identified as victim-survivors of domestic 
abuse; the limited depth of its mostly quantitative data; and the ways in which its focus on the 
extra-ordinary impacts of combat deployment obscures the everyday gendered inequalities which 
shape experiences of abuse. My review of the literature also identified a relatively large body of 
literature on domestic abuse in the US military, and a smaller amount which focuses on the 
Canadian Armed Forces. While this scholarship has informed my study in various ways, I have 
argued that its overseas location precludes easy transposition into the British context. Moreover, 
while Harrison and Laliberté’s research in the Canadian Armed Forces in particular has presented 
invaluable qualitative data which explores several of the issues of interest to this study, I have 
shown that the overwhelming majority of the research conducted in the US context, along with 
Williamson and Price’s British study, is largely quantitative, problem-solving, and positivist in its 
approach, and as a result does not provide qualitative or interpretive data which would allow for 
in-depth reflection on the lived experiences of military domestic abuse. Moreover, the majority of 
the existing literature on domestic abuse in both the US and British militaries fails to take account 
of the insights which emerge from the feminist-informed literatures on domestic abuse and on 
sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict settings. Given the compelling 
nature and empirical basis of these bodies of work, this is frustrating, and represents a significant 
weakness.  
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As such, as I stated in the introduction to this chapter, the study contributes to knowledge in 
important ways. Firstly, the research provides in-depth, qualitative empirical data which enables 
better understanding of responses to abuse - in particular, the responses of victim-survivors 
themselves - in the British military context. This is the first study to produce this kind of data, and 
it has potential uses to policy-makers and practitioners who provide support services in this 
context as well as to scholars. Secondly, by drawing on the insights of feminist-informed 
scholarship on domestic abuse and on conflict and post-conflict forms of gender-based violence, 
my study explores the ways in which perceptions and responses to abuse are shaped by the 
structures and ideologies of a specifically military gender culture. My study thus contributes 
towards understanding responses to domestic abuse in the British military context, and in 
particular the help-seeking decisions of victim-survivors, in important and original ways.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology  
Reflections on epistemology, politics, process, and ethics  
 
The methods that we use to investigate questions in social science, like the questions themselves, 
are not innocent. Our theoretical underpinnings and decisions shape who and what we study, 
how we do it, and how we use the knowledge we construct. An exploration of methodology, 
therefore, should not consist simply of the ways one collects data, but should include 
consideration of one’s epistemology and of the ethical and political implications of the work 
(Wickramasinghe 2010: 8). This chapter explores the feminist-informed, post-positivist, 
qualitative approach which underpins this study; an approach which has been selected because it 
allows me to gather in-depth, experiential data with which to make sense of the ways in which 
responses to domestic abuse are shaped by the arrangements of gender and of power at work in 
the British military context. In particular, this chapter focuses on the issues where significant 
decisions have had to be made about how best to approach the research: such as whether or not 
to build a relationship with the military institution; what kind of sample to pursue; and what kind 
of data collection method to use. Following feminist insights about the importance of reflexivity, 
paying close attention to my methodological decisions enables informed evaluations to be made 
of the study as a whole. Accordingly, I begin this chapter with some broader reflections on the 
epistemological approach which informs my work, my personal investment in the study, and the 
relationship of the study as a whole to the military institution. I follow this with a more detailed 
and focused discussion of the processes through which the research was conducted. This is 
organised chronologically, from sampling and recruiting interview participants, to conducting the 
interviews and analysing the transcripts.  
 
Ethical considerations are a centrally important element of any research with human subjects. 
However, as I discuss in this chapter, a number of scholars have suggested that an ethical 
approach is particularly important, and that ethics warrant particular attention, when studying 
‘vulnerable’ populations and sensitive issues such as domestic abuse (e.g. Abrahams et al. 2004; 
Clark and Walker 2011; Fontes 2004; Lee and Renzetti 1990; Lee 1993). While others have argued 
against this blanket assumption of vulnerability - suggesting that this itself constitutes a 
problematic and ethically questionable approach (e.g. Downes et al. 2014) - I take the view that 
all research must be centred upon a consideration of ethics, and thus ethical reflection is a key 
concern of this chapter. The final section of the chapter focuses in particular on the important 
ethical issue of the safety and wellbeing of participants; in addition, however, broader discussions 
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of ethics are woven throughout the chapter. Research ethics are always complex and rarely 
straight-forward, and like much research this study generates ethical questions which are not 
clear-cut and which cannot be resolved with a totally satisfactory solution (Fontes 2004: 171). As 
such, this chapter does not pretend to be able to offer final or conclusive statements on the 
ethics of the research, but rather to lay out the balancing processes I have used and the decisions 
I have made.  
 
 
Epistemology: reflexivity, a qualitative paradigm, and post-positivism  
Epistemology, defined as “a framework or theory for specifying the constitution and generation 
of knowledge about the social world” (Stanley and Wise 1993: 188), has a structuring impact on 
the process of research. Like many feminists, I resist the epistemological tenets of the positivist 
paradigm of social science, which rests on the assumption that knowledge (as in objective ‘facts’) 
can exist independently of the knower and abstracted from its context. Within this paradigm, the 
context of knowing is deemed unimportant (Code 1995: 13-18), and opinion, values and 
emotional involvement are considered both separate from and dangerous to objective facts 
(Acker et al. 1983: 427; Reinharz and Davidman 1992: 233). Positivists thus aim for what Haraway 
(1988: 584) labelled “the god-trick” - the ability to transcend social location and lived experience 
and to occupy a detached location as neutral observer. Feminists such as Haraway (1988), 
Harding (1991) and Hawkesworth (1989: 458-59) have challenged this paradigm, arguing that all 
knowledges are partial in that they are produced and known in specific circumstances by a 
socially located knower. A researcher’s theoretical frameworks, and therefore the questions they 
ask and the knowledge they create, are shaped by their embeddedness in the social world 
(Hawkesworth 1989: 549-50; Maynard 1994: 16). Moreover, feminist epistemologists have 
argued that “knowledge is not only partial, it is also not innocent” (Wickramasinghe 2010: 42). 
That is, no research is apolitical, and the assumption that certain knowledge is objective allows 
those with the power to define their knowledge as such to distort the research agenda, and 
relegates the knowledge of ‘others’ to the status of partial, biased, applicable only to a given 
‘special interest group,’ or mere ‘values’ (Acker et al. 1983: 424; Code 1995: 16-17; Mies 1983: 
118). 
 
Rather than aiming to research from a position of value-free abstraction in which the object of 
study is positioned as “the ‘other’ who cannot reflect back on and affect the knower” (Acker et al. 
1983: 427), feminist epistemologists contend that those producing knowledge should accept their 
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embeddedness in the social world of the research and aim instead for “conscious partiality” (Mies 
1983: 122). That is, we aim for explicit recognition of the social and cultural assumptions and 
experiences which construct our subjectivity as researchers and thus the research we choose to 
do, analysing the social context in which knowledge is created and the impact of this upon the 
knowledge itself (McCorkel and Myers 2003: 202-03). The findings of any given research 
endeavour are therefore claimed not as a universal and enduring truth, but as a product of this 
particular social process of research (Reinharz and Davidman 1992: 212). It is worth mentioning 
here that this does not indicate a slide into relativism: that no ‘truth’ can be described as 
universal does not mean that no knowledge claim can be prioritised over others. It remains 
imperative to retain the ability to critique misogyny and to produce knowledge which can claim 
the authority to lead to social change (Hawkesworth 1989: 537; Scheper-Hughes 1995).  
 
Given the importance of one’s social location on the research that one chooses to do and the 
findings one generates, feminist researchers have argued for the importance of reflective practice 
in order to “reflect on, examine critically, and explore analytically the nature of the research 
process” (Fonow and Cook 2005: 2218). In reflexive work, researchers “subject themselves to the 
same level of scrutiny they direct toward the subjects of their research” (McCorkel and Myers 
2003: 203), analysing the roles that “thoughts, emotions, experiences, assumptions, intentions, 
imaginations and consciousness of the self play in researching” (Wickramasinghe 2010: 56; see 
also Corcoran 2005: 139). For some scholars (e.g. Davies 2012; Leatherby 2000; Wickramasinghe 
2010: 58-61), this process begins by explicitly writing oneself into the text, outlining one’s social 
positioning or the personal experiences which led one to be involved in the particular piece of 
research. In my case, this might consist of a sketch of my social and political location as a white, 
middle-class British woman without direct links to the military, with a broadly anti-militarist 
viewpoint and an involvement in feminism as an academic, activist and support practitioner. I 
could discuss how my employment in the fundraising department at a domestic violence charity, 
combined with an increasing interest in anti-war politics, led to my being asked by the charity to 
contribute to a response to a BBC Radio Four documentary programme which proposed to 
describe domestic abuse in the military as a “symptom” of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
along with insomnia, panic attacks, and flashbacks. I could go on to explain how it was the 
frustration that I felt at this ignorance of everything I had come to know and to believe about 
domestic abuse that led me to research the issue further and to decide to pursue the subject 
through PhD research at the Gender Institute at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, accompanied by part-time employment on a domestic abuse telephone helpline. 
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However, listing characteristics and experiences in this way runs the risk of fixing them into static 
entities, and in the process erasing their fluidity and context specificity as well as the ways in 
which they are, in turn, shaped by the research process itself (Reinharz and Davidman 1992: 194-
96; Wickramasinghe 2010: 71). Moreover, simply sketching my social location and the evolution 
of my research interests is insufficient: as Alcoff (1995: 112) contends, doing so without critically 
engaging with the way in which this shapes one’s research agendas leaves the work of analysing 
its impact to the reader, in some cases acting as a disclaimer against ignorance and absolving the 
researcher from being fully accountable for her work. My critical engagements with these issues, 
then, begin below. 
 
The story I tell above about my coming to this research topic from a place of frustration with the 
depoliticisation of domestic abuse has had an important shaping effect on the way I have 
approached the work. Specifically, I approach the research from a feminist-informed, expressly 
political start point which centres the experiences of victim-survivors and aims to draw 
connections between individual experiences and the wider social milieu in which they are 
situated. Feminist scholars have drawn attention to the importance of research which does not 
aim to be neutral but which is instead “politically and morally engaged” (Scheper-Hughes 1995; 
Sev’er 2002: 10-11). My politically informed and politically targeted approach lies at the root of 
my decision to use qualitative methods, as feminists have identified a qualitative approach as 
effective for getting the issue of gender violence onto public and political agendas, in particular 
on topics - such as domestic abuse in the British military - about which there is little existing 
knowledge (Griffiths and Hanmer 2005: 23). Moreover, my qualitative approach most effectively 
allows for a troubling of many of the assumptions embedded in much of the “problem-solving” 
approach to abuse embedded in the literature that I critique in Chapter Two, as it enables me to 
centre the multifaceted lived experiences of the victim-survivors who participated in this study. In 
addition, while my sample does consist of support workers and perpetrators as well as victim-
survivors of abuse, my political start-point is at the root of my decision to centre the experience 
of victim-survivors in my analysis - to treat victim-survivors themselves as the “experts” on their 
own experiences (Hage 2006: 85). Centring the voices of victim-survivors is politically important in 
order to challenge both victim-blaming discourses (Thapar-Björkert and Morgan 2010: 33-37) and 
the “culture of disbelief” (Hawkins and Laxton 2014: 17) which have been identified in relation to 
understandings of domestic abuse in the UK. That a culture of disbelief in relation to domestic 
abuse may exist in the military space was highlighted to me throughout the course of developing 
this thesis when, on presenting preliminary findings, I immediately faced the question from 
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military and quasi-military support staff: “But how do you know she is telling the truth?” 
Countering this culture of disbelief around women’s experiences of abuse is an important part of 
the political work of this thesis.  
 
 
Research relationship with the military institution  
Scholars have raised specific concerns about researchers working with the military institution 
because of the possibility that such research may itself become militarised as a result. Jenkings et 
al. express concern that collaboration with the military institution requires researchers to accept 
institutional conceptualisations of the world and institutionally accepted research methodologies 
- factors which are particularly important in the design and operation of research. This 
requirement leaves Jenkings et al. to conclude that while close relationships between researchers 
and the institution facilitate research, they also shape the type of research which can be 
produced; that is, “[r]esearch based on high levels of access within military forces is more likely to 
accord with the conceptual world-views of those forces and their governing institutions” (2011: 
44-45). Similarly, scholars including Enloe (2010: 1107) and  Cohn (1987: 704-07) have warned 
that while becoming fluent in the language of military institutions is likely to build rapport and 
facilitate research relationships, it is also likely to delimit the questions that researchers are able 
to ask and to diminish the criticality of their approach - in Enloe’s words, “If one is eager to be 
held in high regard - to be “taken seriously” - by the institution’s senior players, one could begin 
to adopt not only their language, but their priorities, even their outlook on the world” (2010: 
1107). Finally, for Basham, there is a "significant risk that engaging with militaries legitimates 
their practices, or that in offering relevant policy findings, scholars may enhance military 
effectiveness, intentionally or otherwise" (2013: 3; see also Ben-Ari and Levy 2014; Ouellet 2005; 
Stavrianakis 2006). 
 
The working relationship I have developed with the military institution plays only a minor role in 
my research - the work was not commissioned or funded by the MOD or the military, and no part 
of the MOD or the military was involved with the research from its inception. When I began the 
research, the military was unaware that it was taking place, and 37 of my total 45 interviews were 
carried out before I sought a relationship with the institution. Indeed, having read the work of the 
scholars cited above, when I began the project I did not intend to seek any official relationship 
with the military institution. This changed during the course of conducting the initial research 
interviews, when I began to feel that not engaging with the military institution would cause there 
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to be a significant gap in the contribution that my research makes - both to academic knowledge 
and to support practice. This is because, as I explore in Chapter Two, responses to abuse must be 
approached within their social context in order to be understood; and this means paying critical 
attention to the gendered culture of the military institution itself - including, for example, the 
culture of disbelief pointed to above. Moreover, it also means paying focused attention to how 
military support workers understand abuse in general, and victim-survivors and their help-seeking 
more specifically. It was therefore necessary to build a relationship with the institution in order to 
gain access to interview people within it, as this helped me to understand how support workers 
interpret and enact their roles in relation to abuse in the British military context.  
  
My relationship with the military has been limited to their role as gatekeepers for the eight 
interviews I carried out with participants I refer to as ‘military support workers.’ My working 
relationship with the military has thus been only partial and, as a result, I have managed to avoid 
some of the problems which the scholars cited above warn about. The institution has not, for 
example, been involved in the design of the research, and they will not own or make any 
contribution to any of its outputs - although I have agreed to share documents with them before 
they are published, to allow them to prepare a response if necessary. As a result, I will be able to 
centre arguments and to publish work which expressly engages with the military from a critical 
perspective in addition to focusing on issues which the institution itself might find more ‘useful.’  
 
Despite its limited scope, however, this relationship has required that I make certain 
compromises and adjustments. For example, the military gatekeepers with whom I negotiated 
access were concerned about the potential for negative press to emerge from the research, 
particularly around the relationship between PTSD and the perpetration of domestic abuse. This 
is not surprising, given the levels of media interest in combat-related PTSD in recent years which 
has positioned PTSD as a causal factor in the violence perpetrated by servicemen
71
 and in their 
suicides
72
, and the criticism that the MOD has faced for failing to adequately prepare and support 
its personnel
73
 (McGeorge et al. 2006). Perhaps as a result, military gatekeepers removed specific 
references to PTSD as a possible cause of domestic abuse from the interview topic guides used 
with military support worker participants at a fairly early stage. This was not a particular problem 
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for the research - the kind of access and the study itself are not geared towards establishing 
causality in the kind of way that the gatekeepers seemed to be concerned about, and as I make 
clear in Chapter Seven, I too have significant (albeit perhaps different) reservations about the 
political impact of scholarship which identifies PTSD as causal of domestic abuse. Moreover, given 
the loosely structured, participant-led approach I took to interviewing (discussed below), while I 
did not ask military support worker participants about the causal relationship between PTSD and 
domestic abuse, almost all brought this issue up of their own accord (see Chapter Seven). This 
demonstrates the difficulty - if not the impossibility - of artificially excluding issues which have 
come to feature in dominant narratives around a given topic from research interviews of this 
type.  
 
In the process of negotiating access through the military it was required that I provide “Clear 
identification of the benefits of the research to the MOD” (personal communication with military 
gatekeeper). As a result, I have committed to producing a report, tailored for military welfare 
services, using my research to provide a window into the ways in which current military welfare 
practices are actually functioning on the ground. This report will aim to help military welfare 
services to better understand the kind of impacts that their policies are having and to think 
through how best to improve them. In this way, my research contributes to policy discussions 
within the MOD around the appropriate response of the military to domestic abuse. Given the 
importance that the military places on managing the lives and wellbeing of its families in the 
name of operational effectiveness (Bourg and Segal 1999; Gray 2015; Wood et al. 1995; see also 
Chapters Four and Six), it may be the case that, in some small way, the research does accord with 
military aims, and thus may be understood to be ‘for’ the institution itself - something which the 
scholars cited at the beginning of this section caution against.  
 
However, I want to argue against the binary assumption that research can only be ‘for’ or 
‘against’ the military. Indeed, while I do recognise the potential difficulties of working with the 
institution, I also think that doing the research without involving military personnel would itself 
be problematic. What would it be to assume that I know how ‘the military’ - whatever that is - 
approaches and conceptualises domestic abuse without listening to what it is that the people 
within the institution say and do? Institutions are made up of people, and thus, without paying 
critical attention to the complexities of the experiences and views of the people who live in and 
constitute the military institution, we are in danger of making disembodied, over-generalised, and 
over-simplified critiques - critiques which will, in the end, not possess the same potential for 
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producing increased understanding and positive change. Engaging in fieldwork with military 
personnel has the potential to make more complex the critiques which we originally thought we 
might make, as encounters with the embodied object of research brings the messiness and 
complexity of social life to the fore (Basham 2013: 3-4). As Bulmer suggests,  
 
isn’t this what feminist research is about? Engaging the military community in a 
genuine dialogue that deepens our understandings of militarisation and war, and 
actively intervening in those processes and subjecting them to critique - for me this is 
at the heart of feminist praxis.  
(Baker et al. forthcoming: 7) 
 
Moreover, given that engagement with the institution is how policies which relate to military 
families are made, I could not have expected to have any form of positive impact on the 
experiences of victim-survivors in this context if I did not engage with the institution - and this, I 
suggest, would be an ethical failing. Even accepting that the policy impact of this research is likely 
to be small, to foreclose any possibility for contributing - as I may have done by failing to engage 
with the institution - would not have been ethically sound. While it may prove difficult, in 
particular as more of the research is disseminated in various ways, I have endeavoured 
throughout the project to strike a balance between practical interventions which the military 
might find useful, and broader, systemic critique of the operations of the military institution and 
of militarism itself.  
 
 
Sampling and access 
Having laid out some of the underlying themes which underpin all of the methodological 
considerations of this chapter, I now move on to a more specific discussion of the ways in which 
the research has been conducted. I explore this chronologically - beginning with an exploration of 
sampling and access. I have conducted interviews with 45 participants, who can be divided into 
three main groups: victim-survivors, perpetrators, and support workers. Participants were 
accessed using a convenience sampling technique - a non-representative, non-random sampling 
technique which involves recruiting participants who are most easily available to take part 
(Robson 1993: 141). As Lee points out, it is often particularly difficult to recruit participants for 
research on sensitive topics (Lee 1993: 60), and given the difficulties of identifying and recruiting 
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people to take part in this study, I felt that a convenience approach to sampling offered the most 
realistic prospect for accessing participants.  
 
The sample 
I interviewed 18 victim-survivors of abuse - women who had experienced domestic abuse in 
previous heterosexual relationships with personnel serving in the British military. Thirteen of 
these participants had been abused by men serving in the Army, four by men serving in the RAF, 
and one by a serviceman in the Navy. All of these participants had experienced abuse in 
relationships with servicemen in what the military refers to as ‘other ranks’ - that is, ranks below 
the officer ranks. The issue of rank is an important one, and my lack of participants who 
experienced abuse in relationships with higher ranked personnel is a significant limitation of my 
sample. While scholars and activists have argued that domestic abuse occurs across socio-
economic class groups
74
 (Walby and Allen 2004: 78), military support worker participants in this 
study assured me that, reflecting my sample, the overwhelming majority (although not all) of 
those who come to them for support in relation to domestic abuse are from ‘other rank’ 
backgrounds. In civilian contexts, scholars have suggested that women from lower socio-
economic backgrounds are more likely than others to seek help for abuse through official 
channels because they are likely to lack the financial resources to end the relationship without 
such support (Dobash and Dobash 1992: 56; Sullivan and Cain 2004: 610), and others have 
suggested that women from high-income backgrounds may be particularly discouraged from 
speaking out about abuse due to social stigma (Kaukinen et al. 2013: 594; Walby and Allen 2004: 
98). It is likely that similar issues are shaping the class profile of those seeking help within military 
institutions, and - as my sample was accessed through support organisations (see below) - these 
factors are also likely to have influenced the social characteristics of my participants. This 
represents a weakness in my sample, and further research which looks across the rank spectrum 
would be valuable. The majority of victim-survivor participants (11) identified as white British, 
one as black British, one as mixed-race British, and one as white European. The remaining four 
participants had come to Britain from Commonwealth countries as the wives of Foreign and 
Commonwealth (F&C) personnel - two from Fiji, and two whose precise national origin I have 
chosen not to reveal in order to protect their anonymity because of the very small communities 
within the military from which they are drawn. All of the participants had chosen to access 
military welfare as opposed to civilian or quasi-military services in the first instance when seeking 
help for the abuse they experienced. I also conducted interviews with three perpetrators of 
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abuse, all of whom were serving in the British Army at the time of the interview. All perpetrator 
participants were below officer rank, and all were white British.  
 
Because professionals are likely to have privileged knowledge about the general structure and 
experiences of stigmatised and hidden populations such as victim-survivors and perpetrators of 
abuse (Lee 1993: 73-74), I also interviewed 24 participants who had experience of supporting 
either or both of these groups in a military and/or a civilian capacity. With the exception of one of 
the support workers who was Fijian, all participants identified as white British. Of these I refer to 
eight as ‘military’ support workers. These are serving military personnel in a support role - 
including but not limited to the Army Welfare Service, the Royal Naval and Royal Marines Welfare 
Service, and the various branches of the military police. Of these, six were in the Army, one in the 
RAF, and one in the Navy. While attempts were made to recruit Unit Welfare Officers as 
participants, these were unsuccessful. Another eight of the support workers worked in what I 
refer to as ‘quasi-military’ roles - that is, they themselves were not military personnel, but they 
worked in roles where their clients were exclusively military personnel and their families. This 
includes military-specific charities and support/advocacy organisations. Six of these participants 
worked across the three services of Army, Navy, and RAF, one worked exclusively with the Army, 
and one exclusively with the RAF. Finally, I spoke to eight ‘civilian’ support workers - those who 
work in mainstream civilian organisations including refuge workers, social workers, and the 
police, whose geographical location meant that they regularly came into contact with military 
personnel and their families. It is worth noting that while this represents the organisations that 
support worker participants were involved with at the time of the interview, there was 
considerable cross-over in their past experience and several of the quasi-military and civilian 
support workers had previous experience of working in a military welfare role.  
 
Clearly, representation of the three services of Army, Navy, and RAF is unequal across my sample. 
The dominance of the Army in military research is not restricted to my study, but characterises 
much research into the British Armed Forces. While there are of course some exceptions (e.g. 
Bulmer 2013; de Bere 2003), much important work in the British context looks only at the Army 
experience (e.g. Atherton 2009; Green et al. 2010; Hockey 1986; Ware 2012; Woodward and 
Winter 2007), and other texts which look across the services do not always disaggregate their 
participants by service (Higate and Cameron 2004; 2006). In some cases, the focus on the Army is 
deliberate: Woodward and Winter, for example, chose an Army focus for their study of military 
gender because it is the Army which has the highest proportion of men, the lowest proportion of 
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women, and the highest proportion of posts that are open only to men of the three British 
services (Woodward and Winter 2007: 6). Although it is not explicitly stated, in other cases it is 
likely that the emphasis on the Army in the literature reflects the relative sizes of the three 
forces: in July 2014 the Army had 94,370 personnel, the RAF 35,690, and the Navy 33,610 
(Rutherford and Berman 2014: 5). In my case, the different representation is rooted in my 
pragmatic choice of a convenience sampling technique. There are many important similarities 
which exist across the services, but there is no doubt that there are also significant differences 
between the experiences of abuse across the three, rooted in their different welfare structures, 
housing situations, and patterns of deployment. My generalisation of participants’ experiences 
under the label of ‘military’ is motivated by the exploratory approach which this study takes to a 
previously under-researched topic; and future research which pays more attention to the 
specifics of each service would be valuable.  
 
For ethical reasons, victim-survivor participants were no longer in the abusive relationship at the 
time of the interview. Domestic abuse can pose a serious risk to women’s safety and, in some 
cases, to their lives. As a result, research into domestic abuse is described by scholars as 
“sensitive,” and victim-survivor participants in particular are often described as a “vulnerable” 
group (Abrahams et al. 2004; Clark and Walker 2011; Fontes 2004; Lee and Renzetti 1990; Lee 
1993). Studies which include victim-survivor participants who remain in abusive relationships 
often require complex protocols to protect the safety of participants (Langford 2000; Sullivan and 
Cain 2004). Discussing abuse for research purposes may expose participants to retaliation from 
abusers (Bacchus et al. 2002: 206; Ellsberg et al. 2001: 3), and the risk of abusers finding out is far 
more significant if they remain the participant’s current partner. Although many victim-survivors 
possess the agency and capacity to decide to take part in “informed risk taking” (Abrahams et al. 
2004: 199-200), as Fontes (2004: 145) points out, because of the controlling and often 
unpredictable behaviour of abusers, it may be that some cannot reliably predict how participating 
in research may impact on their safety across time. She states:  
 
Interviewing a victim of severe marital violence in her home one night might be 
perfectly safe, for instance, whereas the next night it could be potentially fatal to the 
interviewer and the interviewed. The consequences of a given research procedure 
might also be dire but not immediate, for instance, when information reported one  
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day could potentially result in tangles with the legal or child protective systems far 
down the road. 
(Fontes 2004: 145) 
 
However, my decision to interview only participants who were no longer in the abusive 
relationship also has negative ethical implications, as the silencing of women can be understood 
as paternalistic (Abrahams et al. 2004: 199-200). Excluding entire groups of participants (as 
opposed to specific individuals) is overly simplistic, denies the agency of individuals (Perry 2009: 
14-15), and risks sending the message that the whole group is total vulnerable and thus not able 
to give meaningful consent (McDonald and Keys 2008: 79-80). As Becker-Blease and Freyd put it, 
“[t]reating survivors as overly vulnerable risks repeating abuse dynamics that cause further harm” 
(2006: 223-24). While the aim of research is, of course, to produce knowledge and not to provide 
therapeutic benefits, scholars have shown that taking part in research into violence and abuse 
can have benefits for victim-survivor participants - including being made to feel valued, being 
treated with respect, having their stories validated, and finding the experience meaningful - and 
excluding entire groups of participants means excluding them from these benefits (Abrahams et 
al. 2004: 205; Cromer et al. 2006; Cromer and Newman 2011; DePrince and Chu 2008; Downes et 
al. 2014; Newman et al. 1999). As with many ethical issues, it may be that there is no complete or 
satisfactory solution to this question (Fontes 2004: 171), and researchers can only seek to strike 
the right balance and to minimise the potential for harm (Griffin et al. 2003: 221). Whether or not 
victim-survivor participants are seen as vulnerable, scholars have pointed out that the rights, 
welfare, and dignity of all research participants should be treated with care and attention - and 
that to single out particular groups of participants obscures the possibility that in any social 
research situation violence and abuse may be disclosed, or particular questions may unexpectedly 
resonate with participants in ways which might cause harm (Downes et al. 2014). This point was 
illustrated powerfully to me in an interview in which a support worker participant unexpectedly 
disclosed that she was herself a victim-survivor of domestic abuse. Particular ethical care must 
therefore be taken to protect the welfare of all research participants (Cromer and Newman 2011; 
Downes et al. 2014).  
 
In addition to the above, the fact that all victim-survivor participants had left the relationship in 
which they were abused also has implications for the quality of my data. This is because women 
who have left abusive relationships are a specific, self-selecting sub-group of victim-survivors 
more broadly. While a small sample such as that used in this study could not be representative of 
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the experiences of the wider population, this group represents a specific section of the 
population whose characteristics may in fact be systematically different from those of others. In 
terms of victim-survivors, although researchers, practitioners and the wider public often assume 
that leaving the relationship is the only sensible choice, not all victim-survivors will choose this 
option (Thapar-Björkert and Morgan 2010: 45-46), and by speaking only to those who do, I 
inevitably only have access to a particular subset of experiences. Indeed, while I approach 
responses to abuse fairly broadly, and while I did try to speak with participants about a range of 
experiences, most of the narratives which emerged from the interviews conceptualised responses 
to abuse somewhat narrowly in terms of accessing official agencies and of ending the 
relationship. As noted above, it may be that those who come into contact with official support 
agencies are more likely than others to belong to particular socio-economic class groups. 
Moreover, the experience of leaving the relationship, and of discussing experiences with support 
agencies, is likely to have had an impact on the ways in which women make sense of their 
experiences. My data would likely have been different if my sample had also included women 
who remained in the abusive relationship.  
 
Gaining access through gatekeepers  
Participants were recruited through agencies from which they had received support or, in the 
case of support worker participants, at which they were employed. As such, it was necessary to 
earn the trust of, and to negotiate access through, gatekeepers (Lee 1993: 123-24). Gatekeepers 
are defined as “those individuals in an organisation that have the power to withhold access to 
people or situations for the purposes of research” (Miniechello et al. 1997: 171) - and in this 
study, gatekeepers were the military authorities and the support workers (whether military, 
quasi-military, or civilian) who facilitated my access to participants. In terms of the women’s 
support services and some of the quasi-military services, I found that my employment on a 
domestic violence support helpline helped to facilitate access. I think that this encouraged 
gatekeepers to read me as a responsible researcher, with an acceptable level of knowledge of the 
topic and of the importance of protecting the safety of research participants. Gaining trust from 
the military institution itself was more difficult because I lacked pre-constituted relationships with 
the military and because, as Enloe notes, the British military has generally been fairly reticent to 
allow access to civilian researchers (2000, 160-161). In order to interview serving military welfare 
workers, I had to get both non-financial ‘sponsorship’ for the research from the Army Welfare 
Service and ethical approval through the MOD’s Research Ethics Committee (MODREC). This 
process was lengthy - although I initially began trying to get access to interview MOD welfare 
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personnel in March 2013, I did not receive final permission to begin these interviews until June 
2014. The MODREC process itself involved the completion of a form outlining the aims, methods, 
and ethical implications of the work, and a meeting with members of the MODREC Committee at 
which I answered questions about the practical and ethical issues surrounding the research. 
 
For Lee (1993: 9), gaining trust from gatekeepers is more difficult when the organisations involved 
have a strong idea of the division between insiders and outsiders. While scholars have suggested 
that these binary categories are too rigid, do not capture the complex, shifting nature of identity 
and research relationships, and mask the power involved in the social constructions ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ in any given circumstance (Mullings 1999: 337-50; Naples 1996: 85; Thapar-Björkert 
and Henry 2004: 369), this divide has been thought to have particular relevance in military 
contexts (Ben-Ari and Levy 2014). For Higate and Cameron: 
 
Military culture is characterised by the creation of insider and outsider categories 
between military personnel and civilians […] the military continues to present 
particular challenges to social researchers in this way, the “them” and “us” 
dichotomy may impact on […] the nature of the interaction civilian researchers might 
have with their military participants.  
(Higate and Cameron 2006: 224) 
 
The process of gaining access (as well as the process of interviewing, as I discuss below) brought 
to the fore some of the subtleties involved in the distinction between insider and outsider, as well 
as some of the ways in which my own social positioning and modes of embodiment played a role. 
That is, while I am a complete outsider in terms of the formal boundaries of the institution, I think 
that I was read in some ways as both knowable and unthreatening by those with whom I was 
interacting within the military and the MOD - and thus not as a hostile kind of ‘other’ who is not 
to be trusted. 
 
The military institution has been described as a “masculinised organisation” (Higate and Cameron 
2006: 222), and, as such, my presence as a woman, and the way in which my femaleness was 
interpreted and given meaning during the process of obtaining access and of conducting the 
interviews themselves, is particularly worthy of consideration. While some scholars have 
emphasised the limitations experienced by female researchers in masculinised environments, 
who may feel disempowered or curtailed by expectations that they behave in an appropriately 
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feminine manner (Huggins and Glebbeek 2003: 375; Reinharz and Davidman 1992: 60-61), others 
have highlighted the opportunities which can be afforded - and this reflects more closely my own 
experiences (e.g. Lomsky-Feder 1996). Glebbeek, for example, argues that her femaleness 
encouraged participants to read her as unthreatening, which gave her access to participants 
which she might not otherwise have had:  
 
I could just show up at officials’ offices without an appointment - something that 
presumably a naïve young foreign woman ‘would do’ - take them by surprise, use a 
little charm - something that they expected a young woman to do - and get an 
interview on the spot. Somewhat later, after I had gained access […] I was allowed to 
navigate relatively freely, perhaps because, as a young woman […] I was considered 
unthreatening. 
(Huggins and Glebbeek 2003: 370) 
 
Similarly, I think that as a young, white, cis woman, with a middle-class accent, fairly small 
stature, and fairly normative gender presentation, who is often thought to be younger than I am, I 
too was read as relatively unthreatening by gatekeepers and participants. It is important to note 
that I am not suggesting that as a young, middle-class, white, cis woman I somehow am 
unthreatening, but that social structures of privilege and discrimination make it more likely that I 
would be read in such a way than may be the case for differently located social subjects. In some 
ways I did deliberately invoke these assumptions - for example, I was particularly conscious about 
performing a certain kind of normative femininity when I attended the MODREC meeting at MOD 
headquarters. The committee members who attended my MODREC meeting included both 
military members and civilians, were mostly drawn from the medical sciences, and were 
overwhelmingly white and male. I had received advice in the run up to the meeting to try to come 
across to the board as deferential, demure, and willing, or even eager, to accept and to 
incorporate the superior expertise of the committee members into my plans – attributes which 
might be associated with Connell’s (1987) model of “emphasised femininity” (see Chapter Four). 
Following this, I dressed in a smart but traditionally feminine way, I held my body straight but 
used deferential body language, and I spoke in a demure and accommodating manner. This is not 
to suggest that I was deceptive, but simply that I was more aware than might otherwise have 
been the case of my gendered performance. In other instances, I felt that elements of my social 
location over which I have little control were shaping my interactions with MOD and military 
gatekeepers in helpful ways. This was most obvious around my class and ethnic background. For 
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example, I remember separate initial meetings with three individual (white, male) military and 
MOD personnel at which they each told me that they have daughters called Harriet - always 
stated in a way which I felt invited me inside, letting me know that I was being read as 
unthreatening, familiar, in some way ‘one of us.’ As I discuss in Chapter Seven, I was surprised to 
find that many of the military gatekeepers and participants who I encountered did not 
understand domestic abuse as a feminist issue. Instead, most viewed it as a welfare issue, one 
which was often approached from a therapeutic, paternalistic, or social work orientated 
viewpoint. Although I of course have no evidence for this, I suspect that, had my gender 
presentation been less normative or less middle-class - had I been read as somehow more radical, 
or even, in a stereotypical imaging, as more feminist - more questions may have been raised 
about the political underpinnings of my research.  
 
This raises two ethical quandaries. First, by taking advantage of my ability to be read in certain 
ways which reproduce particular ideas of a knowable, partial ‘outsider’ identity, it is possible that 
I am legitimating and reifying problematic assumptions about what is respectable, trustworthy, 
and valid. The ethical status of taking advantage of my social position of white, cis, heterosexual, 
and class privilege in this way is questionable. Moreover, although I have not been deceptive 
about the approach of the research, I may have allowed gatekeepers and participants to make 
certain assumptions which mean that they are surprised when they find that my interpretation of 
their words does not closely accord with their own. Reflecting this, in his research into the role of 
the military in everyday life in the US, Wall made an instrumental decision not to openly disclose 
his anti-militarist politics to participants, feeling that doing so would discourage them from 
consenting to be interviewed. As a result, he was similarly concerned that the story that the 
research told would not be that which his participants would either expect or be happy with 
(2011: 135-136). However, as Wall points out, it is not only gatekeepers and participants to whom 
the researcher is ethically bound - our responsibilities must also extend to those “distant others” 
on whom the topic of the research impacts (ibid.: 128-29). That is, in addition to the ethical 
responsibility I have to participants, I have an ethical responsibility to the broader community of 
victim-survivors of domestic abuse in the military context to make sure that their voices, and the 
wider political critiques which their experiences can help to inform, are heard.  
 
Participant consent 
Although the involvement of gatekeepers is common practice in research on sensitive topics, it 
does complicate the power relationships of the research. Gatekeepers can have a considerable 
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amount of power, and may attempt to control the research in a range of ways (Sanghera and 
Thapar-Bjorkert 2008: 549). While gatekeepers who refuse permission to researchers prevent 
individuals from making their own decisions on participation, their support for a study can make it 
difficult for potential participants to refuse to take part (Fontes 2004: 147; Lal 1996: 196; 
Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert 2008; Tisdall 2002: 139-41). As a result, particular care was taken in 
ensuring that participants did not feel pressurised into taking part in the research against their 
will, and that informed consent was obtained.  
 
Gatekeepers were given information about the research, including an outline of the project and 
my contact information, and asked to share this with potential participants through a number of 
means, including flyers given directly to those who might be interested, emails sent to current 
and former clients, posters displayed in safe-spaces such as refuges, and on social media feeds. In 
most cases, individuals who received this information and were interested in participating then 
got in touch with me directly, usually by email. After being sent additional information including 
the confidentiality and anonymity polices of the research, we arranged a mutually convenient 
time and place for the interview to occur. This process was instated in order to try to minimise 
the involvement of gatekeepers, to reduce the possibility that potential participants felt 
pressured by gatekeepers into taking part. Interviews were conducted in a number of locations 
including participants’ homes and offices, support services, and alternative spaces that I 
organised including a private room at a local Citizens Advice Bureau and at a university. As I 
travelled to participants’ locales, they did not incur significant travel costs and I did not pay them 
expenses or other financial compensations. On a few occasions, gatekeepers were more directly 
involved in the recruitment of participants, for example when I visited a refuge and interviewed a 
number of those currently residing there. In some other situations, I interviewed those who had 
themselves acted as gatekeepers to help me to access other interview participants, and in these 
cases I asked gatekeepers directly if they would consent to an interview. I ensured that the 
voluntary nature of their involvement was stressed to all participants both in pre-interview 
communications and at the beginning of the interview itself.   
 
All participants read and signed a consent form at the beginning of the interview which gave 
information about the study and its confidentiality and anonymity policies. In addition, consent 
was seen as an ongoing process as opposed to an initial, one-off event, as the participant’s 
willingness to continue with the research can change as they go through the process (Abrahams 
et al. 2004: 198; Fontes 2004: 147; Lee 1993: 103; McCarry 2005: 94-95). I emphasised to 
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participants that they had the right to avoid topics they did not wish to discuss, to ask for the 
voice recorder to be turned off, and to end the interview at any time.  
 
 
The interview itself 
My data collection method was in-depth, semi-structured interviews. The vast majority of the 
interviews were carried out in person, although two had to be conducted on the phone for 
practical reasons, and one, at the request of the participant, was conducted via an ongoing email 
conversation. With the permission of participants, interviews were recorded and transcribed by 
me. Two participants declined permission to record the interviews, and instead I took extensive 
notes throughout the interview. I kept a research diary around each interview encounter which 
recorded other impressions gathered from the interview such as participants’ body language and 
other non-verbal communications (Reinharz and Davidman 1992: 20, 40), as well as my own 
emotional reaction to what was said and in what manner (Conway 2008: 350).  
 
Qualitative interviewing is a method which has been used extensively to study women’s 
experiences of violence (Lewis et al. 2002: 50-51), and which has enabled me to gain a good 
understanding of participants’ constructions of their own experiences and realities. While I did 
enter the interviews with pre-prepared topic guides and I did prompt participants with the 
questions on it when there was a lull in discussion, as far as possible I encouraged participants to 
guide the conversation around the issues which they felt were important, move at their own 
pace, lead and focus the discussion, and explore their experiences in their own words (Acker et al. 
1983: 426; Campbell 2002: 68; Reinharz and Davidman 1992; Skinner 2005: 49; Thapar-Björkert 
and Henry 2004). If participants raised issues which were not on my topic guide but which they 
felt were particularly relevant to their experiences, I allowed the interview to continue in the 
direction they had identified. This interviewing method allowed me both to gain greater 
understanding of the issues which I had expected to emerge and to remain open to the 
emergence of unforeseen themes - to think beyond my preconceived notions of what was 
important and to encourage participants to name and to define their own experiences and 
realities (Hage 2006: 85). This approach has helped me to expose some of the gaps and 
misconceptions which underpin much of the more positivist, quantitative research into domestic 
abuse in military contexts which I outlined in the previous chapter.  
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Rapport  
In order to encourage participants to feel comfortable sharing their stories and leading the 
conversation, it was important to put them at ease as far as possible. Like many interviewers, I 
invested considerable effort into building rapport. Of particular relevance to military research, as I 
discuss above, is the notion of the ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status of the researcher and the 
participant. While I question the notion of a strict binary between these positions, 
insider/outsider debates remain relevant to the conduct of my interviews as a participant’s 
perception of a researcher’s positionality is likely to have an impact upon their assessment of that 
researcher’s capabilities and trustworthiness, and thus on the narratives they choose to share 
(Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert 2008: 553-54; Thapar-Björkert and Henry 2004: 374-75). Some 
scholars have suggested that shared social characteristics create easy rapport through an 
assumption of shared understandings (Conway 2008: 349-50), and have as a result advocated 
‘matching’ the social characteristics of interviewer and participant (Conway 2008: 349-350; Imam 
and Akhtar 2005: 70-72). Others have drawn attention to the ways in which a researcher’s status 
as either an insider or an outsider in relation to participants is fluid and shifting (Duneier and 
Carter 1999: 12), and moreover, that its meaning and influence upon the process of the interview 
cannot necessarily be foreseen (Dwyer and Buckle 2009; Sherif 2001), and have therefore 
contended that researcher who occupy the “spaces between” (Dwyer and Buckle 2009; Mullings 
1999: 340-41) or who position themselves as a “trusted outsider” (Bucerius 2013) are often able 
to create more effective research relationships.  
 
Reflecting this scholarship, in conducting interviews for this study I experienced my positionality 
as an insider/outsider as fluid. In some cases, this fluidity was highlighted by the ways in which 
participants, too, experienced their own location in relation to the military institution in dynamic 
ways. Victim-survivor participants, as civilian women who have been married to servicemen and, 
in many cases, whose lives have been shaped in multiple ways by the institution itself, both blur 
and embody the fluidity of the civilian-military divide. While these participants have never been 
military personnel, they understand its community and speak its language in ways that I simply do 
not. In terms of building rapport, I felt that my official outsider status was generally beneficial in 
these interviews. This is because while it was not the case for all, many participants felt 
mistrustful of the military welfare services, and in some cases the military community more 
broadly, in particular around the capacity of both to keep information confidential (see Chapter 
Six). My status as an outsider seemed to inspire confidence in participants that they could share 
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their experiences and voice their concerns without worrying that others in the community would 
find out about what they had said (Bucerius 2013). 
 
In interviews with both quasi-military and military support worker participants, it is likely that my 
status as an outsider may have prevented participants from sharing some narratives with me - for 
example, narratives which may have encouraged negative press about the institution (Ben-Ari 
and Levy 2014). In other ways, I think my status as an outsider may have been beneficial in these 
interviews, because it encouraged participants to position themselves as ‘experts’ on the military. 
These participants often assumed that I knew little about the military world and made particular 
efforts to explain its intricacies to me. It may be the case that this assumption allowed 
participants to feel that they were in control of the situation, making them more at ease and 
more willing to share their thoughts. This reflects the experiences of Lomsky-Feder (1996: 235-
36), who reports that - as a woman researching in the masculine world of the Israeli Armed Forces 
- participants assumed that she knew very little about the military, and thus set themselves up in 
the role of “teaching” her about the institution (see also Bucerius 2013: 702). Moreover, because 
insider/outsider positionalities are multiple, while I remain an outsider in terms of my 
relationship with the military institution, participants may have read my position as more fluid in 
other ways. Baker suggests that her status as a linguist gave her a partial insider relationship with 
military translators who she interviewed, despite her lack of specific military status (Baker et al. 
forthcoming), and similarly, in some of my interviews with support workers (military, quasi-
military, and civilian), I think that my experience of working on a domestic abuse telephone 
helpline encouraged participants to read me, in some ways, as an insider in relation to their 
professional experiences. For example, although military support worker participants mostly 
explained military acronyms to me, or apologised if they forgot to do so, most did not explain 
specialist domestic abuse terminology. This experience highlights the fluidity and multiplicity of 
insider/outsider relationships and also draws attention to the difficulty of predicting in advance 
the ways in which these relationships will impact rapport. 
 
While perpetrator participants were also military insiders, the dynamics of these interviews was 
different again. These were the interviews in which it was perhaps more difficult to build rapport. 
A number of female scholars have noted the difficulty of which female interviews may have in 
interviewing men, who may use the opportunity to harass or flirt with the interviewer (Arendell 
1997; Bucerius 2013; Harne 2005: 171-72; Willott 1998: 179-81). Harne has suggested that this 
challenges the idea that the researcher is always in a position of power over the participant in an 
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interview setting (2005; 171-172). However, this does not reflect my experience - indeed, it was 
in these interviews that I felt the unequal power of interviewer over participant was particularly 
obvious. The topic of the interview was the socially sanctioned behaviour of the participant, and 
the fact that he was an abuser was a pre-condition to the interview (Gadd 2004). Although there 
were only three of these interviews, I was particularly conscious of the importance of creating a 
mutually respectful space in which participants did not feel judged, but also did not feel that I was 
supporting their abusive behaviour or accepting any rationalisations or justifications they may 
have offered (Downes et al. 2014; Harne 2005; Hearn et al. 2007).  
 
Ethical issues surrounding rapport have been discussed by a number of scholars, from those who 
suggest that going beyond rapport to friendship may be the most ethical practice (Oakley 1981) 
to those who consider excessively strong rapport manipulative in that it encourages participants 
to reveal information that they did not intend to and that they come to regret sharing (Cotterill 
1992: 595; Fontes 2004: 159; Huggins and Glebbeek 2003: 364; Maynard 1994: 15-16). This is, of 
course, a discussion of power, in that it asks how far the manipulation of participants and the 
objectification of their experiences is avoidable. On balance, I did not feel it was ethical to build a 
‘friendship’ with participants in this research, as such a relationship will always be instrumental 
and to some extent manipulative. Instead, in resonance with Cotterill’s (1992: 596) concept of a 
“friendly stranger,” I aimed to create a space where participants felt safe, supported, and 
believed by a friendly and professional interviewer seeking information for research. While I 
ensured that all victim-survivor and perpetrator participants were provided with information on 
support services (discussed below), I did not encourage them to believe that I would be able to 
provide ongoing support.  
 
 
Interpreting the interview 
I carried out a thematic analysis of my interview transcripts using NVivo 10 software. As defined 
by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006: 82), thematic analysis is “a search for themes that emerge 
as being important to the description of the phenomenon [...].  It is a form of pattern recognition 
within the data, where emerging themes become the categories for analysis.” The process of 
conducting thematic analysis involves a careful and repeated reading of the data - in this case, 
interview transcripts - in order to identify and to map the emerging themes (Rice and Ezzy 1999: 
258). Some themes were very common, and others less so - in thematic analysis, it is not only its 
frequency which marks out matters of interest (Joffe 2012). I chose a thematic analysis because it 
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allowed me to make sense of my qualitative data, pulling out both the themes I had expected to 
find in advance of conducting the interviews, and those which emerged unexpectedly throughout 
the course of the interviews. As I read and reread my interview transcripts I assigned pre-existing 
codes to quotes, and when unexpected but interesting material appeared I created new codes 
accordingly. This enabled me to pay careful attention to what participants had to say by both 
using categories which reflected things that I had expected would be important before the 
interviews had taken place - for example concerns about the confidentiality of military welfare 
services and about access to housing which emerged from Williamson and Price’s pilot study 
(2009) - and also allowed unexpected categories to emerge through the interview transcripts 
themselves - for example the importance of (de)politicisation in understanding domestic abuse in 
this setting (see Chapter Seven). It is worth noting that in line with my post-positivist rejection of 
the notion of ‘objectivity’ in favour of a “conscious partiality” (Mies 1983: 122), I understand this 
approach to the study of qualitative data as a subjective process, as it is inevitable that it is 
informed by my own theoretical understandings and interpretations.  
 
Analysis of data is an area of research in which the researcher wields very significant power, 
because:  
 
ultimately the researcher must objectify the experience of the researched, must 
translate that experience into more abstract and general terms if an analysis that 
links the individual to processes outside her immediate social world is to be 
achieved.  
(Acker et al. 1983: 425) 
 
That is, individual experiences must be abstracted and analysed within their wider social context, 
and the connections between these explored, if feminist research is to effectively critique social 
structures  (Code 1995: 36; Maynard 1994: 23-24). The researcher must therefore exercise power 
by breaking down her data, categorising it according to her own perspectives, and selecting and 
interpreting it to build her argument (Leatherby 2002: 3.7-3.8). Analysis of data is a theory-driven 
process with political motivations and political ends, and this is no less the case in this study. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven of this thesis focus primarily on analysis of my empirical data, and 
while my analysis does sometimes reflect that of participants, there are also numerous occasions 
where my analysis directly contradicts that of my participants. Some of the ethical issues 
surrounding this process are discussed above with reference to Wall (2011), who suggests that 
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while researchers owe respect and understanding to the narratives constructed by their 
participants, they have a further responsibility to the broader community upon whom the 
research may impact. My aim in this study is to produce politically informed knowledge about 
domestic abuse in the British military community which takes seriously the role of gender and of 
power - and as I argue in Chapters Two and Four, this calls for an analysis of my data through a 
feminist lens.  
 
The interview as a process of narrative construction  
Interview data is not something from which an objective or simplistic ‘truth’ can be read; rather, 
it emerges from the collaborative social processes of the interview and is constructed within the 
interaction between participant and researcher (Enosh and Buchbinder 2005; Hardy et al. 2001: 
544-45; Harne 2005: 178; Naples 2003: 90; Presser 2005: 2087). That is, interviews are not a 
simplistic window onto experience, but are necessarily a process in which researcher and 
participant collaboratively construct a representation of particular experiences. Interview data 
does not offer a simplistic reflection of the reality of participants’ lives outside of the interview, 
but rather, reflects the process of meaning making which has occurred collaboratively within the 
space of the interview itself (Rapley 2001: 304). 
 
This is not, however, to argue that the narratives which participants share in interviews are 
somehow false or that they can tell us nothing about the social world; rather, it means that what 
interview narratives can tell us is not simply ‘what happened,’ but how participants make sense of 
what happened through the social discourses and resources which are available to them - both 
within the interview and more broadly. For Chase,  
 
When we listen carefully to the stories people tell, we learn how people as 
individuals and groups make sense of their experiences and construct meanings and 
selves. We also learn about the complexities and subtleties of the social worlds they 
inhabit. We gain deeper understandings of the social resources (cultural, ideological, 
historical, and so forth) that they draw on, resist, and transform as they tell their 
stories.  
(Chase 1996: 45) 
 
Listening carefully to interview narratives concerned with violence and abuse can tell us about 
the ways in which various forms of violence are made sense of within a given community (Watts 
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2006), the ways in which gendered discourses provide a resource for abusive men to draw upon 
in justifying their behaviour (Anderson and Umberson 2001; Stamp and Sabourin 1995), and the 
discursive strategies through which both perpetrators and victim-survivors of abuse explain their 
intimate relationships to others (Enosh and Buchbinder 2005) - that is, it can tell us about the 
ways in which violence and abuse are understood and categorised within the social world of the 
participants. Through participants’ stories, we can identify the narrative resources which 
participants draw upon in, for example, attributing blame and causality for the abuse, explaining 
sequences of events, and explaining the help-seeking decisions that we were taken and the 
motives behind them. As such, interview narratives do not relate only to the individual participant 
to whom one speaks, but can tell us something of the ideas about, for example, gender, intimate 
relationships, violence, race, and loyalty - among many others - which circulate in a particular 
social setting. As Rapley puts it, “[i]nterviewees’ talk speaks to and emerges from the wider 
strategies and repertoires available to, and used by, all people” (2001: 318-319). Paying close 
attention to the stories of victim-survivors, as well as perpetrators, and support workers, who 
have experience of domestic abuse within the military community, therefore, can tell us 
something about the narratives which circulate in this particular social space. It is within this 
understanding of interview data that I approach the empirical materials collected for this study. 
 
 
Protecting participants: confidentiality, safety and wellbeing 
As explored above, my victim-survivor participants were no longer living with their abusive 
partner at the time of the interview. Despite the dissolution of the relationship, I was not able to 
assume that there was no future risk of abuse: studies suggest that at least a third of women 
continue to experience abuse after leaving an abusive relationship (Harne and Radford 2008, 52). 
In order to protect participants’ safety, interviews took place in a safe space in which our 
conversations would not be overheard. Confidentiality and anonymity protects the rights, 
feelings, and safety of participants. All participants were assigned a pseudonym at the point of 
data collection, and all data has been stripped of identifying features before presentation. Data 
has been stored on my own password protected computer as well as on a personal hard drive, 
both of which are kept in private, locked spaces (Fontes 2004: 155; Lee 1993: 170). Despite the 
central importance of confidentiality and anonymity, there was a possibility that there may be 
circumstances in which upholding confidentiality would not be the most ethical practice - namely, 
if I had become aware of a threat of future violence. It was made very clear to participants that if 
they shared information with me during the interview which gave me reason to believe that a 
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specific individual was at risk of future harm, it would have been my ethical duty to pass that 
information on - to support workers, to social services, or to the police, depending on the 
circumstances. Participants signed an informed consent form which made this clear (Tisdall 2002: 
145). Fortunately, I did not encounter this situation during the research.  
 
Violence and abuse can be painful to discuss, and interviewers have a responsibility to respond 
appropriately to participants’ emotional engagements with the topic (Campbell 2002: 6). I was 
aware that some participants, in particular victim-survivors and perpetrators, may find the 
interview experience upsetting or even traumatic. In order to try to mitigate the potential trauma 
of the interview situation in interviews with children (although raising issues which remain 
relevant here), Barter and Renold (2002: 101-02) advocate attempting to ensure that participants 
remain in charge of the topics discussed and the manner in which they are approached - as I note 
above, my interviews proceeded in this way. Victim-survivor and perpetrator participants’ 
reactions to the interviews were varied, and they displayed different emotional responses. Some 
seemed relaxed and detached from the stories they were telling, some expressed anger at the 
way that they had been treated, and others expressed sadness, with a few crying a little. As noted 
above, I work part-time on a domestic abuse telephone helpline, and I feel that the training 
undertaken for this role and the experience of fulfilling it has helped me to deal with participants’ 
emotional responses in an appropriately supportive way. A number of my victim-survivor 
participants suggested that they experienced some emotional benefit from taking part. Several 
stated that it felt good to try to have a positive impact on the experiences of other women who 
are subjected to abuse. Whatever their visible reactions, I ensured that as a matter of routine all 
victim-survivor and perpetrator participants were given information on relevant national and 
local support services, as has been suggested is appropriate by a number of scholars (McCarry 
2005: 95; O’Beirne et al. 2002: 190; Reinharz and Davidman 1992: 212).  
 
While my foremost concern was for the safety and wellbeing of my participants, it was also 
important to protect myself against emotional distress and physical danger throughout the 
process of the research. Scholars such as Campbell (2002), Harne (2005: 185), Reinharz and 
Davidman (1992: 35), and Skinner et al. (2005: 16-17)  have discussed the stress, the sense of 
powerlessness, and the feelings of anxiety, depression, and exhaustion that can come from 
conducting and transcribing interviews around gender violence. Although I did find some of the 
interviews emotionally difficult - as indeed is the ongoing process of thinking about domestic 
abuse - I think the fact that my victim-survivor participants had all left the abusive relationships 
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went some way to alleviating the distress. For example, I did not feel as powerless as researchers 
in the case described by Ellsberg et al. (2001: 11), who felt unable to help participants to leave 
their dangerous situations. Indeed, I have more commonly felt powerless and anxious as a result 
of the calls to the domestic abuse helpline on which I work than as a result of these interviews, as 
callers to the helpline are more likely to be experiencing anxiety and powerless in the present 
moment themselves. Having dealt with emotionally difficult calls while working on the helpline, I 
was prepared in some ways for the strain that can be engendered by listening to narratives of 
violence and abuse. In addition, as Campbell also notes, I did not experience only negative 
emotions as a result of the research, but also positive feelings such as hope and admiration for 
the strength of the victim-survivors with whom I spoke, which helped me to feel positive about 
the process of the research as a whole (Campbell 2002: 65-93). 
 
There was also a possibility that my work could have exposed me to physical risks. As I note 
above, scholars have suggested that interviewing men could potentially be unsafe for lone female 
researchers, as interviews can be used as a space to sexually intimidate or harass women, to 
express misogynistic views, or to otherwise exercise dominance (Harne 2005: 171-72). This risk 
may be exacerbated with men who have committed gender violence. As recommended by The 
Social Research Association in A Code of Practice for the Safety of Social Researchers
75
, I ensured 
that the manager of my academic department was always aware of the time and place at which 
interviews were to take place, and that I was in touch with her both before and immediately after 
each interview to let her know that I was safe. In addition, I always carried a charged mobile 
phone and enough money for unexpected transport needs. In particular, the three interviews 
with perpetrators of abuse were carried out in the safe space of the offices where they were 
attending the perpetrator programme, and the workers on the programme were aware of the 
interviews and waited in the next room while they took place. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter outlines the ways in which I went about collecting the original empirical data that 
forms the backbone of this thesis. Far from assuming data collection strategies and analysis to be 
neutral tools designed to help me discover the truth about military domestic abuse, I have 
suggested that every step of the research process has to be reflexively analysed; its partial and 
political nature laid bare. I have explored the central assumptions which shape my 
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epistemological and ontological approach as well as my thinking around ethics and power in the 
process of research, and have sketched out how these ideas were applied throughout my work, in 
particular in relation to issues such as the recruitment of participants, the process of the 
interview itself, and the analysis and reporting of data. The feminist-informed, qualitative 
approach described above has allowed me to construct in-depth knowledge about the 
inequalities which shape the responses of women who experience abuse in the military 
community. This knowledge is not representative or generalisable, and does not allow me to state 
that certain conditions are accurate for all such women, all of the time. It does, however, help me 
to explore and to describe a range of issues and conditions which shape responses to domestic 
abuse within the military community. 
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Chapter Four: Theoretical Framework 
Theorising power, gender, domestic abuse and militarism 
 
This chapter discusses the main theoretical concepts with which this thesis engages. Drawing on 
scholars in the fields of feminist research on domestic abuse and of critical military studies, as 
well as on critical social theorists more broadly, it sketches out the theoretical approach which 
frames my engagement with domestic abuse in the contemporary British military. I begin the 
chapter with a theorisation of power and of gender. I explore the dual approaches to theorising 
power and gender - both structural and post-structural - which underpin the analysis in this 
thesis: approaches which some scholars have taken to be incompatible (see Risman 2004: 430) 
but which I argue are necessarily brought together in this study. ‘Power’ and ‘gender’ are not the 
same thing, and neither structural nor post-structural forms of power, of course, function only 
through gender. However, gender, as it is of interest to this study, is produced through power in 
its various forms - and it functions within society in both structural and discursive ways. 
Moreover, as gender is a key organising concept of this thesis, it is the ways in which various 
operations of power produce and function through gender which are primarily relevant here. The 
remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections, which theorise first domestic abuse, and 
then militarism, with reference to the dual lenses of power and gender established in the first 
part of the chapter. It is worth noting that while gender is explicitly theorised in the initial section 
of this thesis, because it is a lynchpin of this study and functions both as a topic of study and as a 
conceptual lens, it appears throughout the chapter in multiple ways, both as a topic for focused 
discussions and as a cross-cutting theme and theoretical tool. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the gender order of the contemporary British military, with a focus on the idealised, 
hegemonic models of masculinity and femininity which circulate within this context.  
 
For the purposes of clarity, it is useful in this introductory section to draw attention to the 
multiple uses of the terms ‘violence’, ‘abuse’, ‘control’, and ‘dominance’ which appear in this 
chapter and throughout the thesis, as this is a potential source of slippage and confusion. In 
general, when I talk about ‘violence’ and about ‘abuse’ I am talking about acts, perpetrated by 
specific subjects of violence and abuse against its objects. ‘Violence’ here is mainly physical. This 
includes the whole range of the violences of militaries on the global stage, from those 
perpetrated by personnel deployed as ‘boots on the ground,’ to drone strikes. Physical violence is 
also part of many of the intimate relationships which are of interest to this thesis: the victim-
survivor participants in this study had suffered violence including slaps, kicks, punches, and 
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strangulation from their partners. However, while ‘domestic violence’ is a commonly used term 
among both academics and activists - and as a result, appears numerous times in quoted 
materials - I have chosen to use the (equally widespread) term ‘domestic abuse’ instead. This is 
because the physical violence to which victim-survivors are subjected does not exist in isolation, 
but is embedded within a gamut of abusive behaviours - often including sexual, psychological, 
emotional, and financial abuse. These forms of abuse are not always experienced as separate: 
physical violence may be interwoven with psychologically abusive taunts; sexual abuse is both 
physical and not only physical; and financial abuse often has psychological qualities and is 
underpinned by a threat of physical violence. Because these acts are part of the same pattern of 
behaviour, as I suggest below, I do not find it helpful to separate them in my discussions, and 
refer to them all as ‘domestic abuse.’ The terms ‘violence’ and ‘abuse’ are thus mostly used in this 
thesis to denote the behaviour of a subject towards its object. There is one important exception 
to this: ‘structural violence’ refers to the harms done to people by social structures of inequality. 
That is, in structural forms of violence, there is an object in the form of the person harmed, 
however there is no identifiable subject of violence. Scholars have used the term ‘violence’ here, 
rather than merely discussing structural ‘inequalities,’ in order to draw attention to the embodied 
harms these structures engender. Structural violence is therefore distinct from the direct forms of 
violence and abuse which are present when a soldier fires his gun or a husband assaults his wife, 
as there is no direct subject perpetrating the violence. In both its structural and direct forms, 
however, violence and abuse occurs in the harm done to its object.    
 
Control and dominance, another two key terms which emerge in this chapter and go on to shape 
my analytical engagements throughout the thesis, refer to the motivations which underpin acts 
and structures of violence and abuse - the social relationships towards which violent and abusive 
behaviours and structures drive. For Pain, there are important similarities between warfare and 
domestic abuse, one of which is that both use violence in order to “retain control of the people 
and places they are targeting” (2015: 68). Moreover, both forms of violence, for Pain, arise from 
the same logics and cultures: “Military tactics are not only military, but arise from more 
widespread cultures of masculinise aggression, protection and control” (ibid.: 71). That is, the 
violences perpetrated by militaries are not perpetrated for their own sake, but in order to 
establish or maintain a relationship of domination between collectives such as nation-states. 
Similarly, an abusive husband abuses his wife in order to establish and to maintain an intimate 
relationship in which he dominates and controls her. I argue in this chapter that acts of violence 
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and abuse must be understood in the context of the relationships of dominance and control 
towards which they drive if they are to be understood.  
 
 
Structural and post-structural approaches  
While social theorists have understood ‘power’ in multiple ways - from Weber (1978: 53) to 
Gidddens (1979: 91; 1984) and Lukes (1974) - I draw in this thesis upon a dual conceptualisation 
of power which is based upon both structural and post-structural approaches. These approaches 
to power were selected on the basis of their usefulness for making sense of the experiences of 
participants in this study. As I discuss in Chapters Five and Six, I was particularly struck when 
analysing the interviews collected for this study by the emergence of two broad clusters of 
themes. The first relates to structural inequalities experienced by participants such as access to 
community facilities and resources - this data lends itself to an analysis which relies upon a 
structural approach to power. The second centres on the ways in which participants made sense 
of their experiences of abuse, and came to decisions about the most appropriate ways to respond 
to it, in relation to their ideas about identity. I made the decision that the most useful way to 
make sense of this data was through post-structural approaches. Moreover, interview narratives 
in which participants spoke about structural inequalities and about their identities were, as a rule, 
talking about gendered structures of inequality, and about gendered identities. As a result, the 
ways in which gender has been theorised within structural and post-structural approaches is of 
particular interest to this study. Below, I therefore discuss both structural and post-structural 
approaches to power and to gender, and the relationships between them. 
 
My engagement with a structural model of power, which I use to make sense of my data in 
Chapter Six, allows me to consider the ways in which social subjects are differently positioned and 
differently empowered in relation to one another. Structural analyses of society are interested in 
systems of social relationships, and draw attention to the inequalities rooted in the arrangement 
of society. These social structures are larger than and external to the subject
76
, and function to 
constrain that subject in particular ways. In Connell’s words, “structure” refers to “the experience 
of being up against something, of limits on freedom  [...] The concept of social structure expresses 
the constraints that lie in a given form of social organisation” (1987: 92).  
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While theoretical engagements with structural power are diverse and multi-faceted, my 
discussions focus in particular on “structural violence,” a concept first developed by Johan 
Galtung. Structural inequalities and structural violence are closely related but not precisely the 
same: structural violence is a concept used to describe the embodied harms experienced by 
subjects who are disempowered through structural inequalities. For Galtung, structural violence 
exits when subjects are unable to reach their physical and mental potentials; it is “the cause of 
the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is” 
(Galtung 1969: 168). For example, if a person dies because they are excluded from access to 
existent medical care, structural violence is present (ibid.: 168). Because of violent structures of 
inequality certain social groups - often including women and minority groups - find themselves 
“as a community, subjected to violence, exposed to its possibility, if not its realisation” (Butler 
2004: 20). For Uvin, structural violence therefore amounts to “unequal life chances, usually 
caused by great inequality, injustice, discrimination, and exclusion and needlessly limiting 
people’s physical, social, and psychological well-being’” (Uvin 1998: 105). Structural violence 
refers not to identifiable acts of violence perpetrated by identifiable actors but to “the social 
machinery of oppression” (Farmer 2004: 307). As Farmer argues, theories of structural violence 
allow scholars to understand the suffering that they witness as evidence of how “social forces […] 
become embodied as individual experience” (1996: 261-262). This is where work on structural 
violence provides useful insights for the analysis presented in this thesis, as it allows me to begin 
with the harms experienced by individual victim-survivors and to trace this harm back to the 
specific structures of inequality which shape the British military community.  
 
Systems of structural violence do not just happen naturally or accidentally. They are constructed 
over time by human practices; “the product of an incessant (and therefore historical) labour of 
reproduction, to which singular agents (including men, with weapons such as physical violence 
and symbolic violence) and institutions - families, the church, the educational system, the state - 
contribute” (Bourdieu 2001: 34, emphasis in orignal; see also Anglin 1998: 147). Despite this, 
structural violence is often not recognised as violence by those who are subjected to it, as the 
structures of inequality which underpin it are often normalised and taken for granted. In 
Bourdieu’s words, “The dominated apply categories constructed from the point of view of the 
dominant to the relations of domination, thus making them appear as natural” (Bourdieu 2001: 
35; see also Klinenberg 2004; Price 2012: 6). This insight is useful for the analysis presented in this 
thesis because it enables me to approach the gendered structural inequalities which characterise 
the British military community - and the structural violences which emerge from them - not as 
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timeless inevitabilities, but as political structures which are produced over time and naturalised 
by human practices, and which could be otherwise.  
 
Structural approaches provide one of the ways in which gender is conceptualised in this thesis. 
Structural accounts theorise gender as “an overarching framework that organises social 
institutions and social relationships” (Anderson 2007: 175-76). From a structural perspective, 
gender is a system of inequality and stratification which positions men and women in unequal 
categories, roles and material circumstances. Feminists have labelled social structures of male 
power over women as “patriarchy” - defined as by Walby as “a system of social structures, and 
practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women” (Walby 1989: 214; see also Fraser 
1987; Oakley 2014: xii; Pateman 1988; 1989a; 2006; Rubin 1975). While some understandings of 
patriarchy have been critiqued as ahistorical and universalising (see Walby 1989), scholars 
continue to draw attention to social structures which place women in a disempowered position in 
relation to men. For Scott et al., the gendered division of responsibility in relation to unpaid 
domestic labour and the related prevalence of British women in part-time employment constitute 
economic structures which disadvantage women (2010:1). Similarly, Farmer shows how the 
intersecting structures of poverty and of gender can drive individuals to make unsafe choices, 
with possibly devastating consequences (1996: 271). In various ways in various locations, then, 
structures of gendered inequality continue to limit the social power, choices, and life-chances of 
gendered subjects in various ways. This understanding of gender is important to the analysis in 
my thesis because, as I illustrate in Chapter Six, it is the gendered structures of inequality, and the 
structural violences they produce, which are of most interest in making sense of making sense of 
victim-survivors’ experiences of domestic abuse in the British military.  
 
The post-structural theoretical approach on which this thesis draws allows me to pay attention to 
the ways in which individuals construct and live their identities on a daily basis. This theory of 
power most clearly informs my discussions in Chapter Five. For Foucault, disciplinary power is a 
form of power which produces rather than represses. That is, in contrast to the structural forms 
of power discussed above, disciplinary power is not something which acts upon and limits the life 
chances of pre-formed subjects; rather, it is the social force through which such subjects are 
produced: 
 
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it 
‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, 
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power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production.  
(Foucault 1991: 194) 
 
Disciplinary power circulates throughout the social body, and functions in large part through the 
surveillance, or at least the visibility, of those subjected to it. For Foucault, disciplinary power 
produces subjects who, conscious of their own permanent visibility, shape themselves to conform 
to the norms of their societies - as such, the subject becomes “the principle of his [sic] own 
subjugation” (Foucault 1991: 202-203). The “docile bodies” (ibid.: 138) of subjects thus formed 
are constructed through the detailed control and surveillance of everyday activity, which “moulds 
the mind and soul” (Pemberton 2013: 154).  
 
While Foucault himself did not provide in-depth theorisations of gender, others have drawn on 
his insights to explore the ways in which “docile bodies” are fundamentally gendered, as the 
bodies of men and of women are shaped in divergent (although far from simplistic or 
uncontested) ways (Bartky 1988). The post-structural approach to gender used in this thesis is 
markedly different from that contained within the structural approach outlined above. In 
structural approaches, gendered subjects are limited and repressed based on their position in 
gender hierarchy; in post-structural approaches, those very subjects are formulated, are 
produced, through gendered discourse. That is, following the Foucauldian notion that subjects are 
produced through the workings of power and that there is, therefore, no essential subject which 
can pre-exist power, gender is not an essentialised internal truth, something that a subject is, but 
rather, gender amounts to “configurations of practice that are accomplished in social action” 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 836), a “routine, methodical, and recurring accomplishment”; 
something one does (West and Zimmerman 1987: 126). As Sasson-Levy puts it, masculinities and 
femininities “do not ‘exist’ in reality but dwell in people’s consciousness, as is constantly 
expressed through everyday embodied practices, symbols, and metaphors” (2003: 325). For 
Butler, the notion of an essential, inner substance of gender identity is a fallacy. No fixed subject 
can be said to pre-exist the doing of gender, rather, the intelligible subject is an effect of gender, 
which comes into being through the performance of gender in the form of a “stylized repetition of 
acts” (1999: 191 emphasis in original). That is, gender identity is “constituted by the very 
‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (Butler 1999: 34). This approach is useful for my thesis 
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as it enables me to pay attention to the ways in which responses to abuse can form part of the 
performance of gendered identity in particular ways within the British military context.  
 
As these discussions make clear, my two approaches to power and to gender contain within them 
some fundamental differences which are difficult to allay. The first approach sees power in social 
structures which constrain the life chances of individuals; the second sees those very same 
individuals as produced rather than as repressed by a form of power which is diffused throughout 
social life. The first approach understands gender as a point of difference through which male and 
female subjects are unequally positioned within social structures; the second focuses on how 
those male and female subjects come into being through gendered discourses. However, despite 
the tensions and difficulties which it entails, this multiple approach to power and to gender is 
particularly helpful in understanding the multifaceted issue of domestic abuse; indeed, the 
complex narratives which emerged from the interviews I conducted for this thesis cannot be 
sufficiently understood through recourse to a singular approach. 
 
While Risman (2004: 430) cites a number of studies which have argued (erroneously, she 
suggests) that structural and post-structural approaches are incompatible (Epstein 1988; Ferree 
1990; Risman 1987; Risman and Schwartz 1989), there are a number of key scholars who, 
explicitly or otherwise, have noted the coexistence of multiple forms of power, and, similarly, of 
multiple ways in which gender functions in society. Foucault, for example, while generally 
describing disciplinary power as a modality which replaced sovereign power at a particular 
moment in history, does recognise in his later works that the two forms of power can co-exist, 
citing examples of disciplinary power in existence “like islands” in “the midst of sovereignty” 
(2006: 63). Similarly, Butler refers to the “ghostly and forceful resurgence of sovereignty in the 
midst of governmentality” in the contemporary context of Guantanamo Bay (2004: 59).  
 
Of more direct interest to this thesis is scholarship which theorises gender from both structural 
and post-structural approaches. Connell’s work on gender and power offers a particularly clear 
example of the ways in which power as structure and power as productive of individual 
subjectivities can be understood as mutually existent, or even as co-dependent, in relation to 
gender. Connell describes a gendered structure of inequality centred on the “global dominance of 
men over women,” (1987: 183). Her theory notes multiple, fluid forms of masculinities and 
femininities which are constructed in relation to one another as well as in relation to the 
‘opposite’ sex, and which exist in hierarchical power relationships with one another. Connell 
 96 
 
introduced the concept of a “hegemonic” model of masculinity, which is not imagined as normal 
in the sense that a majority of men embody it, but is understood to be normative in that it 
denotes the most respected contemporary way of being a man and legitimates the structures of 
male dominance over women  (Connell 1987: 183-88; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). 
Connell’s work understands gender as relational, arguing that masculinities and femininities 
cannot exist without one another (Connell 1995: 72), but also that, because of the dominance of 
men over women, “[t]here is no femininity that is hegemonic in the sense that the dominant form 
of masculinity is hegemonic among men” (ibid., 187). Instead, she points to “emphasised 
femininity,” the form of femininity which is most clearly “defined around compliance with this 
subordination and is orientated to accommodating the interests and desires of men,” as the 
closest equivalent (ibid., 183, 187-188). The dominance of hegemonic forms of masculinity is 
achieved not through force (although it is not incompatible with the use of force) but through a 
Gramscian concept of hegemony; social ascendency achieved through the forces which organise 
social and cultural life such as religious doctrine and practice, mass media, wage structures, 
welfare and tax policies (ibid., 184). Importantly for my present purposes, while Connell’s work is 
centred chiefly around social structures of inequality, it also allows space for recognising the 
importance of individual performances of gender. The reliance of this theory on hegemony as 
opposed to force as the means by which unequal gendered structures are maintained points to a 
self-regulating subject; one who constructs their gendered identity through integration of (or 
resistance to) culturally defined notions of appropriate gender practice. Indeed, Connell and 
Messerschmidt argue that the theory points to a multi-dimensional understanding of gender, and 
emphasise the role of patterns of practice, embodiment, and the ways in which subjects 
discursively construct their identities (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832, 37, 41-42). This has 
been highlighted by scholars who have followed Connell’s theory: Wetherell and Edley (1999), for 
example, used the notion of hegemonic norms to discuss the discursive strategies on which men 
draw to position themselves in society through practice (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 841). 
While there remain inherent tensions and contradictions between structural and post-structural 
approaches, then, following the insights provided by Connell’s work I conceptualise gender in this 
thesis through a multiple approach which draws upon both structural and post-structural 
understandings of power. This dual approach allows me to take account of multiple experiences 
of gender and therefore to present a more nuanced picture of participants’ experiences of 
domestic abuse. 
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Theorising domestic abuse 
In Chapter Two, I reviewed the large and well-developed body of feminist literature on domestic 
abuse which has its roots in the ‘second wave’ feminist movement. In that chapter, I stated that 
while domestic abuse has been explained in various ways by scholars drawing on biological, socio-
biological, psychological, and psychoanalytical approaches (see Gondolf 1985: 287; Hearn 1996: 
29; 1998: 17), this thesis draws upon feminist-informed theories which emphasise the social 
inequalities in which abuse is rooted. This is because it is these theories which best enable me to 
make sense of the ways in which the social context of the British military, with its particular 
arrangements of gender and of power, shape the ways in which abuse is experienced and 
responded to. In particular, I draw on feminist work which conceptualises domestic abuse not in 
terms of incidents of abusive behaviour, but of patterns of behaviours through which 
perpetrators aim to build a relationship in which they control and dominate their victims. This 
approach has been chosen because, in addition to being the increasingly dominant approach 
within feminist work on domestic abuse - and indeed, one which has recently been incorporated 
into the British government’s definition
77
 - it was also reflected in the narratives which emerged 
from interviews conducted for this thesis. While some participants did refer to discrete incidents 
of abusive behaviour, in particular those for whom a particularly violent physical incident had 
been a turning point in their responses to abuse, when asked to describe their relationships most 
spoke first of patterns of behaviour, of their partners’ attempts to control them, and of their 
feelings of  entrapment. A focus on the patterns of behaviour which constitute abuse, and the 
control and dominance towards which they drive, enables me to best make sense of victim-
survivors’ responses to abuse.  
 
The theorisation of domestic abuse which underpins this thesis, then, draws closely on Stark’s 
(2007) work on “coercive control,” which understands abuse as a form of gendered violence in 
which a perpetrator uses various abusive behaviours as tactics in order to gain control over his 
intimate partner. In this understanding, abuse is not primarily a crime of assault, but a liberty 
crime in which perpetrators deprive their victims of their rights to autonomy, self-definition, 
privacy, and self-respect and entrap them in a state of everyday  “unfreedom” (Stark 2007: 205). 
That is, incidents of abuse are understood as part of a pattern of behaviour through which a 
perpetrator attempts to take control; to build a pattern of power and control over his partner. 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to dwell in any depth on the causality of abuse as it 
applies to individuals, it is important to note that contrary to popular ‘myths’ which explain 
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domestic abuse in terms of a perpetrator’s lashing out in anger, within this theoretical approach it 
is understood that this taking of control is not the same as a loss of control, and it is not the same 
as anger. That is, perpetrators of domestic abuse do not lose control over themselves and lash 
out at their partners; rather, they use a variety of abusive behaviours to take control over their 
intimate partners (Price 2012: 30; see also Bancroft 2002; Stark 2007).  
 
Feminist scholars (e.g. Harne and Radford 2008: 1-7; Westmarland 2015: 20-46) have drawn 
attention to the wide range of abusive acts - including physical, sexual, psychological, emotional, 
and financial forms of abuse - which perpetrators may use in order to gain control over their 
intimate partners. Physical abuse may include acts such as throwing things, kicking, biting, 
punching, choking, and using a weapon. Sexual violence may be experienced as rape, sexual 
assault, forms of sexual humiliation, or deliberate infection with a sexually transmitted disease. 
Psychological and emotional abuse can take the form of insults and put-downs which continually 
chip away at a victim-survivor’s self-esteem, severe neglect, false accusations, or trying to make a 
woman feel that she is going mad. Finally, financial abuse may involve controlling the victim-
survivor’s access to money or limiting her ability to earn it. Moreover, scholars have also drawn 
attention to behaviours which may not appear to be obviously abusive or as violent but which, 
within the context of an abusive relationship, are part of the pattern of behaviour through which 
a perpetrator achieves control over his partner. For example, Stark details ways in which 
perpetrators “micro-regulate” the basic, everyday functions of their partners’ lives, including 
controlling what they wear, how they spend money, what they eat, where they go, and when 
they are allowed to sleep (Stark 2007: 15; see also Williamson 2010: 1414-16).  
 
The theoretical approach to domestic abuse which focuses on “coercive control” views such 
abuse as intrinsically gendered
78
. Although anyone - of any gender or sexuality - can be a victim or 
a perpetrator of domestic abuse, most statistical work suggests that the overwhelming majority 
of domestic abuse, and in particular those cases characterised by the most systematic and 
repeated abuse and by the most serious types of physical violence, is perpetrated by a man 
against his female partner (e.g. Harne and Radford 2008: 40; Walby and Allen 2004; Westmarland 
2015: 10). This disparity is rooted in gendered social inequalities; domestic abuse both maps onto 
gendered power inequalities and “furthers the politics of oppression” (Pain 2015: 65). Moreover, 
a gendered approach to domestic abuse recognises not only statistical imbalances, but also that 
abusive behaviours mean different things and have different effects when they are perpetrated 
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by women and by men; that is, “women and men are positioned differently as both victims and 
perpetrators of violence” because that behaviour takes place “in a context of  [...] gender 
inequality” (Anderson 2009: 1455). In order to understand domestic abuse, therefore, gender 
must be taken into account. This study draws on both structural and post-structural approaches 
to power and to gender, and my gendered theorisation of domestic abuse also learns from both 
approaches. This dual approach is particularly useful for making sense of victim-survivors’ 
complex and multi-faceted experiences - indeed, scholars including Anderson (2009: 1450) and 
Hearn (2012: 592-97) have argued that overly simplistic approaches to gender have produced 
inadequate scholarship on domestic abuse, and have called for research which draws upon both 
materialist and discursive approaches. The empirical analysis presented in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven of this thesis demonstrate the value of the type of research which Anderson and Hearn are 
calling for by revealing the complex and nuanced understandings of abuse which can be 
engendered by this dual approach. In order to demonstrate what this means theoretically before I 
explore it empirically in later chapters, I sketch out below some of the ways in which structural 
and post-structural approaches inform my theorisation of domestic abuse.  
 
Structural approaches emphasise the material structures of inequality between men and women 
upon which abusers draw in building a pattern of controlling behaviour. As I show in Chapter Two, 
scholars have argued that patriarchal social structures “generate the conditions and relationships 
that lead to a husband’s use of force against his wife” (Dobash and Dobash 1979: ix), and have 
pointed to the intersectionally mediated ways in which the greater social and economic power of 
men enables them to perpetrate abuse against their female partners (Bograd 1999; Crenshaw 
1991; Harne and Radford 2008: 17; Pain 2012; Sokoloff and Dupont 2005). As Chapter Two 
demonstrates, economic inequality is an important example, and Michalski cites studies from 
Ghana, Botswana, India, and Belize which show that where women are economically dependent 
upon their spouses, they are more likely to experience abuse and less likely to be able to leave 
abusive relationships (2004: 665-666). Similarly, Harne and Radford argue that the greater 
average economic power of British men in comparison with British women means that men are 
more likely to be in a position to use economic strategies of control to abuse their partners and to 
prevent them from escaping the abuse (2008: 7, 46).  
 
The geographical imaginary whereby intimate relationships are understood to belong to the 
private as opposed to the public sphere is another important gendered structure which enables 
domestic abuse (see Gray 2015). While the boundaries between public and private are neither 
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constant nor apolitical but fluid, contingent, and produced through social relations and public 
workings of power (Blunt and Dowling 2006: 27; Brickell 2000: 165; Caluya 2011: 204), this 
socially produced divide continues to shape the ways in which domestic abuse is understood and 
responded to in contemporary Britain. Feminists have argued that the public/private divide is 
both gendered and gendering, and have pointed to the frequent association of men with the 
public and women with the private (e.g. Elshtain 1981; Kelly 2003, 32-58; Landes 1998b, 143; 
Mackinnon 1983; Massey 1994, 180; Pateman 1989b). Scholars have highlighted the role of this 
divide in making invisible women’s experiences of abuse by concealing behaviour which occurs 
within the feminised psycho-social and physical spaces of privacy (e.g. Benhabib 1998, 85-88; 
Duncan 1996; Kelly 2003; Landes 1998c; McDowell 1999, 88; Warrington 2001). This has had 
numerous implications for public responses to abuse, including most obviously the long history of 
police reluctance to intervene (McDowell 1999, 88). As a result, in Kelly’s words, “the privacy of 
men [has been protected] at the expense of the safety of women” (Kelly 2003: 34). A structural 
approach to theorising domestic abuse as coercive control is useful for the analysis presented in 
my thesis because it allows me to make sense of the ways in which my participants’ experiences 
of abuse were shaped in particular ways by the specific gendered structural inequalities which are 
present within the British military community.  
 
This thesis also draws on post-structural approaches in theorising domestic abuse, in order to 
draw attention to the ways in which such abuse is “both gendered and gendering” (Shepherd 
2008: 51). Scholars informed by post-structural approaches have suggested that using coercive 
control against their partners is one of the practices whereby perpetrators performatively 
construct themselves as masculine subjects. For example, for Anderson, controlling one’s 
intimate partner can be part of the performance of normative masculinity, but is less likely to be 
part of the performance of femininity, because  
 
the performance of masculinity involves controlling others (opening the door, by 
driving the car), whereas the performance of femininity involves deference to men’s 
control (walking through the door held open). The doing of gender involves rituals 
that position men as dominant and women as subservient, and this facilitates men’s 
ability to control women.  
(Anderson 2009: 1448) 
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For Anderson, men are enabled in building controlling relationships over women because the 
models of masculinity and femininity in conversation with which individuals performatively 
construct their gendered identities legitimate the control of women by men. Of more direct 
relevance to this thesis, other scholars have pointed to the ways in which responses to abuse, 
including help-seeking decisions, may form part of the process through which victim-survivors 
construct themselves as feminine subjects. Scholars including Dunn (2001; 2002), Anderson 
(2009: 1448) and Stark (2007: 210-11) have argued that normative scripts of masculinity, 
femininity, and heterosexual courtship may make it difficult to recognise certain abusive 
behaviours as abusive, because they may mirror “behaviors that are normative gender 
performances in contemporary culture” (Anderson 2009: 1448). For Stark, for example, women in 
heteronormative societies are often expected to defer to their male partners in certain types of 
decisions, and to leave or reduce their participation in paid employment to make a home, and 
that controlling behaviours which mirror these expectations may therefore be difficult to identify 
as abusive (2007: 210-11). Furthermore, Dunn’s (2001) work suggests that victim-survivors have 
to perform an acceptable type of femininity in order to be taken seriously as victims of abuse and 
therefore to obtain support and protection - in West and Zimmerman’s terms, they are “held 
accountable” to gender in particular ways through their responses to abuse (1987). Moreover, as 
I explored in Chapter Two, Towns and Adams have drawn attention to the ways in which “perfect 
love discourses” encourage victim-survivors to try to end the abuse through providing love to 
their partners rather than seeking help to make themselves safe (2000). That is, the performances 
of femininity to which victim-survivors are held accountable may shape their responses to abuse 
in important ways. For the purposes of clarity, this does not mean that masculinities cause abuse, 
or that femininities cause victim-survivors to respond in particular ways - neither masculinity nor 
femininity is an “autonomous ‘thing-in-itself’” which can play such a causal role (McCarry 2007; 
see also Hearn 2012). Rather, the perpetration of and response to domestic abuse can be part of 
the way in which individuals continually construct themselves as gendered subjects. This 
theoretical insight is useful for this thesis because it allows me to pay attention to the ways in 
which subjects are held accountable to gender in particular ways within the military community 
as they respond to domestic abuse.  
 
It is worth flagging here that this is a deeply political approach to domestic abuse; one which 
understands it as a political and social issue as well as an individual and interpersonal one, which 
is rooted the gendered social inequalities which characterise society. For Pain, “Domestic abuse is 
always political, although it is not always considered that way” (2015: 65). This - that domestic 
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abuse is both innately political and not always recognised as such - is an important point for my 
thesis, and worth discussing very briefly here. In this thesis, and in particular in Chapter Seven, I 
draw attention to the ways in which domestic abuse is depoliticised within the dominant 
narratives which circulate in the British military community. By ‘depoliticisation,’ I refer to a 
process whereby the systemic, political nature of a given issue is obscured through its attributions 
to individualised or otherwise externalised causes; in Razack’s words, “a determined look away 
from anything systemic” (2004: 152). For Edkins, depoliticisation works through the encircling of 
difficult and traumatic events and experiences as separate from the constitution and the normal 
functioning of the body politic itself - that is, through a process in which the systemic nature of 
inequalities and violences, and their position as woven into the roots of how modern societies are 
formulated, is denied (2003). In relation to domestic abuse, depoliticisation refers to processes 
through which the rootedness of such abuse in both structural gender inequalities and idealised 
gendered and sexual identities - as sketched out above - is obscured. This discussion will be taken 
up further in Chapter Seven. 
 
To summarise, I theorise domestic abuse as a deeply political, gendered pattern of abusive and 
violent behaviour which a perpetrator uses to establish dominance and control over his intimate 
partner. Domestic abuse is shaped in important ways by the organisations of gender and of 
power in the contexts in which it take place, as it operates both through structures and through 
discourse and social norms. My multiple approach to power and to gender allows me to make 
sense of my interview participants’ complex individual narratives through a recognition of both 
the structural and the discursive forces through which they are shaped and enabled - to locate 
the experience of abuse not just within the physical bodies of one couple, but within the wider 
gendered social and political context in which it occurs. This conceptualisation is particularly 
helpful for understanding responses to abuse, including victim-survivors’ help-seeking decisions, 
as it allows me to consider how the gendered minutia of everyday life, structured by wider social 
forces, either facilitate or discourage particular responses to abuse.  
 
 
Militarism and the British military institution  
The terms ‘militarism’ and ‘militarisation’ have been subject to a range of definitions among 
scholars. Stavrianakis and Selby outline five main ways in which militarism has been 
conceptualised within the academy: as an ideology which glorifies war and martial values; as 
state behaviour and policy-making which tends towards the use of military force; as a 
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quantitative build up of military technologies and personnel; as a tilt in the balance of power 
relations between a state’s military and civilian institutions in favour of the former; and, from a 
sociological perspective, as a set of relations embedded within society (2013: 12-14). Many 
previous feminist interventions have defined militarism as an ideology. Bernazzoli and Flint, for 
example, point to “a worldview that privileges military culture, values, and interests over those of 
civil society” (2010: 158). Similarly, Enloe lists core beliefs which constitute militarism, including 
the assumptions that human nature is prone to conflict, that armed force is the ultimate way to 
resolve tensions, and that in times of crisis there are those who require protection (the feminine) 
and those who have the duty to provide that protection (the masculine) (2004: 119). For 
Stavrianakis and Selby, these “ideology-centred conceptions” have lost influence in recent years, 
“both because wars and militaries are no longer subjects of straightforward glorification, and 
because it is reductionist and limiting to essentialise militarism as ideology.” They note that while 
beliefs and ideas remain relevant, they are now usually contextualised within broader 
interpretations of militarism which also encompass the material (2013: 12). A sociological 
approach to militarism, however, highlights the everyday social relations which allow geopolitical 
violence to take place, and emphasises how ideologies, policy-making, military build-up, and state 
power relations are all embedded within broader social relations (ibid.: 13-14). Stavrianakis and 
Selby define militarism as “the social and international relations of the preparation for, and 
conduct of, organised political violence” (ibid.: 3). In a slight re-working of this definition, I 
understand militarism as: the normalised, everyday, gendered social relations of the preparation 
for, and conduct of, political domination and control for which the use of organised violence is a 
viable option. I explore this approach below. For the purposes of clarity, it is worth noting that I 
use the term ‘militarism’ in this thesis to refer to this set of social relations, and the term 
‘militarisation’ to refer to the process by which this set of social relations comes to exist within a 
particular social space.  
 
My definition of militarism as the normalised, everyday, gendered social relations of the 
preparation for, and conduct of, political domination and control for which the use of organised 
violence is a viable option purposefully draws attention away from dramatic, headline-grabbing 
acts of military violence and towards the everydayness of militarism; to ordinary social relations 
whose relationship to war might not be immediately apparent. This is not to suggest that war is 
not important to discussions of militarism - it is - but that militarism is much broader than war 
itself. If we imagine war as the tip of an iceberg which is visible above the surface of the water, 
then militarism is the part below the waves - made up of unremarkable structures, routines, and 
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interactions - which is mostly unseen, but without which the uppermost tip could not float. As 
Sjoberg and Via argue,  
 
[t]hough war is an essential condition of militarism - the apex, the climax, the peak 
experience, the point of all the investments, training, and preparation - militarism is 
much, much broader than war, comprising an underlying system of institutions, 
practices, values, and cultures.  
(Sjoberg and Via 2010: 7) 
 
My discussions of militarism thus focus not on the drama of international violence but on the 
“banal processes of daily life” which are “so common as to be taken for granted and accepted as 
“normal”, or, even, “natural”’ and in which - very importantly - militarism ‘takes root’” (Dowler 
2012: 497). It is through the everyday actions and interactions of individuals that the ‘nation’ and 
the ‘international’ are produced, and that armed conflict between nation-states becomes 
possible (Basham 2013: 20; Dowler and Sharp 2010: 171). It is the very normality of the social 
relations which constitute militarism which helps to normalise violence on the international 
stage, framing the limited terms of debate over the use of the Armed Forces before it begins so 
that discussions focus on how military force should be used and not on whether it should be used 
at all, which Lutz refers to as “the military normal” (2009). 
 
If militarism is to be understood as a particular set of social relations, then, scholars of 
geopolitical violence need to rethink ideas of “what counts” in geopolitics, shifting their focus 
from the decisions of elites and the security of states to the everyday actions of ordinary 
individuals and the security of persons - both within and outside military institutions (Hyndman 
2001: 214). This calls into question the notion, which often emerges from the academic literature, 
of a neat, binary ‘divide’ or a ‘gap’ between the civilian and military spheres. While the nature of 
this divide has been conceptualised in a number of ways - as rooted in culture, demographics, 
policy preference, or institutional organisation (Rahbek-Clemmensen et al. 2012) - it has been 
widely considered important for ensuring that the military can function effectively (Forster 2012: 
275-76; Herspring 2009: 668, 72) and for protecting the civilian sphere from military 
encroachment (Feaver 1999: 214-15). Feminist scholarship on everyday experiences has drawn 
attention to the militarism inherent in civilian life (Enloe 2007: 4) and to the continuities across 
‘war’ and ‘peace’ (Sjoberg and Via 2010: 7), and has thus undermined the idea of a neat binary 
division. Following this, while Sylvester (2012, 2013) has convincingly called for scholars to put 
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experience and bodies back into the study of war - to bring to centre stage the people who 
“dwell” “in the shadows of IR” (Sylvester 2012: 490; see also chapters in McSorley 2013; Sylvester 
2013) - this study demonstrates the importance of expanding this in order to centre individual, 
embodied experiences in the study not only of war, but of the normalised social relations which 
make war thinkable.  
 
In drawing the focus of discussions of militarism away from the enactment of geopolitical 
violence and towards everyday social relations, I argue that at its core, militarism is not primarily 
about violence per se, but about the exercise of dominance and control - about having mastery 
over the other. To reach a situation where the use of organised political violence is thinkable, 
acceptance of the relations of dominance and control are first required. My understanding of 
militarism therefore highlights its underlying assumption that, on some level, a political body such 
as a nation-state has the right, or even the responsibility, to exercise dominance and control over 
nation-states or social/political groups who are in some way understood as ‘other’. At an even 
more basic level, it depends on ideas about the nation-state (or alternative form of collective) as a 
legitimate social entity with particular characteristics and, importantly, particular boundaries. The 
use of controlled, legitimate violence can then become a tool through which mastery is achieved. 
Whilst it is central to militarism that the use of violence is an option, it remains a last resort, to be 
utilised only when the ability to exercise control over political affairs in other ways are exhausted. 
If we focus only on militarism in relation to war, as Stavrianakis and Selby’s definition might be 
taken to suggest, we are in danger of abstracting the violence of war from its wider context of 
domination and control as well as from its everyday enactment in mundane social relations which 
can, on an experiential level, feel a very long way from the drama of violence and war.  
 
It is important to note that I am not advocating a focus on the ‘small scale’ of everyday 
experiences of the relations of militarism at the expense of the ‘large scale’ of war; rather, I want 
to undermine, to some extent, the idea that the two can be so neatly divided. That is, I argue that 
the assumption of a radical division between the intimate and the geopolitical is misleading 
because the intimate and the geopolitical are intrinsically co-constructed and intertwined with 
one another (Pain 2015: 66). As I note in Chapter Two, feminists have identified a “continuum of 
violence” which connects violence and domination across scales and contexts, which reaches 
“from the home and urban backstreet to the manoeuvres of the tank column and the sortie of 
the stealth bomber” (Cockburn 1999: 5; see also Kelly 1988). The notion of ‘scale’ - that everyday 
life, including that of intimate relationships, is a ‘small scale’ issue in comparison to the ‘large 
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scale’ problem of war -serves to obscure the connections and mutual reproductions of social 
issues which occur between and across contexts. Militarism’s everyday relations and enactments 
are fundamentally relevant to the functioning of its more remarkable manifestations such as 
armed conflict; it is through the mundane social interactions and everyday economic, social and 
political structures that the use of violence on a geopolitical stage becomes thinkable; becomes 
“an inevitability, something good, or even a source of moral satisfaction” (Butler 2010: xi). This is 
not a one-way process in which one ‘level’ shapes the other - in which the intimate is “dripped 
down upon” by geopolitical processes (Pain 2015: 64) - rather, to quote Basham, such processes 
“should be regarded as working in, with and through one another, as overlapping at multiple 
junctures and in various combinations, as intra-active” (2013: 14-15). While the intimate and the 
geopolitical are not the same, their diverse workings of power are thus mutually constitutive and 
co-dependent. 
 
Moreover, judgements of the scale and of the ‘everydayness’ of a given issue are not simply 
reflections of how widespread or how ‘ordinary’ it is. For some people in some parts of the world, 
the violence of war is ‘everyday’ in that they live in its shadow on a day-to-day basis. In another 
sense, while domestic abuse is experienced by individual women, it is a ‘large-scale’ issue in that 
it affects the lives of huge numbers of women worldwide
79
. Understandings of scale are rooted in 
understandings of borders. When borders are erected between families, for example, domestic 
abuse becomes a ‘small scale’ issue experienced within that family unit rather than a broad social 
problem rooted in the structures and ideologies which produce ‘family life’. Moreover, the 
designation of particular social issues as ‘small scale’ functions as a silencing tool whereby socially 
constructed structures of inequality are cast as natural, inevitable, or unimportant - especially in 
relation to ‘large scale’ problems. To rethink scale, then, requires a rethinking of borders - 
between nations, between families, and between the public and the private sphere - in order to 
denaturalise the divisions which have obscured commonalities and undermined political  alliances 
(Hyndman 2004: 310).  
 
Finally, in further contrast to Stavrianakis and Selby, I suggest that militarism cannot be 
understood as gender-neutral because it functions through “a certain logic of gendered meanings 
and images [which] helps organise the way people interpret events and circumstances, along with 
the positions and possibilities for action within them, and sometimes provides some rationale for 
action” (Young 2003: 2). While militarism is not only gendered but works through intersecting 
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axes of dominance including race, class, and sexuality (Lutz 2002: 723), I focus in this thesis on 
gender because, as I argued above, it is gender which best enables me to make sense of 
experiences of domestic abuse. For Young, militarism relies upon a gendered logic of masculine 
protection in which there are those who require protection - the feminine - and those who have 
the duty to provide that protection - the masculine - and the protected are necessarily placed in a 
subordinate position in relation to their protectors (Young 2003: 2). Other scholars have made 
similar arguments. Peterson suggests that a gendered logic of protection “justifies both the 
necessity of rule and who should rule” - that is, in one discursive move, the notion of feminine 
weakness and masculine strength both establishes the need for relations of protection, control, 
and dominance, and decides the positions of gendered actors within them (2010: 20). Similarly, 
Das argues that because of this gendered logic of protection, men and women are called upon to 
“[give] life to the nation” in gender differentiated ways: men, to fight and die; and women, to 
contribute their reproductive labour (2008: 185).  
 
It is important to note, of course, that these logics are not timeless and that change does occur. 
Hyndman, for example, draws attention to the ways in which the public/private binary in relation 
to the appropriate subjects and objects of protection have shifted over time, in particular through 
the growing influence of the notion of “human security” (2001: 215-16). Moreover, the growing 
presence of women in military institutions, while still small scale and managed in ways which limit 
its impact, is “fundamentally challenging at a cultural/symbolic level” (Woodward and Winter 
2006: 60). The dichotomous view of men and women may sometimes appear over-simplistic, and 
it is contested by the gender practices of some individuals. Despite this, as Basham suggests, “the 
re-inscription of this binary is highly significant to the production of identity and difference that is 
central to who fights and dies in modern conflicts and to the ongoing prioritisation of military 
force in liberal politics” (2013: 50). That is, while this gendered binary of the protective masculine 
and protected feminine is shifting and far from inevitable, it does continue to be influential in the 
ways in which wars are understood and are fought. This binary is not simply reflective of reality 
but is itself biopolitical; it produces the bodies of men and women in particular ways, reinforcing 
the suitability of male bodies, and the unsuitability female bodies, for fighting (Pin-Fat and Stern 
2005: 44).  
 
Militarism, I suggest, requires and works through patriarchal social relations, but it cannot be 
reduced to patriarchy alone; it relies also upon the notion of the threat an external other, against 
whom the use of violence is likely to be necessary in the name of protecting the feminised within 
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the collective. For Cockburn, gender relations cannot be considered the immediate ‘causes’ of 
war in the sense that they are what wars are understood to be ‘for’, as oil resources or national 
autonomy may be (2010: 149), but rather, they “predispose our societies to war. They are a 
driving force perpetuating war” (ibid.: 140). That is, gender relations “foster militarism and 
militarization. They make war thinkable. They make peace difficult to sustain” (ibid.: 149). 
Further, for Lutz, patriarchal gender relations are centrally important (although not unique) to 
what she calls “modern imperialism” but, again, are not the whole story - capitalist expansion and 
extraction, she argues, remain central (2006: 595). Militarism in contemporary Britain, then, is not 
just patriarchy, but it does rely upon patriarchal relations. Militarism is a particular form of 
patriarchal social relations which are formulated around the notion of crisis, risk, and the 
legitimate mastery of external others.   
 
The contemporary British military institution  
Having discussed militarism in the abstract, I move in this section to a consideration of the British 
military institution itself as a space in which the social relations that constitute militarism are 
deeply embedded. I do not want to suggest that militarism - understood as the normalised, 
everyday, gendered social relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, political domination 
and control for which the use of organised violence is a viable option - does not exist outside of 
the boundary of the institution. Indeed, I argue above against the notion of a clear, binary division 
between civilian and military and suggest that my focus on the everyday social relations of 
militarism draws attention to the commonalities which exist across the civil-military divide. 
However, while the social relations which constitute militarism breach institutional boundaries 
and are produced in various ways across military and civilian spheres, the military institution does 
constitute a space in which they are crystallised and intensified. Within the military, the 
patriarchal and masculinist ideologies which exist in wider society are concentrated in a 
heightened and institutionalised form. While it is not radically divided from civilian society, then, 
the British military does have a specific gender culture, one which is produced, in part, through 
the idea of difference from civilian life - against the ‘other’ of particular ideas of civilian life (Hale 
2012: 711).  
 
Importantly, the gender order of the British military is produced within a specific institutional 
space. The military institution assumes a greater level of involvement in what might normally be 
considered the ‘private’ lives of its members than might be accepted in most other forms of 
employment, which has led scholars to label it a “total” or a “greedy” institution. Hockey, 
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focusing particularly on the basic training period, compared the British Army to Goffman’s (1961) 
concept of a “total institution,” pointing to the lack of an “offstage” area where recruits can find 
privacy as well as to the identity stripping techniques which underpin training methods (Hockey 
1986: 24-26). Similarly, writing about the US example, Segal (1986) likened the military to Coser's 
(1974) “greedy institution,” one which makes great demands on individuals “in terms of 
commitments, loyalty, time, and energy” (Segal 1986: 9). Like all social institutions, of course, the 
military is not static, and some elements of military life have no doubt changed since Hockey and 
Segal were writing (and indeed, Segal was writing about the USA). Moreover, I want to note here 
the limitations of the institution’s totalising potential: while it does make significant claims on the 
lives of its personnel, the military is not, and does not entirely replace, the state. The military is a 
sub-state institution - an employer - and thus the relationship it has with its personnel is one of 
employer-employee and not of state-citizen. Moreover, as I argue elsewhere, the boundaries of 
the institutional absorption of the lives of its personnel and their families is constantly negotiated 
and incomplete, framed by the fluid needs of the institution as it understands them and not by a 
drive for totalising, blanket control. While the institution does have an interest in, and the ability 
to involve itself in, the ‘private’ lives of its personnel - wherein this interest serves institutional 
needs, such as, for example, if personnel are having personal problems which may impact their 
abilities to do their jobs - it does not swallow whole the ‘private’ lives of its personnel, and, issues 
which are not considered ‘relevant’ to institutional needs may well be side-lined (see Gray 2015). 
However, contemporary British military life remains one which is shaped by the institution in 
numerous ways  - in particular for those who live in SFA ‘inside the wire’ of the base or in patch 
communities.  Indeed, militaries continue to make deliberate efforts to bring personnel and their 
families inside the institutional space in order to promote the recruitment, retention, and morale 
of personnel (Bourg and Segal 1999: 636; Wood et al. 1995: 230). While the military is not the 
state, the institution does replace many of the services and resources for which one might 
normally turn to the state with its own institutional equivalents - such as policing and welfare 
services. Moreover, the British military also makes explicit efforts to shape the identities and 
behaviours of its personnel in all areas of their lives, both on- and off-duty; for example, the Army 
requires all personnel to sign up to its ‘values and standards’ - loyalty, Integrity, courage, 
discipline, respect for others, and selfless commitment - and states that it expects personnel to 
uphold these at all times
80
. Strong social bonds are also fostered within this institutional space; 
both within serving units (Higate 2012; Woodward 2008), and more broadly (Enloe 2000: 154-97; 
Gray 2015: 6). As a result, while it may not be a “total institution” in any kind of blanket sense, 
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the British military is a specific institutional space, and it is this space within which its gender 
order comes into being. 
 
Heteronormative gender in the institutional space  
If we accept, then, that the lives of British military personnel and their non-serving spouses are 
shaped to a significant extent by the institutional context in which they live, we must next ask 
how this is experienced in relation to my above explorations of militarism as a set of social 
relations. How is gendered militarism crystallised within the institution? The contemporary British 
military is a heteronormative space, by which I do not mean only that it remains presumptively 
heterosexual (Basham 2008), but also that it relies upon the idea of male and female difference as 
an important organiser of social life (Nielsen et al. 2000). Below, I draw upon both structural and 
post-structural approaches to power and to gender to sketch out the heteronormative gender 
order of the institution, as this is the setting in which the abusive relationships of interest to this 
study are embedded.  
 
The idea of distinct categories of people known as ‘men’ and ‘women’ is central in the structural 
organisation of the military, and it shapes the spaces institutional life. As Woodward and Winter 
note, gender “informs the understanding of the planners of military bases and barracks about 
who can and cannot live together, how they can live together, what facilities it is appropriate to 
share or not share, and how these spaces should visibly reflect their military function” (2007: 5). 
The roles which men and women perform within this institutional space are largely differentiated, 
the most obvious example of which being the ongoing exclusion of women from ‘combat’ roles in 
the British military (see Chapter One). While it is likely that this exclusion will soon be removed
81
, 
in terms of drawing attention to the heteronormativity of the military what is particularly 
interesting is that the arguments which have underpinned this exclusion have for some time 
centred largely not around women’s psychological or physiological abilities, but about notions of 
their essentialised difference: their very presence as women, the arguments have suggested, 
would be disruptive to unit cohesion (Woodward and Winter 2007: 53-56). Furthermore, as I 
explore in Chapter Six, the structures of military families continue to position non-serving 
spouses, who are overwhelmingly women, as the dependents of their serving spouses in ways 
which reinforce a ‘traditional,’ heteronormative sharing of labour and of power within the 
relationship. While civilian women married to servicemen do increasingly participate in the labour 
market, for example, for many the geographical mobility which structures their military lives, as 
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well as the requirement that those with children function as a “single parent” while their partners 
are deployed, makes it difficult to develop a career or a reliable and long-term independent 
source of income (Enloe 2000: 153-97; Harrison and Laliberté 1994: 130-31, 55, 75, 217-18).   
 
Post-structural approaches can also offer insights into the gender culture of the British military. In 
many ways, military gender norms could be described as conservative - clinging to ideas of male-
female polarity despite these being largely eroded from most civilian discourse (Harrison and 
Laliberté 1994: 14), characterised by a “cultural lag” (Higate and Cameron 2004: 210) and 
‘traditional’ attitudes (Kurpius and Lucart 2000: 256-63). It would, however, be deeply flawed to 
describe military gender culture as simply behind the times, as a less evolved version of host 
society. Military gender relations are in important ways qualitatively removed from civilian 
society because they are formulated for and through the political project of militarism. The British 
military both functions practically and legitimates itself through gendered ideologies; in Hale’s 
words, “[t]he military rebuilds or reframes masculinities [and femininities] as a means of meeting 
the aims of the process of militarisation” (2012: 705). As Belkin argues, militarised gender ideals 
play an important role in legitimating militarism: the portrayal of servicemen as tough, masculine, 
dominant, and stoic, for example, “can conjure up images of military strength, state legitimacy 
and imperial righteousness, while depictions of the soldier’s flaws can implicate notions of 
military weakness and state and imperial illegitimacy” (2012: 58). That is, while the lived 
experiences of military masculinity have always been more complex, fluid and multiple than has 
been reflected in dominant stories that have been told about it - by scholars, the media, soldiers, 
and the wider public - these simplified stories themselves play an important political role in 
enabling and legitimating militarism. A significant and multifaceted exercise of power therefore 
continues to go into naturalising the gender norms of militarism (Kovitz 2003: 2).  
 
In light of the political functioning of military gender ideals, it is important to emphasise that the 
models I describe below are not reflections of the essentialised reality of the lived gender 
identities of people within the British military community - to suggest that they are, as Belkin 
points out, would be to risk reinforcing the very gendered constructions upon which militarism 
relies (2012: 5) The performance of military gender identities is far from a simplistic or unitary 
process, rather, as Higate argues “the making of what might be called military gender is a 
practical, continuous, social accomplishment” (2003a: xiii). That is, drawing on a post-structural 
understanding of subjectivity as an effect of everyday, routine gendered practice, the models 
explored below should be read as the “ideologies or fantasises of what men [or women] should 
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be like” (MacInnes 1998: 2) in conversation with which individuals performatively construct their 
gendered identities.  
 
As political constructions, dominant ideas about the relationship between combat, the heroic, 
and masculinity are neither homogenous nor static but are continuously reformulated in the face 
of changing social and political contexts (Morgan 1990: 26-27). While scholars have pointed to 
the plurality of military masculinities, noting that administrative clerks do not construct their 
gender practice in the same way as front-line soldiers (Higate 2003b), it has been widely argued 
that the hegemonic model in relation to which military performances of masculinity are 
constructed is the “warrior masculinity” of the idealised combat soldier (Atherton 2009: 824). This 
idealised model is centred on physical and mental toughness, the ability to endure physical 
hardships without complaint (Woodward 2003: 44), and the ability to use aggression and violence 
(Hockey 1986: 34). Respect for authority, willingness to obey commands and to conform to 
hierarchy, and ability to exhibit discipline are also central features of hegemonic military 
masculinity (Atherton 2009: 824-25; Cockburn 2007: 249-50). In addition, scholars have identified 
‘traditional’ ideas about appropriate gendered behaviour (Hockey 1986: 115), and even outright 
misogyny (Higate 2003b: 27), as characterising features of this model. Idealised warrior 
masculinity is associated with “aggressive heterosexuality and homophobia” (Woodward 2003: 
44), the enthusiastic pursuit of heterosex (Hockey 1986: 114-15), and the ability to overcome 
trauma and hardship (Woodward and Jenkings 2013: 163; see also Gray forthcoming).  
 
Moreover, while militaries are masculine spaces, because gender is relational (Connell 1995: 72) 
military masculinity is “utterly dependent  […] on this other, on the institution of the family, of the 
feminine”; as without something to protect, the military loses its purpose and legitimacy 
(Woodward and Winter 2007: 83). Soldierly identities are formulated through ideas about the 
protection of “hearth and home” (Atherton 2009: 827), and civilian women married to 
servicemen - as the most immediate embodiment of this - play an important role in their 
construction. For example, Basham quotes an officer in the British Army who reflects on the 
gender dichotomy whereby women - in particular civilian women married to servicemen - 
embody that which is to be protected by military force. 
 
It’s just the way that history is, you know - man goes off to war, leaves his wife and 
children behind and expects them there when he comes back. And you know, she’s 
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there to cook and clean and bring up [the children]  [...] that’s to me the bottom line  
[...] men have a natural inclination to protect the women. 
(Basham 2013: 82-83) 
 
In this officer’s narrative, the role of the military wife is to care for the house and home and, in so 
doing, to embody the constitutive other against whom the soldier constructs his identity as 
military protector.  
 
Military femininities are plural, encompassing a broad range from the sexy/tomboy dichotomy of 
female soldiers (Woodward and Winter 2007: 84-88) to vulnerable  “womenandchildren” (Enloe, 
cited in Wilford 1998: 29-30) in need of protection. For the purposes of this thesis, the most 
relevant construction is that of the military wife. As discussed below and throughout this thesis, 
many civilian women married to servicemen must accept significant and unusual hardships if their 
marriages are to endure and to provide the kinds of unpaid domestic labour and the symbolic 
functions which the military institution requires. Like the use of violence for men, this self-
sacrifice does not come easily for women, and discursive strategies must therefore be employed 
to persuade them to embrace it.  
 
For Enloe, the idealised model of the military wife revolves around her support for her husband’s 
military role. The idealised military wife feels that she is part of the military community, is proud 
of the patriotic duty she does within it, and feels that her own status grows as her husband’s rank 
increases. She is flexible to the changing demands of the institution and accepts certain 
difficulties in the name of duty to her country and her marriage, including the possibility of 
supporting her husband through mental/emotional or physical injuries (2000: 162-64). In 
addition, she accepts as natural the binary division of labour which positions men as 
breadwinners and women as housewives and mothers (de Bere 2003: 98), and embodies the 
virtues of stoicism, self-reliance and toughness (Harrison and Laliberté 1994: 83-84). As Ware 
argues, while many civilian women married to servicemen find themselves unable to live up to 
this ideal or choose to reject it, the point of this model is that it highlights the “parameters of 
acceptable behaviour associated with being married to a soldier” (2012: 207). The military 
institution asks a lot of its families, requiring many spouses to regularly uproot their lives and in 
some cases, to sacrifice the chance to have their own career. In August 2014, just over a third of 
service families had moved house within the previous twelve months (Ministry of Defence 2014, 
1). Western military institutions rely upon the willingness of military spouses to make these 
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sacrifices, and upon their unpaid domestic labour. In the US case, (Wool 2014: 5-7) draws on 
Povinelli (2006) to argue that conjugal couplehood - conceived in liberal imaginaries as the key 
form of sociality through which appropriate personhood can most properly emerge - is 
understood by military authorities as the preferred form through which personnel should be 
supported and reintegrated into civilian communities after deployment. For Horn (2010: 64), 
therefore, to act “appropriately” as a military wife “means accepting particular gender roles, such 
as caring for the children, keeping house, and supporting husbands in their roles as military men.” 
This matters to militaries: as Ware suggests, “[w]ithout the unpaid labour and emotional support 
of thousands of military spouses standing behind their individual soldier, the whole system would 
grind to a halt” (Ware 2012: 207). 
 
Militarism, then, is a political project which is underpinned by a gendered logic in important ways. 
The notion of protection by which militarism is legitimated is inherently gendered, and relies 
upon the idea that there are those who require protection - the feminised - and those who have 
the duty to provide that protection - the masculinised. Rooted in this are the normative 
masculinities and femininities which circulate within the institutional space of the contemporary 
British military. As I note above, it is not the case that all individuals within this context conform 
to such idealised gender roles - there is, of course, resistance, negotiation and agency at work. 
The ideals, however, remain, and continue to play important roles both in shaping the context in 
which individuals negotiate and perform their gender identities, and in the ongoing political 
legitimation of the project of militarism itself.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has explored the theoretical approach which frames this thesis. Drawing on both 
structural and post-structural approaches to power and to gender, I have explored the 
conceptualisations of domestic abuse and of militarism upon which this thesis builds its 
arguments. The theoretical tools introduced in this chapter - both structural and post-structural 
approaches to power and to gender; a political view of domestic abuse as a gendered pattern of 
behaviour through which a perpetrator attempts to gain control over his intimate partner; and an 
understanding of militarism as a gendered set of mundane, everyday social relations which are 
crystallised within the institution of the British military - enable me to make sense of responses to 
domestic abuse in this context. By paying attention to both structural and post-structural 
approaches in making sense of domestic abuse, I am able to build a nuanced understanding of 
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how responses are shaped both by structurally mediated conditions of possibility and by the ways 
in which victim-survivors are held accountable to femininity. Moreover, paying attention to the 
British military as a gendered institution allows me to make sense of how these factors are 
reshaped in this particular context, and thus, to construct a nuanced and multi-faceted 
understanding of the narratives which emerged from the interviews conducted for this thesis.  
 
In addition, while I have built this theoretical approach in order to enable me to make sense of 
the experiences of my participants, my study also allows me to contribute towards the 
advancement of these theoretical approaches. This thesis contributes to the theorisation of the 
social relations which constitute militarism by providing a case study of how these relations are 
lived in this particular example, providing a study of what it means to say that militarism is 
gendered on an everyday, experiential level. Secondly, my study contributes to theoretical 
understandings of domestic abuse by providing information on how coercive control is 
experienced and negotiated in a particular context. This contributes towards the complication of 
this theoretical approach by pointing towards the context-specificity of the ways in which 
patterns of controlling behaviour are established.  
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Chapter Five: 
Responses to abuse and the performance of gendered identity in the 
military 
 
This is the first of three chapters which offer analyses of the themes which emerged from the 
empirical data collected for this study. In this chapter, I draw upon post-structural approaches to 
engage with these central questions:  
 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by discourses of 
gender identity? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
 
I approach the writing of this chapter with some caution, as any discussion of the subjectivities of 
victim-survivors and of perpetrators of domestic abuse is, politically, a difficult and risky 
proposition. All too often, discussions of abuse which focus on the identity or behaviour of victim-
survivors in particular have been framed in a manner which blames a woman for her 
victimisation, identifying some trait in her individual identity or aspect of her behaviour which 
explains why she doesn’t ‘just leave’ (as, it is implied, any sensible person would do), or even 
which explains why she suffered abuse in the first place (Thapar-Björkert and Morgan 2010). As 
discussed in Chapter Two, even theoretical interventions which aim to promote empathy towards 
victim-survivors by casting them as blameless ‘victims,’ for example Lenore Walker’s influential 
work on “battered women’s syndrome” (Walker 1977, 1979, 1984), can unintentionally 
disempower victim-survivors through obscuring their capacity for agency. Similarly, as I discuss 
further in Chapter Seven, theoretical interventions which focus on the identities of perpetrators 
can individualise and depoliticise discussions of abuse by portraying the abuser as deviant, 
sociopathic, or mentally unwell, thus obscuring the wider, gendered social factors which shape 
domestic abuse.  
 
Moreover, it is important to note that gender identity - as an ongoing relational and interactional 
achievement - should not be understood as a causal force for social behaviour. To suggest, for 
example, that forms of masculinity cause violence may be to assume the existence of an essential 
masculinity, prior to and external to social relations - an “autonomous ‘thing-in-itself’” (McCarry 
2007: 409) - which pre-exists a given act of violence in a stable way. For McCarry,  
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if we attribute causal power onto ‘masculinity’ we can locate the blame for male violence 
onto ‘masculinity’ and away from men who perpetrate it. This has a profound effect on the 
way in which both men as individual perpetrators are then conceptualised and how men as 
a social group are understood to receive their ‘patriarchal dividend’ from the violence of 
some men (in terms that this violence contributes to maintaining the gender order). 
(McCarry 2007: 409) 
  
Despite these reservations, several of the narratives which emerged from my interviews strongly 
suggest that there is something about military life other than just its material structures 
(discussed in Chapter Six) which play an important role in shaping responses to domestic abuse. 
For several participants, this was articulated as related to their sense of self, their understanding 
of the character and identity of their partners, and the ways in which these were implicated in 
their making sense of their experiences. Paying serious attention to narratives of identity allows 
for a centring of participants’ own sense-making practices in my analysis, as well as for an 
understanding of the everyday ways in which abuse is negotiated and responded to. I am careful 
to draw connections here from participants’ narratives of identity to theories of power and to the 
political project of militarism, and in doing so I aim to mitigate as far as possible the 
individualisation which has been so politically damaging in other scholarship that discusses 
domestic abuse in relation to the identity of its victim-survivors and perpetrators.  
 
In this chapter I suggest that the ways in which domestic abuse is responded to in the British 
military context is shaped by disciplinary power. I begin by expanding on some of the theoretical 
discussions of disciplinary power which I began in the previous chapter, and by exploring how this 
theoretical approach can help us to understand how victim-survivors are held accountable to, and 
how many develop strong affective attachments to, the norms of idealised military wifehood. I go 
on to discuss how this disciplinary power shapes responses to abuse - specifically, through the 
disciplining of victim-survivors around the ideals of stoicism and of support for the military career 
- two of the traits of the idealised military wife which emerge from both the academic literature 
(Enloe 2000: 162-64; Harrison and Laliberté 1994: 83-84; Horn 2010: 64; Wool 2014: 5-7) and 
from the interviews collected for this study. Recognising that femininities and masculinities 
cannot exist in isolation but are produced through one another on an ongoing basis (Connell 
1995: 72), I then draw attention to ways in which responses to abuse are shaped through 
dominant understandings of hegemonic “warrior masculinity” (Atherton 2009: 824). In concluding 
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the chapter, I return to a discussion of how these idealised norms of militarised gender play a role 
in the making possible and the legitimation of militarism writ large.  
 
 
Military gender identity: Disciplinary power and affective attachment 
In the preceding chapter I sketched out the post-structural approach to power and to gender 
which informs this thesis. I noted that gendered identities are neither static nor innate, but rather 
that gendered “docile bodies” (Foucault 1991: 138) are produced through the “stylized repetition 
of acts” (Butler 1999: 191, emphasis in original), which produce the “effect of an internal core or 
substance” (ibid.: 185). Conscious of their own visibility within a field of what Foucault termed 
“disciplinary power,” subjects come to shape themselves to conform to the norms of their 
societies, and as such a subject becomes “the principle of his [sic] own subjugation” (Foucault 
1991: 202-203). Gendered identities - as in masculinities and femininities - are constructed and 
enacted in relational terms. Neither can exist without the other, as they are co-produced “in the 
process that constitutes a gender order” (Connell 1995: 72). This process cannot be finished; 
rather, gender identity is an ongoing social accomplishment which is never finally complete (West 
and Zimmerman 1987: 126).  
 
For West and Zimmerman, individuals are “held accountable” to the expectations applied to their 
gender within social relationships. That is, individual actions are judged and responded to in 
relation to the gendered expectations to which a person is subject - as a woman, or as a man. The 
(presumed) membership of individuals to one or other of the categories ‘woman’ and ‘man’ 
works to legitimate or to discredit their actions across the whole of social life - although it 
functions differently in different social settings - and, with it, the actor’s competency as a social 
being is also assessed (West and Zimmerman 1987: 136-37). The terms by which we are held to 
account, of course, are not of our own making, but precede and exceed us in various ways (Butler 
2005: 20). Such accountability is both interactional and institutional - “it is a feature of social 
relationships, and its idiom derives from the institutional arena in which those relationships come 
to life” (West and Fenstermaker 1995: 21). While it is possible for individuals to do gender in 
various ways, not all choices are equally easy to make for all embodied subjects, and the cost of 
making certain choices can be very high (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 842-43). Deviance 
from the accepted norms of gendered practice calls subjects “into question as competent 
members of society” (West and Fenstermaker 1995: 20) because, in Butler’s words, ““persons” 
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only become intelligible through becoming gendered in conformity with recognizable standards 
of gender intelligibility” (Butler 1999: 22).  
 
Civilian women married to servicemen are held accountable to what Ware calls the “parameters 
of acceptable behaviour associated with being married to a soldier” (Ware 2012: 207). It is 
important to note once again that I am not attempting to describe who civilian women married to 
servicemen are in any essentialised sense. Instead, as I explore in the previous chapter, military 
gender ideals are political constructions, propped up by a considerable exercise of power, which 
serve to enable and to legitimate militarism itself (Belkin 2012: 58; Hale 2012: 705; Kovitz 2003: 
2). Participants in this study did not claim to embody in any complete sense the idealised identity 
of the military wife. Following Connell’s theory of hegemonic masculinity, however, it is not 
necessary that a statistical majority of women actually conform to the model in order that it be 
considered normative (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832) - and indeed, the vast majority of 
participants did agree that the ‘ideal military wife’ was a concept which they recognised, which 
they could identify, which was held in high esteem, and which, in many cases, they felt pressured 
and/or endeavoured of their own accord to perform.  
 
For military support worker Lily, for example, “Army wives do have a particular identity […] I 
would say that Army wives do have a very specific identity.” Similarly, military support worker 
Veronica suggested that  
 
Veronica: I think, even if she wasn’t an ideal military wife when she married him, she 
either gets to be one or the relationship won’t last […] Her job always comes second 
to his. Her family always comes second to his job. Even the kids that they have come 
second to his job, which, yes, you get in the civilian world but not to the same extent 
[…] [If the] wife isn’t willing to become the military wife image [the relationship 
won’t last] […] I don’t think many of them start off being the ideal Army wife but they 
don’t last long if they’re not. 
 
In addition to providing a clear illustration of the ways in which military gendered identity is an 
ongoing achievement, Veronica’s narrative suggests that the pressures upon civilian women 
married to servicemen to perform the identity of the ‘military wife’ are such that the relationships 
of those who fail to conform to it at least to some extent will not last. Her narrative thus 
highlights the efficacy of disciplinary power in this space - civilian women married to servicemen, 
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she suggests, are aware of the “field of visibility” to which they are subjected - and those who 
succeed as military wives are those who allow this form of power to “play spontaneously” upon 
themselves (Foucault 1991: 202-203).  
 
I want to note that not all participants fully embraced this identity category: for some, ‘military 
wife’ was a limited term which did not encompass their self-image. Victim-survivor participants 
Elenoa and Mereoni, for example, stated that:  
 
Elenoa: I still had my own ambitions […] I still had my dreams and things I wanted to 
pursue. 
 
Mereoni: I didn’t like to be regarded as an Army wife, just an Army wife, I wanted to 
be somebody. 
  
Elenoa and Mereoni did not wish to be entirely defined by the term ‘military wife,’ as they did not 
feel that it fully encompassed their identities; indeed, some level of criticism of those who are 
“just an Army wife” - and by implication are therefore are not “somebody” - can be identified in 
their narratives. This is not, however, the same as an outright rejection of the term, but is rather a 
reluctance on the parts of Elenoa and Mereoni to subsume their identities wholly within it.  
 
Other participants, however, expressed deep affective attachments to the military wife identity, 
and spoke of the positive feelings which they associated with it. Victim-survivor participant Tanya, 
for example, told me:  
 
Tanya: I was proud to be a soldier’s wife [...] Walking down the street in the town [...] 
[People would ask]  “Oh are you in [the base], is your husband in the [regiment]?” 
And, “Yeah, yeah my husband’s in the [regiment]” [...] And just saying, “Yeah, my 
husband’s in the Army,” you think, do you know what, I’m damn proud to be a 
soldier’s wife because they do a good job. You know, they’re fighting for the country.  
 
Tanya’s narrative points to feelings of pride and of self-worth attached to her experience of being 
a ‘military wife.’ That is, while it was her husband, and not herself, who actually served in the 
military, her connection to the institution was something she wanted; it was a source of a positive 
identity of which she was proud. Similarly, when discussing her pride in her abusive former 
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husband’s military role, victim-survivor participant Rachel referred to the self-esteem she found 
in identifying as a military wife: 
 
Rachel: I’m still quite proud of the fact that they’re still going out there, they’re still 
fighting out there [...] I was only 19 when I got married [...] With having my son 
young as well there was that, I don’t know how to put it. This is my life. I’m not a 
typical young mum, you know, in my family life and in, you know, he had the perfect 
job and he was perfect. So it was nice to have that family. ‘Cause that’s all I’ve ever 
wanted.  
 
For Rachel, her identity as a military wife gave her an escape from being looked upon as “a typical 
young mum” - an identity she associated with being looked down upon - and offered instead the 
opportunity to be respectable
82
. This suggests that Rachel understood military wifehood in 
particular as a desirable identity - one with a respectable arrangement of family and a husband 
with “the perfect job” - and that this was an identity to which she felt attached. Finally, victim-
survivor participant Kimberly told me that:  
 
Kimberly: Whatever they’re going through, going to Afghanistan or whatever, you 
support them because you’re the wife, that’s what you want to do. 
 
Kimberly describes the sacrifices she made in her own life in order to support her serving 
husband, difficult though they may be, as something that she, and other military wives, want to 
do. That is, for Kimberly, supporting her husband was not something which was enforced upon 
her by a source of repressive authoritarian power, but rather something that she chose to do 
because of her own desires.  
 
These narratives point to the disciplinary power at work here - subjects self-police, performing 
the behaviours which are expected of them and, through this performance, producing their 
identities as ‘military wives’ in particular ways. In addition, these narratives can also be usefully 
understood through a consideration of the strong affective attachment which many participants 
displayed to this identity. This is, I think, an important point to emphasise in particular given the 
negative and unhappy experiences upon which this thesis focuses - living the social relations 
which constitute militarism can be, and in many cases is, a source of pleasure for some actors. 
                                                           
82
 For a discussion of class, gender, and respectability which is beyond the scope of this thesis, see Skeggs 
(1997).  
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The pleasures of militarism have been explored by scholars discussing the deep connections 
produced during military bonding rituals (Higate 2012: 456-58; Wadham 2013: 226-27); by those 
who refer to the “pull of adventure” in encouraging recruits to sign up to military service 
(O'Connor 2015: 70) in particular in the context of contemporary saturation of Hollywood and of 
videogames with “militainment” (e.g. Stahl 2010); and by others who have identified the 
“masculine pleasures of armament culture” as a gendered fantasy which works towards the 
easing of masculine anxieties in a time of globalisation and job insecurity (Salter 2014: 166-68). 
There remains, however, a dearth of critical scholarly work which takes seriously the pleasures to 
be found in the performances of diverse militarised identities - perhaps because of a taboo 
against the subject among critical scholars of the military - and this is something that scholars 
should take seriously in order make better sense of military experience (Dyvik forthcoming).  
 
Affective attachment does not equal pleasure: indeed, as Berlant points out, it can be 
experienced as “dread, anxiety, hunger, curiosity, the whole gamut from the sly neutrality of 
browsing the aisles to excitement at the prospect of “the change that’s gonna come””(Berlant 
2011: 2). This is a particularly useful point, because it helps to make sense of some of the 
apparent contradictions which characterise participants’ engagements with military identity. 
Victim-survivor participant Jessica, for example, said of her abusive husband that “even though 
he was horrible, I was still proud of him” because of his role in the RAF. Similarly, Tanya’s 
interview transcript contains both scathing critique of the Army and of its personnel and of the 
way they treated her (“they close ranks [...] there’s cover-up, everyone knows it”) and deep 
admiration for both (“you’re a soldier: I take my frigging hat off to you [...] I will always take my 
hat off to any of the Armed Forces”). Working in the U.S. military context, Scott reflects on 
affective attachment to make sense of a similar contradiction: that many servicewomen in the US 
military who have experienced sexual harassment and sexual assault, and who have been 
seriously let down by the institution in the process of reporting the assault and of trying to seek 
redress, still believe in the military’s “innate goodness” and ability to act as a source of positive 
identification and pride (Scott 2015). Scott explores this apparently contradictory attachment 
through the lens of Berlant’s concept of “cruel optimism.” For Berlant, “all attachments are 
optimistic” in that they constitute “a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make 
to us and make possible for us” (2011: 23). Optimistic attachment, she suggests, is an affective 
structure which “involves a sustaining inclination to return to the scene of fantasy that enables 
you to expect that this time, nearness to this thing will help you or a world to become different in 
just the right way” (Ibid.: 2, emphasis in original). For affective attachments to be described as 
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“cruel,” they must constitute “a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility” 
(ibid.: 24); an affective attachment to something which “is actually an obstacle to your 
flourishing” (ibid.: 1). Importantly, Berlant makes it clear that even cruelly optimistic attachments 
are not “a symptom of error, a perversion, damage, or a dark truth” (ibid.: 14). That is, 
servicewomen who remain attached to the military institution as a source of the “good life” even 
as it systematically prevents their attainment of that very same ideal are not to be derided, 
blamed, or pitied, they are not ‘wrong,’ and they are not suffering from a form of “false 
consciousness” (Scott 2015; 1, 19). Rather, for Berlant, optimism is “a scene of negotiated 
sustenance that makes life bearable as it presents itself ambivalently, unevenly, incoherently” 
(Berlant 2011: 14) - the conditions of possibility in which lives are lived mean that even cruelly 
optimistic attachments are sometimes the only ways in which life can be endured. The notion of 
cruelly optimistic affective attachments is useful for my analysis because it can help us to make 
sense of the apparent contradictions which shape individuals’ relationships with the military 
institution and with militarised identity without judging them as somehow ‘wrong.’  
 
Civilian women married to servicemen formulate their identities on an ongoing basis within a field 
of disciplinary power in which they are held accountable to the “parameters of acceptable 
behaviour associated with being married to a soldier” (Ware 2012: 207). Moreover, many 
participants in this study experienced deeply held attachments to the norms to which they were 
held accountable - attachments which do not easily dissipate despite the hardships they may 
experience (Scott 2015: 1) - as they were a source of pride and of identity. This chapter explores 
the implications which this has for the ways in which victim-survivors of abuse in this context 
respond to abuse.  
 
 
Reponses to abuse and ‘military wifehood’ 
In the previous chapter I outlined the idealised model of military wifehood which scholars have 
described, and argued that this model plays an important political role in enabling militarism by 
encouraging civilian women married to servicemen to accept the hardships of military life. This is 
part of a broader gendered logic which, I argued, contributes to the legitimation of the social 
relations of militarism. In what follows, I focus on two traits of idealised military wifehood which 
emerge both from the literature and from my interviews as being particularly significant, in order 
to draw attention to the ways in which these idealised traits shape the responses to abuse of 
victim-survivors in this context. I first discuss the impact of the norms of stoicism and strength, 
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before moving on to focus on the expectation that civilan women married to servicemen will 
provide support to their husband’s career and to the institution more broadly.  
 
“You have to be quite a strong woman to be a military wife”  
For several participants in this study, the unique demands of military life mean that stoicism and 
strength of character are required characteristics of a military wife: as perpetrator participant 
Dean put it, “you need a […] special type of woman to put with the crap that the Army brings.” 
For victim-survivor participant Jessica,  
 
Jessica: You have to be quite a strong woman to be a military wife, I think. Because 
as I say, you know, you can tell by some of the women, they put on this front of, you 
know, “oh la di daa, you know, life’s great, I love it,” when really, you know that 
they’re lonely [...] I think a wife has to take on a lot of stuff.  
 
Jessica’s narrative highlights the ongoing accomplishment involved in performing the identity of 
military wifehood. Stoicism, she suggests, is not something which comes naturally to civilian 
women married to servicemen, but rather it is something that they try hard to attain and to 
present to the world. Civilian women married to servicemen, subject to disciplinary power, work 
to attain the ideals to which they are held accountable.  
 
Moreover, while the pressure to perform stoicism is a source of anxiety for some civilian women 
married to servicemen, many also experience an affective attachment to their own identity as 
stoic - and this can become a source of pride. Describing how she coped on her own with the 
children when her husband deployed to Afghanistan, for example, victim-survivor participant 
Isabella stated: 
 
Isabella: It was amazing. It was the best 6 months of my life [...] When I moved [to 
the patch] I had nothing. I had these Army wives who I didn’t trust, all my family 150 
miles away, no church, nothing. And I had to learn to do it by myself. And so those 
seven months when he was in Afghan, I just had to survive doing it by myself. And 
that was the best thing for me because that is what has enabled me to, kind of, cope 
since leaving him.  
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Isabella’s narrative points to an affective attachment to the notion of herself as a strong woman, 
one who can cope. This may be particularly important in the context of domestic abuse - as I 
discussed in Chapter Two, the label ‘victim’ may itself be disempowering and may obscure the 
agency exercised by women who experience abuse; and some may therefore resist this label. This 
does not mean that Isabella did not also feel anxious and pressured into remaining strong - 
indeed, in another extract from her interview, cited below, Isabella laments feeling pressured not 
to admit that she was struggling. As discussed above, it is not unusual for affective attachments to 
be experienced in contradictory, but none the less significant, ways.  
 
Several victim-survivor participants interviewed for this study recounted the ways in which the 
expectation that they perform a form of ‘military wife’ femininity centred around stoicism, and 
their own affective attachment to this performance, shaped the ways in which they responded to 
abuse. For many, the pressure to stay strong at all times led to a reticence to admit that they 
were going through a hard time and that they needed help. Victim-survivor participants Jessica 
and Isabella, for example, told me that: 
  
Jessica: You feel like you can’t go and ask for help. Because you’re supposed to be 
that strong person, and you’re meant to be, like, this good little wife [...] [I]t makes 
you not want to get the help because you’re not, I think it makes you feel like you’re 
weak. Because you know, you’re not meant to be that person. You’re meant to be 
this strong woman. And going for help means that you’re a weak person, and 
basically saying that you can’t cope with everything. And you’re not supposed to be 
that person, so you shouldn’t do it.  
 
Isabella: You don’t want to admit that you’re struggling. You don’t ask for help. 
Because then that makes you look like you’re not as good as people are making, like, 
people think you are. Although I didn’t have that kind of image, but because 
everybody else did, I didn’t know who to ask. Because I didn’t know who would help 
me. 
 
Jessica’s and Isabella’s narratives show how the disciplining of ‘military wife’ subjects 
around the ideal of stoicism can limit their ability to seek help, because doing so is read as 
an admission of failure to embody the proper identity of a military wife. Indeed, several 
interview participants painted a clear picture of the failed military wife as one who is 
 126 
 
insufficiently stoic and, as a result, unable to cope with the demands of military life - a 
figure who was widely seen as an object of scorn. Civilian support worker Andy, reflecting 
on his previous experience as a military support worker, emphasised the difference 
between ‘proper’ military wives and those who were found wanting: 
 
Andy: As soon as the unit went away you knew Mrs Jones, Mrs Smith, Mrs Roberts 
would be charging down your door saying “I need him back I can’t cope” […] Then 
you had the other ones, I remember one lady in particular, she broke her arm, she 
fell over and broke her arm, quite badly, she had a 6 week old baby and an 18 month 
old baby, she couldn’t cope. She didn’t want to ring the unit to get him back because 
she thought it would affect his career. I phoned the Welfare Officer […] “This has 
happened”, “Ooh, that’s not right, we’ll get him back” […] [The welfare office and I] 
went out and said to this lady, you know, it’s not gonna impact on his career. You are 
not one of the ones known to the Unit Welfare Officer, oh every time your husband 
goes away you’re shouting that you can’t cope…. there is an understanding of 
genuine need versus oh, as soon as they go, she’ll be in, she’ll be in, she’ll be in.  
 
This narrative of failure functions as a cautionary tale which describes the fate of those who are 
insufficiently stoic, and which forms part of the process through which subjects self-police. The 
circulation of shame embedded in ideas about who is a worthy and who is an unworthy object of 
sympathy and of support functions to discipline subjects, further producing the desire to be one 
of those who are worthy. Furthermore, it also works to legitimate power inequalities within the 
community, by attributing blame to those who are insufficiently supported by the welfare system 
itself (this issue will be further taken up in Chapter Six).  
 
The discussion above illustrates how civilian women married to men who serve in the British 
military are held accountable to the idealised image of the military wife as a strong and stoic 
figure who is able to deal with the hardships of military life without complaint. This emphasis on 
stoicism is not mere coincidence but, as I argue in the previous chapter, is part of the social 
relations of militarism, which rely upon the performance of symbolic and practical roles by civilian 
women married to servicemen. Several participants in this study had conflicted and yet deeply 
held affective attachments to stoicism, which functions as a source of both pride and of intense 
anxiety. A number of victim-survivors in this study reported that the ideal of stoicism had an 
important shaping influence on their responses to domestic abuse; specifically, that it 
 127 
 
discouraged them from seeking the help that they needed. This is because the expectation that 
they perform stoicism added a potential cost to reaching out for help: the risk of being judged as 
a ‘failed’ military wife.  
 
“You do have to really look after him, for the things that they go through” 
Another element of the idealised ‘military wife’ model which has formed a central part of 
scholarship on the figure (Enloe 2000: 162-64; Horn 2010: 64; Wool 2014: 5-7) - as well as one 
which emerged strongly from my own interviews - is the emphasis on the multiple and 
overlapping forms of support which civilian women married to servicemen owe to their husband’s 
careers. The British military institution continues to rely heavily on the unpaid domestic, 
reproductive, and emotional labour of the civilian women married to its personnel. This gendered 
division of labour - with so called productive labour understood as the primary duty of men and 
reproductive labour that of women - is hardly a phenomenon unique to the military institution; as 
Fraser puts it, “[t]he construction of breadwinning and caregiving as separate roles, coded 
masculine and feminine respectively, is a principle undergirding of the current gender order” 
(1996: 61). Although women’s labour market participation has increased dramatically in recent 
decades, they continue to bear the majority of responsibility for reproductive and domestic 
labour (Baxter 2000; Schober 2013), and participation in unpaid household labour - or not - 
remains one of the key ways in which subjects ‘do’ gender (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994; 
Evertsson and Nermo 2004; Greenstein 2000). 
 
While the feminisation of reproductive labour is by no means unique to the military context, 
then, women’s unpaid labour has played a crucial role in the maintenance of military institutions 
in various ways across time and space. Civilian women married to servicemen often take 
responsibility for regular house moves, and in particular in the context of the recent invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, many are expected to cope with the periodic absences of their husbands 
when they go away on deployment or on training exercises. If they have children, many act as 
single parents during this time, running the household and caring for their children and, when 
their husbands are deployed on combat duty, managing their own fear and that of their children 
for the wellbeing of their serving spouse. They have to deal with the sometimes difficult period of 
readjustment and reintegration when their husbands return from training or deployment, as well 
as with any longer term impacts of war such as physical and mental injuries (Bowling and 
Shermian 2008).  
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That wives’ reproductive labour remains key to the functioning of the British military - and that it 
is largely expected within military communities - was supported by the interviews conducted for 
this research. Victim-survivor participant Rachel described the domestic labour she carried out in 
support of her husband: 
 
Rachel: I did take care of him [...] a lot more than probably a normal wife. You do 
have to really look after him, for the things that they go through, the things that they 
see and do.  
 
For Rachel, the unique demands that the military career puts on a serviceman require that the 
civilian women who marry them perform high levels of unpaid labour, in particular emotional 
labour, to support them. Rachel’s narrative questions neither whether this labour is necessary nor 
whether it is the proper duty of civilian women married to servicemen - rather it takes for granted 
that it is so, pointing to the efficacy of the disciplinary power which operates within this space.  
 
Official labour requirements placed on British military wives - such as the expectation that they 
will not take on paid employment but will instead provide unpaid ‘voluntary’ labour on base 
(Enloe 2000: 161-62; Jolly 1987: 48-51) - have largely been eroded in recent decades. Despite this, 
participants in this study, including perpetrator participant Dean and victim-survivor participant 
Mereoni, suggested that civilian women married to servicemen continue to experience pressure 
to fulfil their more traditional roles.  
 
Dean: If you say “Oh well, I can’t come to this function because my wife’s working so 
I need to look after the kids,” they’d go mad, you know, so if you went to the RSM - 
the Regimental Sergeant Major - and said look I can’t come to this function because I 
need to stay at home and look after the kids it just wouldn’t wash. It would be like, 
“Tough, you tell your wife to take that night off work.”  
 
Mereoni: [Welfare workers] ask you, you know, if you have time to […] volunteer, 
but they don’t pressure you into doing it because they now know that women, you 
know, we know what our rights are. But having said that [...] [they] say, “We’re 
looking for people, can you do it? Would you be available?” Some of us go “OK yes” - 
you feel obliged to do it. You can’t answer back because he’s the Unit Welfare 
Officer, so you just say “OK I’ll come and do it,” despite the fact you don’t want to.  
 129 
 
 
In Dean’s and Mereoni’s narratives, while civilian women married to servicemen are in theory no 
longer expected to provide unpaid labour to the military institution, many continue to experience 
pressure to do so. That is, repressive forms of power by which military wives were officially 
required to perform certain labour have diminished; however, they have been replaced with 
disciplinary forms of power which may achieve, to some extent at least, the same result.   
  
Moreover, and somewhat more difficult to pin down than the concrete and demonstrable forms 
of labour which civilian women married to servicemen are often expected to perform, 
participants spoke of feeling compelled to police their own behaviour in particular ways so as not 
to risk harming their husband’s career. That is, participants felt that their husbands would be 
judged by the standards of behaviour which they, as wives, performed. In victim-survivor 
participant Amy’s words, a wife’s behaviour is considered to reflect “how a husband controls his 
household” - and servicemen who are thought to lack appropriate control over their wives may 
find their career prospects diminished. Similarly, for victim-survivor participant Natalie, 
“whatever the wife does, it gets back to the husband, the husband gets it in the neck, it creates 
problems in his career;” and for victim-survivor participant Mereoni, there remains a need for 
women married to servicemen to “suck up” to those with influence in the community. 
Emphasising this further, victim-survivor participant Amy reported that her behaviour could have 
negatively impacted her husband’s career when she was unable to attend military social 
functions. She explained: 
 
Amy: There is a great expectation you will support your husband and attend the 
functions. Many of the functions were inconvenient to me for a variety of reasons 
such as I had a small baby, they were mid week functions and so on […] I can recall 
many years ago some OC [Officer Commanding] saying that as a family we needed to 
attend more functions. This was actually written down on [my husband’s] CR 
[Confidential Report
83
] which has implications on promotion. 
 
The narratives cited above suggest that there is a belief among many civilian women married to 
servicemen that their behaviour impacts the career prospects of their husbands in ways which 
would be unusual in the civilian sphere. Aware of their visibility and the importance of this to 
their standing within the community, civilian women married to servicemen are subject to 
                                                           
83
 This is the annual internal report on a serviceman’s performance, which has impacts on the individual’s 
future career.  
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disciplinary power, held accountable by the community and the institution itself for the 
appropriate performance of their roles.  
 
The expectation that a ‘military wife’ will support her husband’s career shaped participants’ 
responses to abuse in a number of ways.  Some participants reported deciding not to pursue 
official channels of support because they felt, at least initially, that it was more appropriate to try 
to be understanding and to offer support to their husbands - including victim-survivor participants 
Amy and Danielle:  
 
Amy: Of course, I allowed certain incidents to go unchallenged as he was either 
deploying or returning. 
 
Danielle: I thought, ‘cause he’s served, I thought he had, like, PTSD, so it just let it 
ride over my head. I thought, OK, we’ll let this off, this one time […] I let it go 
because I thought that he’d been in 22 years, I thought, let it go, be nice. [After that] 
I think it happened like three or four more times. 
 
While Amy and Danielle recognised that the violence their partners subjected them to was not 
right, their response to it was to try to support their partners through a difficult time, offering the 
emotional support which was commonly expected of them in the hope that this would prevent 
further violence. It is likely that this is not unique to the military community: in Chapters Two and 
Four I point to the work of scholars such as Towns and Adams who argue that the “perfect love 
discourses” which circulate in civilian society encourage victim-survivors not to seek help but 
instead to offer love and support to their abusers in an attempt to end the abuse (Towns and 
Adams 2000; see also Hoff 1990; Kearney 2001; Sueffert 1999). It may be, however, that this issue 
is exacerbated within the military institutional space becuase of the particular concern that 
seeking help through military support services meant reporting abuse to the perpetrator’s 
employer (see Chapter Six). The strength of victim-survivors’ reticence to risk harming their 
husband’s career by reporting abuse was reflected in Williamson and Price’s research into 
domestic abuse in the British military (2009: 18)  and also in help-seeking support materials 
provided by the military itself (Ministry of Defence 2015a: 8). In my study, several participants 
spoke specifically of their reticence to seek official forms of help because they were worried 
about the impact it might have upon their husband’s military careers - which they felt compelled 
to support. Victim-survivor participants Frances, Mereoni, and Natalie told me: 
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Frances: I didn’t wanna involve [military support agencies] because I didn’t, I 
suppose I didn’t wanna get him into trouble [...] ‘cause it ruins them, doesn’t it, their 
promotion and everything, and I should have done, I should have done.  
 
Mereoni: I always wanted my husband, regardless of him being the way that he was, 
I wanted him to do well in his career. And that would mean that I would have to 
support him wholeheartedly, you know. It impacted a lot on their career. If the wife 
is being ‘difficult’, yes, that’s what they say. You just have to toe the line and keep 
quiet.  
 
Natalie: I did report it to the RMPs, the RMPs did come and arrest him, I did make a 
report, [and] he begged me not to go through with it. They told me the 
consequences of, if they [took it forward], on his career and that. So you’re made to 
feel guilty that you could obviously ruin his career. So I […] dropped the charges.  
 
For these three participants, the perceived importance of their husbands’ career progression, and 
the expectations - those that they had of themselves, and those that others had of them - that 
they support that progression, made it difficult for them to report their experiences of abuse to 
the military authorities. That is, the perceived costs of responding to abuse by seeking official 
forms of support were, for some participants, prohibitively high.   
 
Civilian women married to British military servicemen are held accountable to the model of the 
idealised military wife who supports her husband’s career and is careful not to do anything which 
might harm his prospects. Again, this expectation is integrally connected to the gendered political 
project of militarism. This may be a factor which discourages those who experience domestic 
abuse from responding to abuse by seeking help through official channels. It should be noted, 
however, that this does not necessarily reflect a lack of agency on the part of the victim-survivor. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, victim-survivors of abuse exercise agency in multiple ways. Those 
who, given the conditions of possibility in which they live, choose not to report their husbands to 
official agencies so as to mitigate against other potential threats to their personal security - such 
as the economic insecurities caused by the loss of their husband’s job or the end of the 
relationship - are exercising agency. However, it is an exercise of agency which shapes responses 
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to abuse in particular ways; one which is formulated through the field of disciplinary power in 
which military wives perform their identities.  
 
 
Responses to abuse and “warrior masculinity”  
At the beginning of this chapter I noted that the ongoing social achievement of gender identity is 
relational - that is, that “[m]asculinities do not first exist and then come into contact with 
femininities. Masculinities and femininities are produced together in the process that constitutes 
a gender order” (Connell 1995: 72). Following this understanding, it is not surprising that 
discussions of idealised military masculinities - of who the idealised military serviceman is as a 
man - also emerged from my interviews as an important discourse in conversation with which 
victim-survivor participants made sense of their own identities as they were subjected to - and 
resisted - domestic abuse. In the section below I discuss some of the ways in which ideas about 
military masculinities shape responses to abuse in this context. I explore the ways in which 
women make sense of and perform their identities as ‘military wives’ in conversation with - and 
perhaps in opposition to - these dominant models of military masculinity, and how this affects 
their help-seeking choices. In addition, I highlight how support workers’ understandings of the 
identities of military servicemen can also impact the ways in which they respond to abuse. Given 
the relational construction of masculinities and femininities, there is some unsurprising overlap 
here with the above, to which I point but do not dwell upon. Despite the risk of repetition, 
however, it is important to show  that the ‘military wife’ model which I discuss in the preceding 
section does not exist in isolation, but only makes sense and comes into being in relation to 
militarised models of masculinity. While there are a number of ways in which this could be 
approached, I arrange the following section around the three tropes identified by McCartney as 
dominant in imaginings of British military servicemen in recent years - hero, victim, and villain 
(McCartney 2011). I have chosen McCartney’s framework because it reflects well the dominant 
themes which emerged from the interview narratives collected for this project. 
 
““He’s a hero.” Is he?” 
Military servicemen are often assumed to be heroic by virtue of their status as servicemen - an 
“automatic heroism” (Woodward and Jenkings 2013: 162) which is not necessarily connected to 
the performance of particular heroic acts. A 2008 poll undertaken for the British Army, for 
example, found that nine out of ten people considered soldiers to be heroes, in comparison with 
58% and 34% of people who thought the same of public sector workers and journalists 
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respectively (McCartney 2011: 44). Moreover, in 2010, McCartney identified 238 British 
newspaper articles which used the words “soldier” and “hero” in the headline (ibid., 44). The 
charity Help for Heroes - one of the UK’s biggest military charities, with an income of £32.6 
million in 2011/2012
84
 - exemplifies this automatic heroism in its statement that “anyone who 
volunteers to join the Armed Forces, knowing that one day they may have to risk it all, is a hero. 
It’s that simple
85
.”  
 
The notion that servicemen are made heroic by virtue of their service emerged strongly from the 
interviews conducted for this study, in ways which tie in closely with participants’ pride in, and 
affective attachments to, their identities as military wives. Tanya’s narrative cited above in which 
she states that she was “damn proud to be a soldier’s wife because [...] they’re fighting for the 
country” provides an illustrative example of this. Similarly, for victim-survivor participant Elenoa,  
 
Elenoa: he was doing things that I don’t think I would do, across the world and being 
out in Afghanistan, ‘cause he had done Northern Ireland [...] he had done Belfast, 
Iraq and Afghanistan. So that wasn’t something I see myself doing, so yeah I was very 
proud.  
 
Moreover, the interview narratives collected for this thesis also reveal important ways in which 
the understanding of servicemen as heroic shapes the ways in which victim-survivors and support 
workers respond to abuse. Military support worker Zoe told me: 
 
Zoe: [In a recent case review, the perpetrator] was deemed, literally months before, 
a war hero because he’d been shot in the eye. So for his spouse to actually say 
actually, he’s a monster at home. He’s a monster and he does this and he does that 
would be particularly, you know, particularly difficult. 
 
Zoe’s narrative suggests that victim-survivors who understand their abusers to be war heroes - 
and who are aware that others within the community also hold this view - may find it difficult to 
speak out about abuse. That is, they may find themselves disciplined against challenging the high 
levels of community respect for military heroes by denouncing their husbands as abusers.  
 
                                                           
84
 www.helpforheroes.org.uk/Publications/Annual-
Reports/2012/files/assets/common/downloads/publication.pdf, last accessed 25 September 2014. 
85
 www.helpforheroes.org.uk/how-we-help/about-us/faqs, last accessed 25 September 2014. 
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Even when they do report the abuse, victim-survivors may find that the automatic respect that 
others have for their ‘hero’ husbands makes it difficult to get their claims taken seriously. Victim-
survivor participant Sophie took her husband to (civilian) court for multiple, very severe charges 
of violence against her; however after the Army gave him, in her words, a “glowing” report which 
failed to disclose her long periods of contact with the Army Welfare Service over his abuse. She 
said: 
 
Sophie: I had to listen to judge thank my abuser for being a “hero,” tell me he was a 
loving husband and devoted father, and say he has suffered enough because of his 
PTSD.   
 
Similarly, quasi-military support worker Marcus described frustrating experiences in civilian 
courtrooms:  
 
Marcus: [Everybody says] “Oh, he’s a hero.” Is he? He’s knocked ten bells out of his 
Mrs, what kind of hero does that? You know what I mean, the courts are tied, I’ve 
[seen (civilian) court cases] […] where they’ve turned around and said, this guy’s a 
hero, he’s served in the [military]. And yeah, brilliant soldier, but he was a thief as 
well, or, he stole money as well […] All the evidence can stack against him. Hero - off 
you go. Yeah, you can lose cases in court - hero. Courts need to see past the job.  
 
In both of these narratives, the assumption of heroism is one that prevents civilian judges from 
taking seriously the notion that servicemen might also be perpetrators of serious criminal acts - 
and thus, one which makes it difficult for victim-survivors to obtain support and justice. This is a 
disciplining mechanism, in which victim-survivors are forcefully reminded through their 
interactions with other actors of their husbands’, and their own, social positions. The persistent 
association between military masculinity and heroism - an important political tool in the 
maintenance and legitimation of militarism - thus plays a role in shaping responses to domestic 
abuse in this context.  
 
“I thought, let it go, be nice”  
McCartney identifies the trope of the serviceman as victim as one which has been growing in 
influence in recent years, pointing to 169 national newspaper articles in the year 2010 with 
headlines containing the words “victim” and “soldier” (2011: 45). Injuries - both physical and 
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mental - sustained by service personnel through recent conflicts have increased public awareness 
of and concern over their fate; a concern compounded by public criticism of the standard of 
equipment provided to those deployed (ibid.: 46-47) and by claims to victimhood by personnel 
themselves
86
 (McGeorge et al. 2006). For McCartney, “There is now an expectation that soldiers 
will be psychologically damaged by war” (2011: 46). Most often, this psychological damage is 
understood to constitute PTSD - upon which I reflect in more detail in Chapter Seven of this 
thesis.  
 
Complicating somewhat McCartney’s model, I argue that narratives of the victimisation of 
military personnel often contains within it not just ideas of passivity but of active - even heroic - 
agency in the overcoming of victimising events. Narratives of overcoming - evident in the ideas 
surrounding the Invictus Games which took place in London in September 2014
87
 - have also been 
identified by Woodward and Jenkings (2013)  as characteristic in the literary genre of 
contemporary military memoirs. Such narratives focus not on the traumatic experiences of 
combat which led to injury taking place, but on the heroic stories of overcoming hardships and 
shaping a post-injury life in which conventional markers of happiness are achieved. As such, these 
narratives function to dispel public discomfort around the effects of war by focusing instead on 
rehabilitation and renewal, contributing to the idea that even when war is horrific, it can and 
should be transcended rather than resisted. As with the other elements of gendered ideologies 
discussed in this chapter, such narratives of redemption serve to, in Belkin’s (2012: 5) words, 
“clean up” militarism in contemporary Britain (Woodward and Jenkings 2013: 161-62; see also 
Gray forthcoming). 
The idea that servicemen are likely to be psychologically damaged by their military duties but, 
equally, that this is a form of damage which they will, with time, be able to overcome, had 
important impacts on the responses to abuse of some participants in this study. Some victim-
survivors attributed the abuse to their husbands’ psychological traumatisation and, therefore, did 
not hold them truly responsible for it. This meant that they felt they had a duty to provide care 
for their husbands through their difficulties and, as a result, not to report the domestic abuse or 
to seek specific support for it. Victim-survivor participant Danielle’s interview extract cited above 
bears repeating here:  
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 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1852964.stm, last accessed 4 August 2015. 
87
 www.invictusgamesfoundation.org, last accessed 10 September 2014. 
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Danielle: I thought, ‘cause he’s served, I thought he had, like, PTSD, so it just let it 
ride over my head. I thought, OK, we’ll let this off, this one time […] I let it go 
because I thought that he’d been in 22 years, I thought, let it go, be nice. [After that] 
I think it happened like three or four more times. 
 
Danielle understood her abuser’s behaviour towards her as a symptom of his victimisation 
through military service. As such, she did not approach it as something for which he was 
responsible, but as a hardship that, with proper support, he could be expected to overcome. As a 
result, her role as a military wife was to provide that support. The notion that domestic abuse is 
rooted in servicemen’s victimisation thus functions as a disciplining mechanism which encourages 
victim-survivors to conform even more tightly to the norms of idealised military wifehood - as 
those who report abuse in such circumstances are understood as failing to provide the support 
they owe to their serving husbands at their time of greatest need.  
 
Other participants who attributed their husband’s abusive behaviour to the damage done to 
them in conflict noted that, as masculine subjects, their husbands would have difficulty seeking 
help for this damage. Victim-survivor participants Isabella and Jessica explained that:  
 
Isabella: when I first left him I wrote to [Prime Minister David] Cameron and they put 
me in touch with the head of the Armed Forces, and I then wrote to him and he said 
“Well there is counselling available to them should they want it.” And I’m like, but 
these are men. They’re not going to come forward for counselling unless they have 
to. 
 
Jessica: I don’t think men are good at really expressing their feelings. Even if you are 
there willing to say you know “Look I’ll, what’s wrong, you know I’m always here for 
you,” you can say that as many times as you want, but men don’t usually express is 
out…. And I think because he couldn’t express, couldn’t let it out [by] talking [to] 
someone [...] He explodes.  
 
Isabella and Jessica suggest that even when support is offered to counter the damages of war, 
servicemen are prevented from taking advantage of such help because of their identities as 
militarised masculine subjects. In this narrative, the inability to seek help further entrenches the 
damage done by war and maintains the serviceman’s position as victim. In addition, if servicemen 
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are assumed to be both significantly damaged and unable to seek help through military sources, 
the responsibility to provide caring labour is further pushed away from the military institution and 
onto the private sphere. This further disciplines civilian women married to servicemen, whose 
burden of care is increased.  
 
Assumptions of a causal connection between the victimisation of military personnel and their 
perpetration of abuse also shape the perceptions and responses of support workers. Victim-
survivor participant Amy reported finding herself rebuffed and left without support after 
disclosing abuse to a health visitor: 
 
Amy: I did approach the health visitor and she said "they all go through this stage  
[...]  it will settle down." 
 
In Amy’s case, the health visitor’s assumption that the abuse was an unfortunate but relatively 
normal, short term problem of adjustment, which would “settle down” over time, left Amy 
without access to support for the abuse she was experiencing.  
 
In comparison, victim-survivor participant Sophie was offered support when she disclosed abuse 
to the Army Welfare Service on the base where she lived - however the particular type of support 
put forward was aimed not at the abuse itself but at her husband’s (assumed, not diagnosed) 
mental health needs:  
 
Sophie: [The AWS workers] went “right, that’s fine, we’ll get that incident dealt 
with.” So they got him, basically they forced him into getting help. So they, he went 
up to go speak to somebody about, did he have post-traumatic stress or anything like 
that. 
 
Because the signposting workers in Sophie’s case assumed a causal connection between the 
combat-related victimisation of her husband and domestic abuse, their response was to provide 
support primarily orientated towards the mental health of the perpetrator and not towards the 
safety and well-being of the victim-survivor. This is not to suggest that no benefit could be 
engendered by this avenue of support - it may well have been beneficial to the perpetrator and 
perhaps even helped to reduce particular forms of the abuse in some way. However, because this 
approach did not recognise the underlying patterns of power and control which motivate abuse it 
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was not able to tackle its root causes. Even more worryingly, because it was focused on the well-
being of the perpetrator rather than that of the victim-survivor, Sophie’s welfare - and her safety - 
was not its central concern. This left her unsupported and at risk of further abuse - and indeed, in 
Sophie’s case, she went on to survive an attempted murder by her abuser before she accessed 
specialist support. In Amy’s and Sophie’s examples, support workers further reinforced the 
disciplining of victim-survivors by failing to challenge the notion that the good ‘military wife’ is 
one who supports her husband through the hardships caused by his military career.   
 
“They’re killing machines [...] that’s what they’re trained to do” 
The third major trope identified by McCartney as central in understandings of British military 
personnel is that of the serviceman as villain - a classed construction which views the serviceman 
(and the soldier in particular) as both violent and thuggish. While McCartney suggests that the 
trope has lost influence in recent years because of the growing attribution of servicemen’s 
misdeeds not to bad character but to the difficulties and traumas of military service (2011: 48), 
narratives which cast serviceman as innately and problematically violent did emerge from some 
of my interviews. Victim-survivor participant Sophie, for example, felt that “it’s just one of those 
things, they’ve got no control over their anger and anything will set them off.” Similarly, civilian 
support worker Elizabeth reported a conversation with the Commanding Officer of the local 
military base who explained that the perpetration of domestic abuse by servicemen was to some 
extent inevitable because “they’re killing machines [...] that’s what they’re trained to do.” For 
victim-survivor participant Amy: 
 
Amy: The training and situations [my husband] he has been in do not call for non-
confrontational methods…He has used that method [force] so many times it is 
second nature and gets the desired results quickly […] He has no understanding of 
how to conduct himself in civvy street with civilians and his answer to anything he 
does not understand or like is aggression […]  He knows he is "not normal" but is too 
rigid in his thinking. He can never change who he has become as the Army moulded 
him to be that person. 
 
Similarly, civilian support worker Barbara noted that: 
 
Barbara: They are soldiers aren’t they, so what is expected of a solider? [...] If you’ve 
got them being all in touch with their feelings and all this business, how are they 
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gonna go out and shoot somebody? (laughs)  […] if you’re all touchy-feely you might 
not do that.  
 
For Sophie, Amy and for Barbara, British military personnel retain some level of ‘villainy’ at least 
to the extent that they are understood to be, as a result of their military service, more violent and 
more controlling than civilian men. While McCartney suggests that the ‘villain’ trope is on the 
wane, then, it seems to maintain some currency among participants in this study.  
 
Some victim-survivor participants in this study made explicit connections between the heightened 
physical and psychological capacity for violence which they felt that their husbands, as 
servicemen, had, and their experiences of domestic abuse.  Jessica and Sophie, for example, 
recounted:   
 
Jessica: He goes, “‘cause of my training I know how I can snap any of your bones,” 
and all this. So the training thing [...] “Oh yeah, I know how to do that to you, so I can 
break this”…. The physical side got much worse [when he joined the RAF]. ‘Cause as I 
said, ‘cause he was trained in things then he’s like ‘Oh I know how to do things, and 
no one would even know it was me.’ And that’s a frightening thing. Very frightening 
[…] [During one incident] ‘cause he’s RAF trained, he grabbed me here [gestures to 
her neck] to make me [...] pass out.. 
 
Sophie: He also told me one day, if he was gonna kill me, how he’d dispose of my 
body. In very, very intricate detail, you know, he’d put my body in the bath full of 
lime, burn the, yep, it was in major detail […]  And it would be in really heavy detail 
he would tell me how he would get rid of my body, and everybody would have just 
thought that I’d ran away.  
 
The idea that military personnel have a greater capacity for violence in the perpetration of 
domestic abuse was undermined by other participants in this study - perpetrator participant 
Dean, for example, suggested that training for most personnel focuses on how to operate 
weapons systems rather than on hand-to-hand combat - the ‘reality’ of this is not relevant here.  
Jessica and Sophie both believed that their serving husbands had a particular capacity for 
violence, and this seems to have added an extra layer of fear to their abusive relationships. While 
participants in this study did not explicitly state that their fear of their serving husbands in 
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particular was a factor which shaped their responses to abuse, fear of future violence is a factor 
which has been shown to impact responses to domestic abuse more broadly. Often, fear that 
abusers will retaliate with more severe violence has been identified as something which 
discourages victim-survivors from seeking help through official channels, or from attempting to 
leave the relationship (Harne and Radford 2008: 130-31; Hoyle and Sanders 2000: 21; Murray et 
al. 2015: 386; Wolf et al. 2003: 126). Sadly, in many cases victim-survivors’ fear of an escalation in 
violence if they reach out for help is well-founded, as the time around leaving an abusive 
relationship is when a female victim-survivor is most at risk of being killed by her abuser (Downes 
et al. 2014; Jones 2000; Westmarland 2015: 11-12). It therefore seems likely that victim-survivors 
in the military context who experience heightened fears of violence might be particularly 
discouraged from responding in certain ways. That is, victim-survivors of abuse may be self-
policing by shaping their own behaviour in response to the violent norms of masculinity to which 
they understand their husbands to conform. This is worthy of further exploration in future 
studies. 
 
 
Concluding remarks  
The analysis offered in this chapter has centred around the questions: 
 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by discourses of 
gender identity? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
 
In exploring the answers to this question, this chapter has drawn on post-structural approaches 
to disciplinary power to identify the ways in which victim-survivor participants in this study were 
held accountable to military gender ideals - by themselves and by others - in making sense of and 
responding to domestic abuse. I have shown how the expectation that a ‘military wife’ will be 
stoic and will show various forms of support for her husband’s career shapes the ways in which 
domestic abuse is responded to in the military context; often, by discouraging victim-survivors 
from seeking official forms of support and/or punishment for their abusers, and in some cases by 
encouraging them to remain in the abusive relationship. Because masculinity and femininity are 
relational constructs, I also reflected on the impact that hegemonic ideas about “warrior 
masculinity” have on help-seeking - both by functioning as a disciplining mechanism which 
reinforces the ideals of military wifehood, and by shaping the responses of support workers. 
When military servicemen are treated simplistically as heroes, victims, or villains, and when 
 141 
 
civilian women married to servicemen are expected to be stoic in their support for their 
husbands, particular responses to abuse are made more or less likely. This can have the 
dangerous effect of discouraging those involved from naming the abuse as abuse and from 
prioritising the wellbeing of victim-survivors.  
 
In concluding this chapter, it is important to note that the discourses of idealised military 
masculinity and femininity which shape responses to domestic abuse are not apolitical, random 
or coincidental; rather, they are central to the political project of militarism itself. That is, and as I 
argued in Chapter Four, militarised constructions of warrior masculinity and militarised wifehood 
are part of a political project which enables and legitimates militarism. This is not to suggest that 
civilian women married to servicemen are devoid of agency, merely the unconscious pawns of 
militarism - as I have argued in this chapter, many experience deep affective attachments to their 
roles as military wives and make active choices to embrace them. As Enloe reminds us, however, 
“recognising any women’s agency - her capacity to think and act autonomously - should not 
lead us to be uncurious about a larger institution’s efforts to put women’s labour and 
emotions to work for its own patriarchal ends” (Enloe 2000: 39).  
 
The ideals of militarised masculinity and femininity explored in this chapter, then, enable and 
legitimate the political project of militarism in both practical and symbolic ways. Practically, 
the military needs men to choose to join and to find pride, honour, and purpose in doing so 
(Hockey 2003: 15-17; Kovitz 2003: 3-6). Furthermore, it also needs civilian women who are 
married to servicemen to accept - even to embrace - their roles as military wives. It needs these 
women to remain stoic and strong in order that they cope with and tolerate the hardships of 
military life and their own disempowered positions within the military community (discussed in 
Chapter Six). It also needs them to embrace their supportive roles within the military community, 
as without the unpaid emotional and practical labour that military wives provide “the whole 
system would grind to a halt” (Ware 2012: 207). On a symbolic level, public understandings of the 
masculine identities of military personnel are centrally important for the legitimation of 
militarism itself - as Belkin puts it, “constructions of the soldier’s toughness, masculinity, 
dominance, heterosexuality and stoicism can conjure up images of military strength, state 
legitimacy and imperial righteousness, while depictions of the soldier’s flaws can implicate 
notions of military weakness and state and imperial illegitimacy” (Belkin 2012: 58). This is not 
always a simple and straightforward matter - and indeed this chapter has explored some of the 
complexities which characterise public imaginings of military servicemen in particular (McCartney 
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2011; see also Belkin 2012 for a discussion of the contradictions which underpin militarised 
masculinity in the US example). Despite this complexity, however, the normalisation of the 
association between masculinity and military service remains centrally important in the 
naturalisation and legitimation of the gendered relations of protection and control which 
constitute militarism (Young 2003); and a significant operation of power therefore goes into 
perpetuating this connection in the eyes of the public (Kovitz 2003: 2). Similarly, the 
understanding of military wives as stoic and as supportive naturalises the sacrifices which they 
are called upon to make and reinforces the gendered logic of militarism whereby they embody 
the “hearth and home” (Atherton 2009: 827) upon which servicemen are called to protect. That 
is, the particular ways in which disciplinary power functions to shape the identities of gendered 
subjects in the British military community - and through this, the ways in which they respond to 
abuse - is deeply woven into the gendered project of militarism itself.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter contributes towards filling some of the gaps in knowledge 
identified in Chapter Two. Most obviously, I have begun my qualitative exploration of an issue 
about which very little previous empirical data has been collected - experiences of domestic 
abuse in the British military. In particular, I have contributed to understandings of the “internal” 
barriers to help-seeking which may be faced by civilian women who experience domestic abuse in 
marriages to men serving in the British military - specifically, their accountability to a model of 
femininity centred on stoicism and support for the military career, and their complex 
understandings of their abusers as heroes, victims, and/or villains. While these are not 
diametrically opposed to the internal barriers faced by women who experience abuse in the 
broader British civilian context, they are reshaped and crystallised within the particular 
institutional context of the British military in important ways. Moreover, I have argued that the 
gendered ideals in conversation with which military subjects respond to abuse are an intrinsic 
element of the gendered social relations which constitute militarism itself. As such, I have begun 
the process, which I develop throughout this thesis, of understanding domestic abuse as both 
political and as an enactment of gendered militarism.  
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Chapter Six 
Structural violence against civilian women married to servicemen 
 
Like Chapters Five and Seven, the discussions in this chapter emerge from a thematic analysis of 
the interview data collected for this research. In this chapter, I draw on structural approaches to 
engage with the following questions:  
 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by the material 
structures of life in this context? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
 
Throughout my interviews, victim-survivor participants repeatedly referred to material structures 
- in particular their access to housing and to particular types of welfare provision - as factors 
which shaped their responses to abuse. This led me to a consideration of the structural forms of 
violence and inequality which shape participants’ experiences. At its most basic, this chapter 
argues that civilian women married to servicemen are positioned in a liminal space on the 
borders of the military community; neither fully within it nor fully outside of it, and that this 
places them in a disempowered position in relation to their husbands. That is, I show that the 
structural arrangement of the military institution both draws lines around the community in ways 
which bring civilian women marred to servicemen inside, and that these women exist within the 
military sphere as dependents, as add-ons to their serving husbands, and not, therefore, as full 
and equal members of the communities in which they live. This produces a constant, normalised 
precarity within such women’s lives. While this very normality disguises the violence of the 
structures which I identify in this chapter in such a way that they are, in most circumstances, not 
recognised as violence, I suggest that the processes of help-seeking in response to domestic abuse 
can provide a window through which the gendered, violent structures of everyday normality in 
the military community can be made visible.  
 
I begin this chapter by offering a brief recap of and extension to the theoretical discussions of 
structural violence which I began in Chapter Four, with a more specific focus on what the concept 
of structural violence offers to understandings of domestic abuse. Following this, I explore the 
notion of ‘operational effectiveness’ as a discursive strategy which functions to naturalise and 
thus to legitimate the gendered social relations which constitute militarism and upon which the 
military institution relies. I then argue that the way in which the social relations of militarism are 
embedded within the institutional space of the military itself positions civilian women married to 
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servicemen in a liminal space on its borders, subjecting them to forms of structural violence 
which are normalised through recourse to the notion of operational effectiveness. I suggest that 
the gendered ideologies and structures of militarism both rely upon the presence of civilian 
women married to servicemen and simultaneously require that these women are peripheral to 
the institution itself, and that these coexisting requirements produce civilian women married to 
servicemen as precarious subjects. I then go on to illustrate this argument through discussions of 
two of the key structures through which civilian women married to servicemen are both brought 
into and marginalised within the military community - the provision of housing and of welfare 
services by the institution. I conclude by returning to a discussion of the significance of these 
everyday structures to the processes by which militarism is both enacted and legitimated.  
 
 
Gendered structural violence 
As discussed in Chapter Four, structural violence is a concept used to describe the harms 
engendered by structural inequalities. It refers not to discrete acts of violence perpetrated by one 
identifiable subject against another, but to “the social machinery of oppression” (Farmer 2004: 
307), which “shows up as unequal power and consequently as un-equal life chances” (Galtung 
1969: 170-71). That is, unlike the previous chapter - which centred on an understanding of power 
dispersed throughout the social body which causes individuals to self-police, shaping their 
identities in conversation with dominant social norms - this chapter pays attention to power as it 
solidifies in social structures.  
 
In this chapter I make sense of victim-survivors’ narratives of abuse and of responses to it through 
a focus on the gendered structural violences which underpin their experiences. The concept of 
gendered structural violence is particularly useful in discussions of domestic abuse because it 
allows for an understanding of individual suffering as embedded into the wider social matrix of 
power relations. As such, these discussions allow us to conceptualise abuse not simply as a 
relation of violence and control which occurs within a given intimate relationship, but as one 
which is rooted in and made possible through broader societal structures of oppression and 
inequality. Importantly, structural violence is not, in general, immediately visible as violence to 
most members of society, in many cases even to those who are most affected by it, because 
everyday structures of oppression and exploration are normalised as taken-for-granted elements 
of the status quo (Loyd 2012: 148; Price 2012: 6). That is, structural violence is deeply woven into 
the roots of normality; as Walter Benjamin put it, for the oppressed, a ““state of emergency” […] 
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is not the exception but the rule" (quoted in Taussig 2004: 207). Structural inequalities connected 
to gender, race, and class, for example, are often assumed to be inevitable, part of the natural 
order of things and not, therefore, political issues. Drawing attention to the violences of 
structures is thus a politicising move.  
 
To be clear, domestic abuse is not directly caused by structural violence, and it is not itself a form 
of structural violence; rather, domestic abuse is perpetrated by an identifiable perpetrator 
against an identifiable victim-survivor. The utility of the concept for my analysis here is that it 
enables me to identify how it is that certain social groups find themselves “as a community, 
subjected to violence, exposed to its possibility, if not its realisation” (Butler 2004: 20). Again, for 
clarity, this does not mean that particular groups of people are innately vulnerable to becoming 
victims of violence; rather, it means that structural forms of violence produce vulnerability to 
other forms of harm among those who are its targets (Pain 2012: 18). Klinenberg’s exploration of 
the deaths which occurred during the 1995 Chicago heat-wave provides an illustrative example 
here. In Klinenberg’s analysis, while the heat-wave itself was a natural occurrence, the uneven 
distribution of its harms reveals it to be “a structurally determined catastrophe,” in which certain 
“forms of precariousness” such as poverty and social isolation made particular subjects 
vulnerable and unable to protect themselves (Klinenberg 2004). In relation to the present study, 
it is not that women are naturally predisposed to becoming the victims of intimate violence; 
rather, gendered structural violence against women both makes women more likely than men to 
experience domestic abuse and produces particular barriers to women’s ability to seek certain 
forms of help in response to it - it is this which makes women vulnerable to abuse (Sokoloff and 
Dupont 2005; Stark 2007). A consideration of structural violence, in other words, allows me to 
make sense of and to unpack the limited conditions of possibility in which subjects exercise their 
agency; in this case, in which victim-survivors of abuse in the military context respond to abuse. It 
allows me to pay attention to the structural underpinnings which limit the ability of civilian 
women married to servicemen to respond to the abuse perpetrated against them.  
 
It is important to note that gendered structural violence is not unique to the military, but exists 
across civilian society. In the British civilian setting, scholars have identified the family as one of 
the key social institutions through which gender takes shape (Bielby 1999; Budig 2004), and have 
also identified the heteronormative nuclear family in particular as a site of gendered structural 
violence through which women as a group are structurally disadvantaged and disempowered in 
comparison with men. While significant changes have taken place in recent decades, scholars 
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have demonstrated the role of the dominant liberal idea of the dichotomous public/private divide 
- in which the feminised space of the family is associated with the private sphere - in 
disempowering women and obscuring many of the issues and inequalities which shape gendered 
lives (e.g. Duncan 1996; Elshtain 1981; Kelly 2003, 32-58; Landes 1998a; 1998b: 143; Mackinnon 
1983; Massey 1994, 180; McDowell 1999; Pateman 1989b; Warrington 2001). For Kelly, for 
example, the heteronormative nuclear family is a structure through which “the privacy of men 
[has been protected] at the expense of the safety of women” (Kelly 2003: 34; see also Gray 2015). 
Others have pointed to the ongoing gendered division of labour which structures family 
relationships (Almqvist and Duvander 2014; Himmelweit 2007; Rose et al. 2015), and drawn 
attention to the importance of this to the functioning of capitalist economies (Andrew 2003; 
Braunstein et al. 2011; Luxton and Bezanson 2006; Luxton 2015: 213-14). While families are often 
a source of comfort and love, then, feminist work has shown that dominant forms of family are 
also socially formulated structures which work through and entrench structural inequalities.  
 
Gender and operational effectiveness in the total institution 
While the gendered structural violence and inequality which is ingrained within the 
heteronormative nuclear family is not unique to the military, then, the military draws upon and 
makes use of these inequalities in ways which intensify and crystallise their effects. As I argue in 
Chapter Four, the British military is an institution which has its own gender culture; albeit one 
which is not completely detached from that of the civilian society. This gender culture revolves 
around the notion of masculine protection of the feminised space of home from perceived 
external threats. While militaries remain masculine spaces, militarism relies upon both 
masculinities and femininities for its enactment and legitimation. The figure of the ‘military wife’ - 
the particular focus of this thesis - is important to military institutions both in its symbolic role, 
providing the most immediate constitutive other upon which soldierly identity relies (Woodward 
and Winter 2007: 73), and because militaries rely upon the domestic labour of military wives to 
support and motivate personnel to cope with the demands of military life and to effectively 
perform their military roles (Bourg and Segal 1999: 636; Enloe 2000: 153-97; Wool 2014: 5-7). As 
a result, civilian women married to servicemen are simultaneously both brought inside and 
excluded from the military institution, as I go on to argue below.  
 
First, however, it is necessary to offer a brief consideration of the discourse of ‘operational 
effectiveness,’ through which military gender culture is naturalised. This discourse is a very 
powerful one, as operational effectiveness is considered within military circles as an essential and 
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unquestionable national priority, one which is “beyond debate, naturalised and immutable” 
(Woodward 2004: 133), the firm limit beyond which issues such as environmental protection 
(ibid.: 85-87, 133) and equality and diversity policies (Basham 2009) cannot be prioritised. At its 
most simply defined, operational effectiveness refers to fighting power and the ability to win 
battles - the capacity to use lethal force, or the threat thereof, to “achieve the ends set
88
”. The 
discourse of operational effectiveness is, however, understood and deployed far more broadly 
than this within the British military context. It is understood to require three overlapping and 
mutually supporting elements: “a conceptual component (the ideas behind how to operate and 
fight), a moral component (the ability to get people to operate and fight) and a physical 
component (the means to operate and fight)
89
”. As a result, operational effectiveness as a 
discursive strategy is a nebulous concept which stretches well beyond the battlefield. It 
underpins, for example, the rationale for the values and standards by which personnel are 
expected to live
90
, the importance of unit cohesion (Basham 2009, 732), and policies against the 
use of recreational drugs
91
. In order to be considered operationally effective, it is not necessarily 
sufficient simply that a service member be well trained in the use of militarised violence; they 
must embody certain identities, values and standards, and they must behave in particular ways 
even away from the field of battle. That is, the idea of operational effectiveness is used to 
structure and to police the masculine identities of servicemen in order that they conform, as 
much as possible, to the military ideal.  
 
It is not my intention to reproduce the idea of operational effectiveness in this thesis as an 
objective or value-free concept. Rather, I approach the idea of operational effectiveness as a 
discursive strategy which naturalises militarised ideologies by presenting as neutral a set of ideas 
which are in fact highly gendered and ideological. It is recourse to the unquestionable importance 
of operational effectiveness which legitimates the military’s claims to exceptionalism, and 
therefore its ability to discriminate. That is, through the discursive strategy of operational 
effectiveness, the structural violences through which some people are treated as more important 
or more valuable than others within the military are masked and justified. While operational 
effectiveness remains an ostensibly gender-free concept, Basham illustrates how certain bodies - 
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white, male, (presumed) heterosexual bodies - but not others are constructed as innately 
operationally effective, or at least capable of becoming so (2013: 20, 138). Similarly, Woodward 
and Winter point to the efficacy of this discourse in justifying the military’s legal exemption from 
the 1975 Sex Discrimination Act and in excluding women from taking on ‘combat’ roles 
(Woodward and Winter 2006: 51; 2007: 53-54). Moreover, as this chapter goes on to argue, 
operational effectiveness is used to justify both the incorporation and the simultaneous 
disempowerment within the military community of civilian women married to servicemen. This is 
not to imply that the military is not concerned about its ability to win battles, or that it 
deliberately pursues irrelevancies under the guise of operational effectiveness; clearly, the 
military’s ability to successfully project its power remains the central concern of the institution, 
around which all structures and practices are orientated. What I want to suggest, however, is that 
it should not be assumed that institutional assessments of the needs of operational effectiveness 
are inevitable or objective; rather, the decisions which are made in the pursuit of operational 
effectiveness are underpinned and shaped by the gendered ideologies of militarism itself. That is, 
ideas about what is operationally effective and what is not are shaped by gendered ideologies of 
militarism; and recourse to the notion of operational effectiveness acts as a discursive strategy to 
naturalise these gendered assumptions.  
 
Civilian women married to servicemen do not themselves sign up to serve in the military; they do 
not formally commit themselves to the institution in the way that their husbands do. However, 
because of the important roles that ‘military wives’ play in the social relations of militarism, they 
are brought into the “greedy institution” (Segal 1986) of the military institution in the name of 
operational effectiveness. One of the most important ways in which they are brought into the 
institutional space is through the provision of resources. The logic behind this was laid out by 
civilian (former military) support worker Andy and military support worker Frederick in 
statements which were reflected in several others interviews conducted for this project: 
 
Andy: [The military] needs […] a man fit to fight. Which means the family is happy 
[…] they make sure the dental service is provided, medical services, certainly abroad, 
that the wife can get access to dentists, medics, vets if they’ve got pets. So if the 
family’s happy, then the guy’s gonna be happy; you got a happy soldier, you got a 
productive solider.  
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Frederick: If we don’t support the families when those soldiers are away, if those 
families then start becoming problematical with whatever challenges they’re faced 
with, that has a direct consequence on the operational capability of the soldiers and 
the unit when they’re away on operations, because they’ll hear that their [...] 
families are not in good order. So the soldier themselves won’t do what they need to 
do as effectively. So it’s insuring that the families are supported, they’re supported 
when the soldiers are away, and at the end of it, it’s all about maintaining an 
operational effective military capability.  
 
Andy’s and Frederick’s narratives highlight the institutional interest in involvement in the lives of 
civilian women married to servicemen: such women are important because of the influence that 
they have upon the productivity of their serving spouse. As these statements reflect, it is this idea 
which underpins and explains the provision of resources such as housing and welfare to military 
families - such services are provided, and families are encouraged to use them, in the interests of 
ensuring the wellbeing of the soldier. The provision of resources is one way in which civilian 
women married to servicemen are brought into the institution in the interest of maintaining the 
wellbeing of the soldier and, through him, of the institution itself.  
 
However, the gendered ideology of militarism also requires that the institution remain, in 
Woodward and Winter’s terms, a “masculinist organisation,” and that the activity of soldiering 
continues to be “defined in terms of its masculinities and in opposition to women and the 
feminine” (2006: 60). As such, it is also important to the culture of the military that civilian 
women married to servicemen are not central figures who are seen as emblematic of the 
institution itself, but rather that they remain marginalised in order that the military can retain its 
character as a masculine, fighting organisation. As such, civilian women married to servicemen 
are brought into the community not as full and equal members of the military space, but as 
dependents whose status within the community is entirely reliant upon the serving spouse. 
Reflecting this, several victim-survivor participants in this study described their experiences of 
occupying disempowered positions within the communities in which they lived, including victim-
survivor participants Frances, Amy, and Melissa:  
 
Frances: You’re not your own person, you’re wife X. You’re not Mrs Alderson or, you 
know, you’re wife of. […] It makes you feel like you’re a second-rate citizen. 
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Amy: You feel like you are stripped of your own identity and are insignificant. 
 
Melissa: I was just excess baggage. That’s what [civilian women married to 
servicemen] are classed as, excess baggage. 
 
Frances, Amy, and Melissa all experienced their position within the military community as 
‘second-rate,’ and felt themselves to be disempowered subjects who lacked full and equal status 
within their communities. That is, their tangential right to be in the community meant that they 
felt themselves to be unimportant, marginalised add-ons to their serving husbands. This marginal, 
dependent status - and the precarity it produces - is embedded into the structures of military life, 
as I go on to illustrate through my discussions the institutional provision of housing and of welfare 
which constitute the remainder of this chapter. 
 
“It’s my fucking quarter, and you do what you’re fucking told”  
As I describe in Chapter One, the military provides family homes to personnel who are registered 
on the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system as Personal Status Categories (PStat Cat) 1 or 
2 - that is, those who live with a partner to whom they are legally married or in a civil partnership 
with, and/or with children for whom they are the primary carer (Ministry of Defence 2013: 1-2). 
This military housing is known as Service Families Accommodation (SFA) and is provided either 
‘behind the wire’ of the serving person’s duty station, or in a local ‘patch’ - an area of military 
housing within 10 miles of the  serving person’s current duty station
92
. Military personnel and 
their families do not have to live in SFA, of course, but many are encouraged to do so by the 
realities of military life, perhaps most importantly by the mobility of many military careers. 
Depending on their military branch, rank, and role, servicemen may find themselves ‘posted’ - 
that is, transferred to a new job, often in a new geographical area - regularly throughout their 
careers. This is particularly the case for personnel serving in the Army and in the RAF, who may 
find themselves being posted every two to three years. In August 2014, 39% of Army families, 
34% of RAF families, and 23% of Naval families reported moving house in the previous 12 months 
(Ministry of Defence 2014: 3). The proportion of those who live in SFA reflects these differential 
patterns of mobility: in August 2014, 70% of Army families, 55% of RAF families, and 35% Naval 
families lived in SFA at least during the week (Ministry of Defence 2014:3). The provision of SFA 
makes regular moves easier - it means that families do not have to find the time, money, and 
energy to find new accommodation at every posting, and moreover, as discussed below, it 
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provides families with access to social networks in their new communities, thus mediating to 
some extent the social isolation engendered by a mobile lifestyle. As such, military mobility is a 
factor which pushes personnel and their families towards living in SFA.  
 
The provision of housing in the segregated, military-specific spaces of the base or patch is a 
particularly important structural factor which draws civilian women married to servicemen into 
the military community. Firstly, and most obviously, it renders these women dependent on the 
institution for their housing - those who live in SFA are tied into the military in a very practical 
sense, and they are likely to be less able to simply walk away from the institution or to live their 
lives entirely outside it. Moreover, several participants also reflected on the friendly, close-knit 
nature of base and patch communities in which everyone was connected to the military and 
everyone knew one another. This suggests that the communal nature of SFA provision, separated 
to some extent from the civilian community, is a factor which draws civilian women married to 
servicemen further into the military community. Civilian (former military) support worker Peter 
said: 
 
Peter: Still to this day on military quarters […] [people have] their doors open, people 
are in and out of the houses all day, children all play together [...] I remember going 
into quarters, and we had 14 different houses, right, and I remember going into 
quarters and just herds of children you know naked, covered in pizza, you know, so 
all roaming between people’s houses, and that is so unique. So in many ways that 
was the best thing. 
 
Peter’s narrative paints a picture of a close-knit, somewhat idyllic community, of which non-
serving spouses and children are very much a part. Reflecting this, several victim-survivor 
participants spoke of the close-knit nature of the base and patch communities as something 
which drew them into the community and encouraged them to rely upon it for their social lives. 
For some, this was mainly through what they lost rather than through what they gained - victim-
survivor participant Frances, for example, stated that due to 11 house moves during her marriage 
to a servicemen, she “lost contact with all my friends.” For others, however, this was experienced 
more positively. Victim-survivor participants Ursula and Mereoni described the close-knit nature 
of life on the patch as a factor which encouraged the building of friendships with others in the 
military community:  
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Ursula: The friends the husbands have [are their] workmates. So that’s who you 
mingle with at the weekends […] it’s constantly everybody together. 
 
Mereoni: The Army is your family […] regardless of you being just the one nuclear 
family, in general the Army is your family. So everything is Army.  
 
In Frances, Ursula, Mereoni’s experiences, the fact that they lived in SFA on the base/patch was 
an important factor in bringing them into the military community and integrating their lives 
within it. Important connections must, of course, be drawn with the previous chapter of this 
thesis, in particular because there are particular expectations about what the ‘family’ is which go 
along with the material provision of service families accommodation. SFA is only available, for 
example, to those in recognised legal marriages or civil partnerships; non-married partners 
cannot live in SFA. Moreover, several participants emphasised to me the importance of having 
children in integrating a non-serving spouse into the SFA community, which hints at the 
heteronormativity of the base or patch community. In military support worker participant Zoe’s 
words, for example, “for somebody that gets posted in here and they have no children, it is 
extremely isolating.” Living in the military community and socialising with other ‘military wives’ 
can therefore be understood as an important structural factor which encourages the self-policing 
of civilian women married to servicemen in conversation with the ideals of ‘military wifehood.’  
 
However, despite the ways in which the military’s provision of SFA draws civilian women married 
to servicemen into the community, such women are also structurally disadvantaged in relation to 
their husbands in accessing this important resource. SFA is rented only in the name of the serving 
person, who is the only official tenant, as the non-serving spouse’s right to live in that 
accommodation is purely as a dependent of their serving spouse. When a housing move is 
required, the application process can only be accessed and completed via computers which are 
on the MOD’s secure intranet, accessible only to Armed Forces personnel themselves. While 
personnel can print off the details and discuss housing options with their non-serving spouse, 
there is no obligation for them to do so
93
. Non-serving spouses are therefore officially excluded 
from decisions regarding the application for housing in which they will live.  
 
Further, when marriages in the military break down, the non-serving spouse’s lack of entitlement 
to the housing in which they live becomes clear as, after a period of time, they are required to 
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leave their quarter. When a couple decide to formally separate, the serving spouse must change 
their Personnel Status Category (PStat Cat) on the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system to 
reflect their separated status. Once the PStat Cat has been changed, the non-serving spouse is 
given a formal Notice to Vacate the SFA. Non-serving spouses, along with any children who will 
not remain with the serving spouse, will be expected to leave the quarter within 93 days of this 
notice being served (in some unusual cases, special circumstances such as ongoing medical 
treatment may enable them to stay in the SFA for a longer period of time). This is because the 
non-serving spouse does not have any entitlement to stay in the SFA once the relationship has 
broken down (Ministry of Defence 2015a: 9).  
 
The structures of housing provision within the British military community therefore place civilian 
women married to servicemen who live in SFA in a precarious position by making them 
dependent upon their serving husbands for their accommodation. In cases where domestic abuse 
occurs, this dependency may have a significant impact upon victim-survivors’ responses to abuse. 
For some participants in this study, including perpetrator participant Dean and victim-survivor 
participant Melissa, the serviceman’s exclusive rights to housing was something explicitly used as 
a method of control by abusers:  
 
Dean: I’d be like, “I’m the fucking man of the house, I fucking earn the wages.” Even 
though she worked, but, I’d be like, “It’s my fucking quarter, and you do what you’re 
fucking told.” 
  
Melissa: [The housing situation] empowered it [the abuse]. “This is my house.” 
‘Cause we’ve got no right to it. Basically they have a roof over their heads 24/7 
whether they’re with somebody or if they’re not…. “This is my house.” And it’s like, 
you wouldn’t have this house if it weren’t for me and the kids. “It’s still my house.”  
 
For Dean and for Melissa, the dependency engendered by the military’s structures of housing 
provision empowered the abusive behaviour. In these narratives, the perpetrator of abuse, as the 
party with exclusive rights over the housing in which the couple lived, felt entitled to abuse and 
control their non-serving partner without consequence. The unbalanced rights to housing raise 
the costs for the victim-survivor of leaving the relationship, as was reflected by victim-survivor 
participant Jessica: 
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Jessica: I remember thinking, God, if I do this, we’re gonna leave here, what have I 
got? [...] And I think my big thing leaving, ‘cause I did think about going back to him 
[…] ‘cause I didn’t wanna leave the house. ‘Cause I’m thinking, I’ve got nothing [...] I 
didn’t have a penny to my name, and you think God I’ve got two kids, I haven’t got 
anyone, what am I gonna do? 
 
As Jessica thought through her response to the abuse she had experienced, the costs of ending 
her abusive relationship in terms of housing were a significant factor. While she did decide to 
leave the relationship on this occasion, her housing dependency upon her husband raised the 
costs of doing this, as it was a decision which made her and her children homeless.  
 
The difficulties of leaving SFA do not revolve solely around the practical challenges of finding a 
physical new home for the victim-survivor and any children she might have to live in. Leaving a 
marriage to a serviceman also entails exiting the whole military community. For some, this is a 
major life change which, as discussed in the previous chapter, means leaving the world in which 
they have lived for years and losing the identity they have built for themselves. As victim-survivor 
participants Amy and Mereoni told me:  
 
Amy: Leaving was difficult…. My whole life married to him was, like, Army. Now it’s 
not. It’s strange. 
 
Mereoni: [Leaving was] very difficult, Harriet. It was sad. Because I didn’t want to 
leave my pad […]  And it was I felt really sad, because you were leaving that life and 
that was the life that you lived [...] that was your family. You know, and then when 
you leave, you leave everything else behind you to come and live somewhere else, 
even though I was just you know an hour away from where they are. Extremely 
difficult and emotional.  
 
For Amy and Mereoni, deciding to leave their abusive marriage and their home was not simply a 
matter of leaving bricks and mortar; it was leaving the life they had built for themselves. To refer 
back to my discussions in the previous chapter, despite the disempowerments which civilian 
women married to servicemen experience within the military community, many retain strong 
affective attachments to the community and to the identities they construct within it. This raises 
the costs of leaving an abusive relationship.   
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Similarly, victim-survivor participant Tanya described the rejection and resentment she felt when 
she had to leave the military community following the end of her marriage: 
 
Tanya: While you’re married to someone in the Armed Forces […] you are supported 
because you’re supporting them. You’re keeping the house together, you’re keeping 
them going, you’re doing your wife’s, your wifely duty, you’re doing what you’ve got 
to do. As soon as you mention, “that’s it, it’s over, I’m not doing it anymore, I’m 
leaving,” you’re not supporting the soldier any more. It’s like they can’t wait to get 
rid of you. You’re no use to them anymore. Because they’re now having to support 
their soldier, because they haven’t got a wife to do it for them. So it’s, you’ve served 
your time [...] “Thanks for the past ten years, sweetheart, but you’re not doing it 
anymore so, move aside ‘till he finds someone that can do the next ten years.” That’s 
exactly how it feels.  
 
Like those provided by Amy and Mereoni, Tanya’s narrative also highlights the sadness and loss of 
identity which can be engendered when civilian women married to servicemen leave their 
marriage and their SFA. More than this, the feelings of rejection by the community and the 
institution that Tanya experienced upon the breakdown of her marriage also emphasises the 
precarious status of civilian women married to servicemen within the military community. 
Tanya’s position in the community was contingent upon her support for her serving spouse; once 
this was withdrawn, she was forced to “move aside.” 
 
It is important to note that the military institution does make efforts to support the civilian 
women married to its servicemen when they go through marriage breakdown, and some of the 
provisions that are made can be of real help to victim-survivors of domestic abuse. The ability to 
stay in SFA for 93 days after the relationship formally ends, for example, provides victim-survivors 
with temporary accommodation while they decide how to move on from the abusive 
relationship. In some cases, this may replace the need for refuge accommodation - although in 
many cases it would not be safe for victim-survivors to remain in such close proximity to where 
their abusers are living, particularly during the time of heightened danger around the ending of 
an abusive relationship. However, while military welfare agencies and workers have made efforts 
within the structures in which they operate to support civilian women married to servicemen, the 
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structures themselves remain - and these structures are unavoidably disempowering to civilian 
women married to servicemen who experience domestic abuse. 
 
This discussion of the military’s housing provision highlights the liminal space on the borders of 
the military community in which civilian women married to servicemen are positioned by the 
structures of military life, as the structures by which housing is provided to military families both 
draw these women into the community and refuse them a full and secure position within it. This 
is a form of structural violence because, as I show above, these structures place victim-survivors 
in a precarious position which exposes them to harms. The precarious position which civilian 
women who live in SFA occupy in relation to their housing, and indeed their membership of the 
military community, is not something which only comes into being when the relationship breaks 
down - it is always there, although it is often not recognised as precarity until problems arise. This 
precarity constitutes a form of structural violence which raises the costs of particular responses to 
abuse for civilian women married to servicemen.  
 
“They protect their own” 
In the introductory chapter to this thesis I offered a brief outline of some of the support services 
which are available to civilian women married to servicemen who experience domestic abuse. I 
noted that, while those who are stationed abroad may have little choice but to seek support 
through the services provided by the military - such as the Unit Welfare Officers (UWOs), the 
Army/Royal Naval and Royal Marines Welfare Services (AWS/RNRM Welfare), the Personal 
Support and Social Work Service RAF (run by SSAFA), the British Forces Social Work Service 
(BFSWS), and the various military policing services - most of those in the UK have a choice: they 
can access military welfare services, quasi-military services, or mainstream services provided by 
local authorities and third sector organisations. Mainstream civilian services which may be 
available include specialist domestic violence services such as refuges, outreach and floating 
support services, and Independent Domestic Violence Advocate services (IDVAs), the Home Office 
police (including their specialist Domestic Violence Units and Community Safety Units), and local 
authority children’s services and housing/homelessness support. Finally, quasi-military services 
include the Stepping Stones Homes run by SSAFA, as well as some sources of funding offered by 
organisations such as SSAFA and the Royal British Legion.  
 
Even when based in the UK, however, many civilian women married to servicemen who 
experience abuse - including the overwhelming majority (17 out of 18) of those interviewed for 
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this study - turn to military rather than civilian or quasi-military services, at least initially. For 
some participants, turning to military welfare services was an active choice. Important 
connections must again be drawn here with the previous chapter - most civilian women married 
to servicemen are not forced into accessing military rather than civilian support services, but they 
do so because they identify with the community and feel that it is the most appropriate thing. 
That is, disciplinary forms of power as well as structural forms of power can be identified here. 
Victim-survivor participant Mereoni, for example, stated “I felt that it was appropriate for me to 
go [to military welfare], because everything about the Forces, Harriet, is all about going through 
your Chain of Command.” In Mereoni’s narrative, it was her understanding of appropriate 
behaviour within military culture, and not any structural factors such as lack of opportunity, 
which shaped her response to abuse. For other participants, however, there existed structural 
factors which made turning to military services the easiest choice to make, or in some cases, the 
only available choice.  
 
At the most extreme end of this spectrum, women who are not British citizens and who come to 
the UK from abroad as the spouse of a Foreign and Commonwealth (F&C) person serving in the 
British Armed Forces may find it difficult, or even impossible, to seek mainstream support. These 
women come to the UK under unique immigration rules, and their status is dependent upon their 
serving spouse. Under the terms of their initial four year visa, commonly referred to as a 
‘dependent’s visa,’ they have ‘limited leave to remain’ in the UK, and while they can work they 
have ‘no recourse to public funds.’ These women are not able to apply for indefinite leave to 
remain (ILR) - an independent status which gives them recourse to public funds - until their 
serving spouse has been in the military for five continuous years.  Without recourse to public 
funds, F&C spouses are unable to access the key mainstream services of refuges and local 
authority emergency accommodation, because these funded through housing benefit - although 
exceptions may sometimes be made for those with children who can, in some cases, access 
funding through social services (Burman and Chantler 2005: 67-68). SSAFA Stepping Stones 
homes are able to take women with no recourse to public funds in their two quasi-military 
refuges. This is no insignificant resource - at the time of writing, there are no civilian refuge 
services which are able to offer accommodation to women with no recourse to public funds on a 
routine basis. In addition, as of December 2013, victim-survivors whose serving spouse has served 
for four years or more can apply for the Destitution Domestic Violence Concession (DDV), which 
allows them temporary access to public funds and a fast-tracked application for ILR - although this 
of course leaves those whose husbands have served for less than four years without support. 
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There remain, however, structural factors which prevent victim-survivors in F&C communities in 
particular from seeking external sources of support, and which therefore bind these women into 
the military community. Almost all of the victim-survivor participants in this study who were from 
Foreign and Commonwealth communities struggled when leaving their relationships because 
their insecure visa status and lack of recourse to public funds left them with few options. Victim-
survivor participant Kimberly, for example, had tried to access a mainstream refuge, but found 
that her lack of recourse to public funds meant she had nowhere to go until a space opened up in 
a SSAFA Stepping Stones house. She told me that victim-survivors with no recourse to public 
funds such as herself often stayed with abusive partners because they felt that they had no other 
options; “and probably they’re right, you know.” 
 
In addition, there are important structural factors which underpin and encourage the feeling that 
the military welfare provision is the most appropriate choice even for those who do, technically, 
have other options. Some participants in this study described the military as an institution which 
deliberately excludes external support providers from being able to provide services to members 
of the community in order to keep support provision ‘in-house’ as much as possible: in quasi-
military support worker Marcus’ words, the military is an organisation which is “precious” about 
maintaining their its own welfare and policing provision. Civilian support worker Elizabeth 
outlined some of the frustrations experienced by her specialist domestic violence service, which 
has been trying to make in-roads to provide support to military families connected to the local 
base for a number of years: 
 
Elizabeth: We want to run a campaign on the camp that says “You do not have to go 
to Army Welfare, you don’t have to go to SSAFA.  If you need help you can come to 
us in complete confidence.” You know, so […] their commissions won’t be 
compromised, their opportunities for promotion won’t be compromised, their COs 
[Commanding Officers] don’t […] need to know about it. [But] Army Welfare, I’m 
sure you’ve come across this, you know, the shutters go up. ‘Cause you know, “we 
deal with our own”…. They’re always gonna be pushing to make sure that everything 
stays in house…. We’ve come up against a lot of, not hostile, I can’t say it’s hostile, 
it’s not, but it’s kind of like a passive aggressive non-cooperation kind of thing. It’s 
really hard to describe because they’re saying “Yes, yes, yes, we want to work with 
you, yes, yes, yes we want be beside you when we’re doing this,” you know, and 
then on the other hand you don’t get the connection  […] It’s a closed shop.  
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In Elizabeth’s story of frustration, a preference among military authorities for the provision of 
welfare “in house” has prevented her organisation from promoting its services to members of the 
military community. As a result, civilian women married to servicemen are encouraged to seek 
help within the “closed shop” of the military, because they do not know how to access 
alternatives. Indeed, several victim-survivor participants within this study reported that they did 
not access civilian support services for the abuse they experienced because they did not have any 
information about them. Victim-survivor participants Tanya, Isabella and Amy told me:  
 
Tanya: [The military welfare] never told me anything about [specialist civilian 
domestic abuse services] [...] There’s not enough information for the wives who are 
wanting to get out, and for me it was, well what the hell do I do? Where do I go?  
 
Isabella: I didn’t know about [local civilian service], or anything like that. I didn’t 
know about refuge centres, stuff like that, I didn’t know about any of it [...] I think 
information like that needs to be given out more in Army settings.  
 
Amy: When we were living together there was no information regarding external 
services.  
 
Tanya, Isabella, and Amy felt that a lack of information prevented them from accessing 
alternative sources of support. That is, a lack of information drew lines around the military 
community, within which they were contained.  
 
Other participants disputed this idea of a “closed shop.” For military support worker Lily, this is 
“quite an old attitude,” and the military is now “certainly very much trying to involve other 
agencies.” Indeed, some external agencies do work closely with the military institution. Quasi-
military support services such as the SSAFA Stepping Stones Homes are deeply embedded into 
the institution, but remain independent services. In addition, my research identified one civilian 
agency which has built a very successful working relationship with the institution, and which 
receives regular referrals directly from military welfare agencies. It is interesting, however, that 
this organisation is largely staffed by former military personnel and military spouses who, in the 
words one of its staff members, gain “kudos” from military welfare workers for their ability to 
“speak [the military’s] lingo.” In several areas of the country, representatives of military agencies 
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such the RNRM Welfare Service and the AWS sit on local multi-agency domestic abuse fora and 
do, therefore work together with civilian agencies.  
 
While the image of the “closed shop” may be increasingly outdated, then, there does seem to be 
an ongoing centring of military welfare provision in the sources of support made available to 
civilian women married to servicemen. Military support workers, one the whole, assumed that 
military services would be the first point of call for civilian women married to servicemen who 
experienced domestic abuse, and set up their systems and policies accordingly. Military support 
worker Diane, for example, described a revised support strategy which was being written for use 
by all Naval personnel who may come into contact with victim-survivors of abuse, in which “all 
routes lead back to RNRM welfare, basically.” Similarly, while the recent resources which the 
MOD has published to offer support and advice to victim-survivors and perpetrators of abuse - 
the British Defence Film Library’s 2012 video (British Defence Film Library 2012) and the recently 
launched MOD website
94
 - do refer to civilian and quasi-military avenues of support, they are 
mainly centred around military sources of support. Military support worker Frederick explained 
the pre-eminence of military-run support services in terms of their ability to best understand the 
experiences of civilian women married to servicemen:  
 
Frederick: We have a welfare organisation that understands the military context [...] 
So what we do, how we go about doing it, the ethos and what builds up our fighting 
spirit, isn’t really understood outside the military community. So we have something 
that delivers what is required by and large because the deliverers understand the 
military [...] If you follow the logic of supporting the family with people who 
understand in the detail of the family, and have the credibility and the trust of those 
needing help, it’s probably going to be done by a military type organisation.  
 
For Frederick, it is necessary that military welfare services are provided by people who 
understand the military. Frederick’s narrative prioritises understanding of the military institution 
over understanding of the specific problems which civilian women married to servicemen may be 
experiencing, such as domestic abuse. Specialist domestic abuse organisations have significant 
experience and expertise in supporting victim-survivors of this form of violence; far more than 
could be expected of military welfare workers, who offer a more general level of support. 
Frederick’s prioritisation of military knowledge relies upon and reifies the notion of a civilian-
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military divide, in which only those who are within the institution can truly understand the 
military experiences. This re-entrenchment of the civil-military divide draws civilian women 
married to servicemen inside the military community.  
 
Interviews with military welfare personnel suggest that the institution is keen to maintain its own 
welfare services for reasons of operational effectiveness. In military support worker Diane’s 
words, the military needs “in house” welfare because it needs to know when its personnel are 
having problems: “At the end of the day, if you’ve got someone who loses their temper easily, 
flies off the handle, can’t handle their alcohol, and they’re on a ship or worse still on a submarine 
[...] it’s literally an explosive situation that they can’t actually tolerate within the Navy.” The 
structures by which civilian women married to servicemen are encouraged to turn to military 
welfare services, then, can be justified with recourse to notions of operational effectiveness - the 
military needs to know if there is a problem within their relationship, as this may influence the 
serviceman’s capacity to do his job. However, reflecting my discussion of housing provision 
above, many of the interviews collected for this study suggested that civilian women married to 
servicemen are often not treated as full and equal members of the community by the military 
welfare system through which they are encouraged to seek help. In the views of many of my 
participants, military welfare workers fail to prioritise their self-defined needs of civilian women 
married to servicemen because of their subordinate status as “second-rate” members of the 
military community. 
 
Before I move on to explore some of these narratives in depth, I want to note that not all victim-
survivors have a bad experience with military welfare workers, and indeed, many military welfare 
workers themselves are caring and committed individuals who do their best to support victim-
survivors of abuse with whom they come into contact. A small number of victim-survivor 
participants in this study - in particular Rachel and Onika - reported being very well supported by 
military welfare structures which put their needs first and were able to connect up with other 
services in order to promote their safety and well-being. In both of these cases, the welfare 
workers listened to the women’s needs, took proactive steps to ensure they felt supported, and 
enabled them to get to SSAFA Stepping Stones homes safely. Importantly for the discussion in this 
chapter, the welfare workers in these cases were able to draw on the “total institutional” 
elements of military life - including knowledge of the perpetrator’s work schedule, connections 
between the various military and quasi-military welfare services, and the ability to enforce 
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particular conditions on a perpetrator without a court order - in order to provide the best 
possible support (for a longer discussion of this, see Gray 2015). 
 
Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of participants in this study told a somewhat different 
story of their experiences with military welfare providers, which demonstrate the status of civilian 
women married to servicemen as, in victim-survivor participant Frances’ words, “second-rate” 
members of the community. Several stated that military welfare personnel, from across the 
different branches of military welfare, prioritised the needs of the service person or the military - 
the needs of ‘operational effectiveness’ - above their own as victim-survivors of abuse. Victim-
survivor participants Amy, Elenoa, and Mereoni, and quasi-military support worker Marcus, 
provide just four examples of a number of similar statements gathered for this research: 
 
Amy: [The welfare providers in the Army] are only interested in the soldier and his 
ability to do his job. 
 
Elenoa: At the end of the day, the Army is more concerned with keeping the serving 
personnel than the family. 
 
Mereoni: The Forces, even though they say that they are for families […] no, they’re 
not for families. Because the serviceperson comes first. They will always support the 
serviceperson.  
 
Marcus: [The military] look after their own. They tell you that quite clearly […] “we’re 
a family, we look after our own.” But the head of the family happens to be […] the 
serviceman. So that’s who they’re looking after.  
 
For Amy, Elenoa, Mereoni, and Marcus, military welfare providers do not prioritise the needs of 
the victim-survivor of abuse; instead, the services which they provide are centred on the needs of 
the serviceman himself. In cases of domestic abuse between a serving perpetrator and a non-
serving victim-survivor, this means that, in the view of these participants, military support 
services are effectively prioritising the needs of perpetrators over those of victim-survivors - 
something which is clearly not only frustrating but dangerous for victim-survivors.  
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In an earlier section of this chapter, I suggested that in the institutional space of the British 
military, services such as welfare are provided to civilian women married to servicemen in order 
that they are able and willing to support their husbands in their military roles and thus to 
contribute to ‘operational effectiveness.’ This is borne out in the stated aims of the various 
branches of military welfare provision. At the first-line welfare level, the Welfare Office of the 
Royal School of Signals, Signals Regiment states on its website that:  
 
The aim of the Welfare Office is to provide a confidential welfare support service 
that is responsive to the needs of the soldiers, families and the Chain of Command. It 
must fulfil statutory requirements and help maintain operational effectiveness of 
service personnel within the Regiment
95
 (emphasis mine). 
 
Moreover, while second-line military welfare services are intended to provide services which are 
focused more on the needs of those seeking support rather than the institution itself, the mission 
statement of the Army Welfare Service is: 
 
To provide a comprehensive, professional, and confidential welfare support service, 
responsive to the needs of individuals, families and the chain of command, in order 
to maximise operational effectiveness of servicemen and women
96
 (emphasis mine).  
 
Similarly, the Mission Statement of the RNRM Welfare service states that it exists to:  
 
provide accessible support services that strengthen and enhance the resilience and 
resourcefulness of Naval Service personnel, their families and communities in order 
to contribute to the Moral Component and optimise Operational Capability
97
 
(emphasis mine). 
 
Military welfare services, both first- and second-line, then, are officially oriented around the 
needs of the military institution and all that is subsumed under its notion of ‘operational 
effectiveness,’ and not primarily around the self-defined needs of military families who approach 
them for help. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that military welfare providers do not 
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want to help families themselves or that they do not care about their problems. However, the 
ultimate target of this welfare provision is not families themselves, but the military institution and 
its gendered ideas of operational effectiveness, which often centre the wellbeing of the serving 
member and his ability to fulfil his job. This places civilian women married to servicemen in a 
disempowered position in relation to their abusers when they come to access military welfare 
services.  
 
This disempowerment was demonstrated in a number of ways throughout my interviews. Several 
participants, for example, spoke of a lack of confidentiality (either real or perceived) among 
military welfare workers. This lack of confidence in the protection of confidentiality applied to 
military welfare personnel in all agencies, including the second-line organisations which are able 
to give greater emphasis to confidentiality than their first-line equivalents, but which still find 
themselves bound to break confidentiality when the ability of an individual service person to do 
their job, or operational effectiveness more broadly, may be compromised.  
 
Several participants in this study described a reticence to seek help motivated by concerns over 
the lack of confidentiality with which their reports would be treated. Victim-survivor participant 
Elenoa, for example, described the fear of repercussions which prevented her from seeking help 
from the military welfare services: 
 
Elenoa: ‘[If] I reported the incident he would get called in. By the time he’s finished 
work for the day I know what to expect from him at home. Either the silent 
treatment [or] he’ll be gone for the whole day [...] or last and truly the worst, he’d do 
something to me. So there was always that, be careful what you’re going to do, next 
time, because if you phone he’s gonna get called in.’ 
  
Elenoa’s her lack of confidence in the confidentiality of the military welfare services was a factor 
which discouraged her from seeking help, because she was afraid of the potential repercussions 
of her doing so. This reticence was also reflected in Williamson and Price’s 2009 survey of 179 
partners of British military personnel, a majority of whom stated that due to lack of 
confidentiality they would not tell military welfare personnel about relationship problems 
(Williamson and Price 2009, 20; Williamson 2011: 14). 
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The remainder of this chapter, however, focuses on the experiences of participants who felt that 
military support workers had prioritised the needs of the military institution over their own self-
defined needs as victim-survivors of abuse. In some cases, participants reported the military 
welfare services prioritising the maintenance of the family unit despite the risks this brings to the 
victim-survivor, perhaps out of a concern to preserve a serviceman’s support system and thus his 
ability to contribute to operational effectiveness. Victim-survivor participants Sophie and Tanya 
and perpetrator participant Dean told me:  
 
Sophie: The welfare, they try and help support the family, but they’re trying their 
hardest to keep the soldier and the family together. So they’re always, like, at his 
corner to try and keep that unity, family unity. 
 
Tanya: When I told the welfare team that I was leaving […] I told them what had 
gone on, what had happened, and they said “Oh, we’ll get him brought back from [a 
training exercise abroad] early.” And I said “No […] This is why I didn’t wanna say 
anything.” I wanted, I know it sounds really, really bad to say, but I wanted just to get 
my kids and leave. Because I said […] “You bring him back […] and I’ll get the same as 
what I got before, which is why I never left before. The tears, “I’m so sorry it’ll never 
happen again” […] and I don’t want that.” I said “I’ve had enough” [The welfare office 
said] “Oh don’t just leave, don’t leave, we’ll speak to [your husband], we’ll get him 
home.”  
 
Dean: [The welfare are] desperate to get you back together. You know, they’re like 
“Go for counselling, go for this, go for that,” because they don’t want you to split up.  
 
The narratives cited above suggest a desire on the part of military welfare workers to maintain 
stability in the lives of service personnel, even in cases when this might bring harm to victim-
survivors of abuse. This may reflect a centring - whether conscious or not - of gendered ideas of 
operational effectiveness which depend on familial support as the most appropriate form of 
sociality through which servicemen should be supported and reintegrated into civilian life (Wool 
2014: 5-7). It may also reflect a lack of proper understanding of the harms of domestic abuse. In 
Tanya’s case, cited above, in particular, it prolonged her abusive relationship and exposed her to 
additional harm.  
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Other participants described their access to justice as limited by their disempowered position 
within the military community in relation to their serving husbands. When domestic abuse cases 
go to military courts, as they did in victim-survivor Natalie’s case as she and her husband were 
based abroad, the whole justice system may be experienced as geared towards military discipline 
and military needs. Natalie’s husband pleaded guilty to multiple charges spanning a decade of 
abuse. He received a sentence which included attendance at a court-mandated perpetrator 
programme intended to put an end to his abusive behaviour. However, while he did attend some 
of the course, his superiors excused him from attending all of it so that he could attend a military 
training exercise instead. Furthermore, Natalie showed me a letter she received from the 
authorities outlining the penalty received by her husband after he pleaded guilty to the charges, 
within which it stated that in sentencing, the court martial “had to strike a balance between 
punishment and retaining his valuable traits and skills and appropriate levels in the Army.” 
Understandably frustrated by this, Natalie told me: 
 
Natalie: They’re all together. There’s no separation from any of them. They’re all, 
boys club together, even the prosecution, [Royal Military Police], everybody is 
together in the mess […] Nothing in the Army is separated […] They’re there to 
protect the soldier.  
 
In Natalie’s perception, all and any elements of the military institution act first and foremost in 
the interests of the serviceman, and as a disempowered member of the military community she 
was unable to get her needs and experiences prioritised.  
 
Even when trials take place in civilian court, they are not immune from the military intervening to 
protect their interest in the serviceman. Civilian support worker Norah talked to me about the 
common practice in which higher-ranked personnel are sent the trials of their subordinates to act 
as character witnesses or to encourage magistrates to leave punishment in the hands of the 
military itself:  
 
Norah: His welfare came down and spoke on his behalf, and said “This is who he is, 
this is what we want, this is  […] what [we] think the sentence [should be]” […] What 
you’ve got to remember, no disrespect to any magistrate whatsoever, if somebody 
of rank is coming in to say “This is what we can offer him, this is what we can do 
when we go back to the Army, he’s not gonna be coming back here, he’s gonna be 
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taken away for 6 months […] away from where the lady’s living” and, you’re thinking 
“Oh, yeah,” but really you’ve got no idea. You know, and that’s no disrespect to any 
magistrates, you know, if they’re convincing enough to say they’re gonna get him 
help in the Army then probably you’re gonna [allow the Army to influence 
sentencing decisions]. 
 
Victim-survivor Sophie experienced the pain of this first-hand when she took her husband to 
court for multiple charges which included attempted murder. Although Sophie had many positive 
things to say about the way that the welfare had supported her previous to the court case, when 
it came to trial: 
 
Sophie: The Army backed him all the way knowing he had abused me before his tour 
of duty. They gave him a glowing report even though he had several warnings […] 
and failed to say he was in contacted with the welfare for abuse towards me [...]. I 
almost died at the hands of a trained killer and the Army would rather save their 
reputation than do the right thing. 
 
In Norah’s and Sophie’s narratives, military interests - in maintaining the labour of service 
personnel and in protecting their reputation - trumped victim-survivors’ need for justice.   
 
In the most extreme examples, victim-survivor participants described incidents in which military 
welfare staff actively sided with their husbands in disputes which arose as a result of abuse. 
Victim-survivor participant Ursula described being forced by an AWS worker and a BFSW service 
worker to leave her SFA in Germany when her marriage broke down due to her husband’s abuse: 
 
Ursula:  He called welfare […] they said “You have to leave,” and I said “But I don’t 
know where to go, if you tell me where to go, I’ll go.” I was crying, I was in a bad 
state  […] I said “I’m telling you I’ve got nowhere to go […] I’m not leaving.” And they 
said “Well if you don’t leave we’ll call […] the military police,” and I said “OK, but I’ve 
not done anything”…. they said they were gonna make something up. So I thought 
well I’ve got no chance here. If a social worker [and] a welfare worker says I’ve done 
something, and they’re just gonna make something up, and I say I haven’t, they’re 
not gonna believe me. So I had to leave.  
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Similarly, victim-survivor participant Natalie, based abroad, recounted an experience when the 
Royal Military Police (RMPs) came to her house after an altercation had taken place between her 
husband and another soldier, in which the RMPs concern for the safety of the other soldier 
overrode their interest in the violence that Natalie herself was experiencing:  
 
Natalie: The RMPs were stepping over my broken furniture when they’d come to get 
my husband to protect another soldier. And I was saying […] “Are you not gonna 
protect me?”…. And they were walking around, seeing my broken house, and just 
walking away from me and leaving me like that, while I’m getting attacked with drills 
in the middle of the night, slashed bed, being tortured, fucking strangled, and I’m 
telling them, going in and telling them, “can you please tell my husband to stop?” 
 
In Natalie’s and Ursula’s narratives, military support agencies actively prioritised the needs of 
serving personnel - whether these were other soldiers or their abusers themselves - over those of 
the victim-survivor. In these women’s experiences, military agencies did not treat reports of 
domestic abuse as relevant, serious, and/or important, and responded to them in a way which 
failed to improve the situation or even made it worse. For both, their marginalised status within 
the military community undermined their ability to have their self-defined needs heard and 
responded to appropriately.  
 
In the section above, I have demonstrated both that victim-survivors of abuse are drawn into the 
military community by the structures through which welfare is provided and that, as 
disempowered subjects subject to structural violence within the military space, that they often 
find that military welfare services do not prioritise their self-defined needs. As with my 
discussions of housing provision above, this demonstrates that civilian women married to 
servicemen are positioned in a liminal space on the borders of the communities in which they live 
- they are both drawn into the community and find themselves unable to occupy the position of 
full members within it. Again, this is a system of structural violence which has hugely important 
implications for the ways in which abuse is responded to in this context. Angela Davis, anti-prison 
scholar and activist in the US, asks “Can a state that is thoroughly infused with racism, male 
dominance, class-bias, and homophobia and that constructs itself in and through violence act to 
minimise violence in the lives of women? Should we rely on the state as the answer to the 
problem of violence against women?” (quoted in Loyd 2012: 484). Following this, I want to 
highlight the limited capacity of a patriarchal, heteronormative institution, with an active 
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investment in the serving spouse, to support civilian victim-survivors of domestic abuse. As 
illustrated by the experiences of victim-survivor participants cited above, the provision of welfare 
in the military community is structured around the maintenance of the social relations and the 
ideologies of militarism, naturalised through the discourse of operational effectiveness. This leads 
military welfare providers to “look after their own,” and thus has very damaging impacts on the 
ability of victim-survivors to access help which prioritises their self-defined needs.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
My discussions in this chapter have focused on the questions:   
 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by the material 
structures of life in this context? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
 
In beginning to answer this question, I have drawn attention to some of the material structures 
which shape responses to domestic abuse in the British military context. Clearly, I have not been 
able to provide an exhaustive exploration of the relevant structures here - rank, for example, is 
undoubtedly an important issue, as is the isolation caused by the mobility of military life and the 
associated economic dependence of many women upon their serving husbands - but limitations 
of space and of my sample of participants prohibit the full exploration of all of these factors here. 
However within this chapter, using the provision of housing and of welfare as examples, I have 
shown how the structures of military life both draw civilian women married to servicemen into 
the community and simultaneously exclude them from full and equal status within it. I have 
therefore described these women as positioned in a liminal space on the borders of the 
institution- they live in the community, but they are not fully of it. Civilian women married to 
servicemen who exist in this liminal space, I have suggested, are precarious subjects, subject to a 
form of structural violence which means they are disempowered within their communities. Like 
many examples of structural violence, the everyday precarity of civilian women married to 
servicemen is not always recognised as such by those who are subject to it, as it is naturalised 
both through its similarities to broader civilian forms of inequality and oppression and through 
recourse to the powerful discourse of operational effectiveness. This process of naturalisation 
masks and legitimates the military’s treatment of some subjects as more important than others. 
While this structural violence is usually taken for granted, I have suggested that an analysis of 
victim-survivors’ responses to domestic abuse can increase its visibility as, following Klinenberg 
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(2004), unusual circumstances of difficulty can lay bare the forms of everyday precarity which 
usually go unseen.  
 
Gendered structural violence is not unique to the military; however, I have argued in this chapter 
that the military as an institution draws upon and crystallises the structural violences of civilian 
life. The military has a specific gender culture, albeit one which is closely related to the cultures of 
the society from which it emerges. The gender culture of the military, however, is particular 
insofar as it underpins the logic of militarism, and plays a central role in enabling the enactment 
and legitimation of military institutions. This gender culture relies upon the notion of 
masculinised protection of the feminised space of home from perceived external threats - it is this 
idea of protection and of threat which makes sense of and legitimates the existence of militaries 
and the militarisation of relations on the geopolitical stage. The gendered ideologies which 
produce and legitimate militarism both require the presence of women and require that they 
remain marginal to the institution itself. It is the embedding of these ideologies in the structures 
which shape the everyday lives of civilian women married to servicemen which situates them in a 
disempowered, precarious position in a liminal space on the borders of the military community 
and, therefore, which shapes their help-seeking decisions in response to domestic abuse.  
 
My discussions in this chapter continue to contribute towards filling some of the gaps in 
knowledge identified in Chapter Two. Again, I have continued the qualitative exploration of 
responses to domestic abuse in the British military, and have contributed in particular to 
understandings of the “external” barriers to help-seeking faced by victim-survivors in this context. 
Specifically, I have shown how the positioning of civilian women married to servicemen in liminal 
space on the borders of the military community constitutes a form of structural violence which 
limits victim-survivors’ ability to take various help-seeking decisions - in some cases, limiting their 
ability to access external services; in others limiting their ability to seek any kind of official 
support or to end the relationship. Again, I have identified the structural violences which shape 
victim-survivors’ help-seeking decisions in this way as intrinsically embedded within the gendered 
project of militarism itself. As I continue into the next chapter, this will contribute towards my 
argument for understanding domestic abuse as a political enactment of gendered militarism.  
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Chapter Seven 
The depoliticisation of domestic abuse in the British military 
community 
 
In this third and final chapter centred on a thematic analysis of the interview narratives collected 
for this thesis, I engage with the following questions:  
 
• How is the causality of domestic abuse perpetrated by servicemen in the British military 
perceived by participants in this study? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in these 
perceptions? 
 
In answering these questions, this chapter does not engage as directly as the previous two 
chapters have done with the barriers to help-seeking which have shaped victim-survivors’ 
responses to domestic abuse in the British military community. Instead, I expand my focus 
outwards from the ways in which individual cases of abuse are responded to, to a discussion of 
how domestic abuse, responses to it, and the barriers to seeking help identified in the previous 
chapters are understood on a broader level within the British military. In particular, the narratives 
I discuss in this chapter circulate around participants’ perceptions of the causality of domestic 
abuse perpetrated by servicemen in the British military. This discussion has important 
implications for responses to individual cases of abuse, because the ways in which abuse and its 
causality are perceived by policy-makers, support workers, and victim-survivors shapes the 
services that they make available, recommend, and access. Indeed, participants in this study 
spoke repeatedly of their perceptions of the causality of abuse in explaining their responses to it. 
In a broader view, the ways in which abuse and its causality are conceptualised also shape the 
larger-scale strategies which are drawn upon in attempts to prevent abuse more generally and to 
reduce its occurrence.  
 
This chapter is concerned with what Sandra Whitworth might refer to as a “struggle over 
meanings” - the contestations which take place around what a particular social issue is and what, 
if anything, it can tell us about society more broadly. For Whitworth, “contestations over 
meanings matter, and they matter not only to those who wage and sustain them, but they matter 
also to most of the rest of us who are left to live with the consequences” (2007: 1). While I have 
argued in Chapters Two and Four in particular that domestic abuse is a deeply political and social 
issue as well as an individual and interpersonal one - which maps onto and emerges from 
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gendered social inequalities and which therefore requires both political analyses and political 
solutions - I show in this chapter that many of the dominant understandings of abuse which 
circulate in the British military community are actively depoliticising. That is, in the dominant 
narratives which emerged from the interviews collected for this thesis, the causality of domestic 
abuse was largely understood in individualised rather than in social or political terms - as an 
individual, pathological, ‘cultural’ or otherwise non-political concern. This depoliticisation has 
important implications for the possibility of working to prevent and to effectively respond to 
abuse; and it also has implications, I argue, for the depoliticisation and the reproduction of 
militarism itself as a set of gendered everyday social relations.  
 
I begin the chapter with a brief explication of my understandings of depoliticisation, of why it is 
important, and of the ways in which the ideas under consideration in this chapter contribute to 
the depoliticisation both of abuse within the military context and of militarism more broadly. 
While domestic abuse may be depoliticised in a variety of ways, I focus in this chapter on three 
main clusters of narratives, which I have selected because of the pervasiveness with which they 
emerged from my interviews. I begin with ‘cultural’ narratives which ‘other’ domestic abuse from 
the mainstream culture of the British military by identifying it as overwhelmingly perpetrated by 
Fijian personnel. Following this, I explore narratives which treat domestic abuse as extraordinary 
by attributing it to the mental health effects of combat. Next, I reflect on the prevalence of a 
gender-neutral approach to abuse within the military institution. In each of the sections, I provide 
illustrative examples from my fieldwork interviews to demonstrate the discourses to which I am 
referring, as well as problematising the assumptions inherent within them and pointing to the 
ways in which I see them as depoliticising. Finally, I draw the threads of my argument together to 
highlight not only the depoliticising impact that such discourses have on dominant 
understandings of abuse in the military community, but further, to argue that by naturalising the 
gendered inequalities inherent in the social relations which constitute militarism, these 
depoliticising narratives serve to naturalise and to reproduce the normalised, everyday, gendered 
social relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, political domination and control for which 
the use of organised violence is a viable option - that is, they serve to reproduce militarism itself. 
This is because depoliticised approaches to domestic abuse function to normalise the gendered 
power inequalities which are at its root and, therefore, to normalise the gendered power 
inequalities which underpin militarism.  
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Depoliticisation: “a determined looking away from anything systemic”  
As Razack  suggests, depoliticisation constitutes “a determined look away from anything 
systemic” (2004: 152). Depoliticising processes work by the encircling of a difficult event or 
experience as separate and exceptional; as somehow removed from the normal processes 
through which the political body is constructed (Edkins 2003: 17). Depoliticisation thus refers to 
processes by which the structural, political nature of a given social issue is disguised, removing 
the rationale for political engagement with it. Klinenberg (2004) usefully highlights this in his 
study of the deaths which occurred during the 1995 Chicago heat-wave. For Klinenberg, particular 
groups of Chicagoans were exposed to serious danger when the heat-wave hit because of the 
underlying structural violence which made their lives precarious on an everyday basis (see 
Chapter Six). However, this precarity was obscured, he suggests, by the discourses of individual 
responsibility employed by the city’s authorities in response to the soaring temperatures. In 
Klinenberg’s example, the political issue of the social inequalities which produced particular 
Chicagoans as vulnerable to the harms of the heat-wave was masked by depoliticising discourses 
which cast their experiences in separated and individualised terms - as atypical rather than 
systemic - and which therefore undermined the basis for political analysis and intervention. 
Similarly, as I illustrate in this chapter, narratives which cast domestic abuse as an exceptional, 
individual problem serve to obscure the gendered social inequalities which underpin abuse. 
Moreover, they also serve to obscure the gender-based social forces - both structural and 
discursive - which shape responses to domestic abuse, as explored in the previous two chapters. 
If domestic abuse is approached on an individualised basis, its occurrence does not imply any 
need to analyse or to work to challenge gendered social inequalities, and the political structures 
which underpin it are thus left unquestioned.   
 
Whilst the forces which depoliticise abuse within the British military community are important 
and worthy of analysis for their own sake, and are the focus of this chapter, I suggest that analysis 
of these processes can shed light on the ways in which militarism in the broader sense is subject 
to depoliticisation. Militaries themselves, of course, are political spaces; politics are implicated 
not just in the specific acts of violence that militaries undertake at a particular time, but in their 
very existence as institutions established to exert dominance through violence. The processes 
which depoliticise militarism are myriad, and include, for example, certain geographical 
imaginaries (Dalby 2013) as well as the assumption of a rigid civil-military divide (Basham 2013: 
21-23). Militarism is also depoliticised through recourse to gendered norms; as Peterson argues, 
the naturalisation and widespread social acceptance of the superiority of the masculine over the 
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feminine within the binary system of gender plays an important role in the construction of “war 
stories” which normalise and legitimate acts of war. Subordinated or enemy groups are feminised 
and thus devalued; and the appropriate response to such feminised groups, whether for the 
purposes of protection or of control, subsequently requires a masculinised response. “This 
conveniently justifies both the necessity of rule and who should rule” (Peterson 2010: 20). 
Militarism writ large is also depoliticised through processes of scaling which, as discussed in 
Chapter Four, separate the everyday gendered processes which underpin it from its more 
dramatic enactments of violence on the geo-political stage. Experiences cast as individual are 
deemed irrelevant to understanding the large-scale events of war, and broad political structures 
are deemed irrelevant to understanding personal everyday experiences such as gendered 
performance. When connections between the ‘the normal’ and ‘the extraordinary’ are thus 
erased, opportunities for political analysis of the co-constitutive processes at work across these 
sites, for recognition of the rootedness of the extraordinary in the normal and opportunities for 
effective strategies to counter them are lost, and militarism is naturalised.  
 
Domestic abuse within the military community, as a site at which gendered power and militarism 
clearly intersect, provides a potential avenue for political work to denaturalise militarism. This is 
because paying political attention to the ways in which the precarious status of civilian women 
married to British servicemen shapes their experiences of abuse could allow us to identify and to 
problematise some of the militarised gendered relations and enactments which structure the 
everyday lives of military families. Given the co-constitutive relationship between the logics of 
militarism as it operates in all contexts from the intimate everyday to the geopolitical, such an 
analysis would present a powerful opportunity for highlighting and undermining the often 
unspoken everyday assumptions through which the use of violence, both within intimate 
relations and on the geo-political stage, becomes possible. The analysis of military abuse 
presented in this thesis thus works to resist the encirculation of difficult or traumatic experiences 
and events as separate from the linear stories of national mythology, highlighting the socially and 
politically constituted pain which underpins the normal (Edkins 2003: 17). Despite the potential 
which is thus inherent in analyses of military abuse for identifying and challenging militarism’s 
political construction, when abuse within military communities is not interpreted in this way but 
is actively depoliticised, which, as I show in this chapter, is commonly the case, it is part of the 
wider processes through which the gendered basis of militarism itself is normalised and 
depoliticised.  
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“It’s their culture”  
Throughout the course of my research I have been struck by the ubiquity of assertions, both in 
research interviews and in more informal conversations with members of the military community, 
that domestic abuse in this context is largely a problem associated with the Fijian personnel 
serving in the British military and their spouses. As I note in Chapter One, the majority of Foreign 
and Commonwealth personnel serving in the British military are originally from the Republic of 
Fiji
98
. The idea that Fijian personnel in particular are associated with domestic abuse is not unique 
to my study, but has emerged in other scholarship on the British military. Basham, for example, 
cites both a white Officer in the Army who suggested that “By our standards wife-beating is not 
acceptable, but actually it seems to be prevalent [among Fijian families]” (Basham, 2013, 128), 
and a memorandum on “Fijian Culture and Tradition” prepared by the MOD in 2005 for the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Defence which states that “Fijian men usually beat their wives 
and children” (ibid.: 129). Similarly, Ware quotes a cultural guidance document which asserts that 
“Despite the general equality of opportunity for women in Fijian society, it is a traditional 
expectation for the husband to be head of the household and for the wife to accept the 
husband’s domestic authority. This can lead to a greater tolerance of controlling behaviour 
including, sometimes, domestic violence” (2012: 215).  
 
For several participants in my study, the simplistic notion of a static, homogenous ‘Fijian culture’ 
functioned as a self-explanatory basis for domestic abuse, as exemplified in the following 
interview extracts from quasi-military support worker Sarah, victim-survivor participant Elenoa, 
and perpetrator participant Dean:  
 
Sarah: It’s their [Fijian] culture…. I know [the Fiji Support Network] go around giving 
presentations and one of the things they talk about is domestic violence and how it’s 
not accepted in this country, whereas in Fiji I get the idea that it kinda is…. That’s in 
their culture and that’s accepted.  
 
Elenoa: In our society, I’m Fijian, it’s a norm. It’s alright if a man hits a woman […] 
Back home, men hit women a lot and it’s expected.  
 
                                                           
98
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/295803/british_colonies_table.
pdf, last accessed 21 April 2015. 
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Dean: I’ve heard stories of all sorts of, dragging the women around by their hair and, 
you know, giving them a hiding and stuff like that. And you hear some, all sorts of 
nonsense coming out of a lot of people’s mouths about how the Fijians back in Fiji, 
how they treat their women. 
 
In most of the interviews which touched upon the relation between Fijian culture and abuse, 
participants did not expand upon exactly what it is about Fijian culture that produces abuse as 
acceptable. As in Ahmed et al’s (2009: 15) study of British South Asian women’s experiences of 
abuse, the utility of culture as an explanation was often assumed not to require further analysis, 
structural understanding, or explication, as most participants simply stated the acceptability of 
abuse for Fijians as self-evident fact. In addition, within the narratives of my participants, Fijian 
culture seems to travel unscathed across national borders, affecting Fijian victim-survivors in the 
UK in the same ways as it would do in Fiji. Victim-survivor participant Elenoa went on:  
 
Elenoa: It’s a norm. It’s alright if a man hits a woman. And sadly enough most of 
these Fijian guys that have come across and joined the British Army, they still do 
that. 
 
Within such narratives, it is sometimes further assumed that as this is a cultural phenomenon, it 
can only be understood by, and is best dealt with by, members of the community itself. Quasi-
military support worker Alicia, herself from Fiji, felt quite strongly on this point. She told me: 
 
Alicia: [White British military support workers] don’t understand the individuals’ 
culture, background […] what [do they] know about Fijian culture? [...] We know how 
to deal with that person. We’ve, we know, we are brought up together…. 
[Perpetrators of abuse] give you all the fibs, they giving them all the lies to the white 
Unit Welfare Officer. When there is, a Fijian goes and talk to them they know they 
can’t hide […] He knows he can’t tell me lies. Because I know, I’ll correct him, yeah. 
What is the real reason. So they know now, they can’t go on and start punching 
around because they know, there’s another Fijian [who] will be, will be called.  
 
Within the narratives provided above, ‘Fijian culture’ is produced as fixed, uniform, and whole, 
unchanging in the face of international travel, its relation to abuse clear and not necessitating 
further explanation, yet it is fully comprehensible only to those who can claim it for themselves. 
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Importantly, ‘culture’ is taken within these narratives to be something which only affects 
minoritised groups; white majority people’s experiences of abuse do not seem to be equally 
rooted in ‘culture’ even when there are considerable similarities between women’s experiences 
across ethno-national boundaries (Ahmed et al. 2009: 11; Narayan 1997: 84). In fact, the 
narratives which emerged from my interviews often paint the UK as a place where, in stark 
contrast to Fiji, abuse is most certainly not acceptable. Fijian victim-survivor Elenoa told me:  
 
Elenoa: Mostly back home men hit women a lot and it’s expected. Whereas here, 
which is something I’m quite glad [about], you hit a woman and that’s not accepted. 
So it’s just, it’s alright, back home it’s the mindset that it’s OK to do that. But you 
can’t do that when you’re here.  
 
This narrative is, of course, factually undermined by the statistical prevalence of domestic abuse 
in Britain, as discussed in Chapter One, and by the ways in which the gendered inequalities which 
underpin abuse are deeply woven into and normalised within British society. As such, this 
narrative chimes closely with Narayan’s concept of “death by culture,” a phrase she uses to 
describe “the ways in which “culture” is invoked in explanations of forms of violence against 
Third-World women, while it is not similarly invoked in explanations of forms of violence that 
effect mainstream Western women,” even when these forms of violence appear to be similar in 
many ways (1997: 84).  
 
In opposition to the narrow portrayals of culture discussed above, I argue that culture cannot be 
understood as fixed and homogenous, but is in fact fluid, dynamic, and contested. As Ahmed et 
al. (2009: 20) put it, “‘culture’ should not be treated as a reified causative category; rather, we 
should consider its various discursive constructions, how such constructions may or may not be 
resisted by women and how there could be a focus on women’s agency and resistance to 
perceived cultural norms.” That is, culture should be understood not as something which simply 
exists, but as something which people do, and therefore something which they can, and do, do 
differently from one another (Ahmed et al. 2009: 10).  
 
While women in Fiji itself do experience high rates of domestic abuse - it was estimated in 2011 
that as many as 64% of Fijian women experience physical or sexual abuse from an intimate 
partner within their lifetime (Singh et al. 2013: 4) - even a cursory glance at the literature on 
‘Fijian culture’ and on abuse in Fiji itself reveals it to be far more complex, contested and dynamic 
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than the one-dimensional narratives presented above might suggest. Even in ‘traditional’ rural 
areas, a husband’s ability to rely upon existent male privilege to justify abusing his wife would 
likely be mediated by other factors such as the inter-clan nature of marriage, and thus the 
potential detrimental impact of abuse upon inter-clan relations (Aucoin 1990). Fiji is not an 
ethnically or culturally homogenous nation but is made up of a number of ethnic groups, with the 
majority of people identifying as either indigenous Fijian or Indo-Fijian. Women from various 
ethnic groups have engaged in dynamic feminist movements from the 1920s onwards, both 
independently of, and in conversation with, western feminisms (Mishra 2008, 2012). 
Organisations such as the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre and the Fiji Women’s Rights Movement, both 
founded in the 1980s, actively campaign against gender violence in their country. Fiji Women’s 
Crisis Centre state: 
 
We work on the principle of the empowerment of women. We believe that all forms 
of violence against women are a violation of women’s human rights, and that no one 
has the right to inflict violence on a woman or child under any circumstance.  
(FWCC 1998: 89) 
 
While groups such as the Fiji Women’s Crisis Centre continue to critique state responses to 
domestic abuse in Fiji
99
, the state is at least attempting to make changes: legislation has recently 
been updated and strengthened (Singh et al. 2013: 8-10); and Prime Minister Bainimarama 
personally denounced domestic abuse at the Pacific Women Parliamentary Forum in April this 
year
100
.  
 
The notion of a static and homogenous culture upon which cultural explanations of abuse rely is 
thus easily undermined when one pays attention to the conflicting interpretations of the issue 
taking place within Fiji itself. In addition, similarly to Ahmed et al’s (2009: 19-20) findings in their 
research with British South Asian women, even in those narratives in which Fijian interview 
participants appeared to be reinforcing the idea that abuse is accepted in their culture, they often 
simultaneously undermine this idea through their own stance against abuse as well as their 
actions in escaping their abusive situations and their expressed disappointment with other 
members of their community for not rejecting abuse outright. Fijian victim-survivor Mereoni, for 
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example, expressed her frustration with other members of the Fijian community who failed to 
offer her appropriate support when she ended her abusive marriage:  
 
Mereoni: [I] didn’t have any friends […]  Because nobody wanted to, you know. I had 
to prove myself, Harriet, even when I left. I had to prove myself, to rise to the 
occasion and, you know, set them wrong. To tell them no. You know, the way that 
you think is wrong, I will make it. Yeah. I was very determined to do that [laughs].  
 
So if culture is dynamic, fluid, and contested, but is seen as static and uniform, then the practice 
of who gets to define the apparent essence of a given culture is deeply political and rooted in 
power. Often, such definitions emerge from racist ideas circulating within white majority 
communities which produce Fijian perpetrators of abuse as ‘other,’ to some extent barbaric and 
unable to control their anger, constructing a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them' in which the 
majority culture claims the moral high-ground. Analysing the understandings of ‘cultural’ forms of 
gender violence in EU policy documents, for example, Montoya and Agustin describe the ways in 
which abuse in minoritised groups is pathologised, allowing for the construction of Western 
European nations as morally superior through the invisibilisation of persistent forms of violence 
against women within the dominant culture (Montoya and Agustin 2013: 535). In concert with 
this, Fijian victim-survivor participant Mereoni suggested that this notion of culture is partly 
defined by abusive Fijian men, who stand to gain legitimation for their behaviour from this 
conceptualisation: 
 
Mereoni: My husband hits me today, [the military authorities] find out, he goes in 
front of his Commanding Officer and [he says] “Oh, well, that’s how we discipline our 
women in our country”. You know, “It’s OK to hit your wife, to discipline her in that 
way, because it’s a cultural thing.” “It has always happened.” I completely disagree 
with that […] So that carries on because they tell their superior officers, so when [the 
superior officers] speak about it […] [they say] “It’s a cultural thing. That’s what they 
do in their country, that’s how they discipline their wives”…It’s their excuse of having 
to get away with what they’ve done. 
 
While views on domestic abuse among Fijian people are likely to vary, then - as Mereoni states 
above, she herself “completely disagree[s]” with the notion that domestic abuse is acceptable in 
her version of Fijian culture - the power imbalances which allow certain people but not others to 
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define the apparently essential elements of what is a fluid and contested culture have meant that 
their voices are often silenced.  
 
The structural violences which limit Foreign and Commonwealth spouses’ abilities to seek support 
in circumstances of domestic abuse are also masked within these depoliticising discourses which 
attribute domestic abuse to this distant and static thing labelled ‘culture.’ Quasi-military support 
worker Sarah suggested:  
 
Sarah: The ability to go and ask for help is down to individuals very much. And, and 
also the ability to actually be successful [...] The more you, sort of, push for help, the 
more you’re going to get it, when the people who just sort of sit there don’t, and 
don’t want to ask for help, and a lot of them you see don’t wanna ask for help as 
well, and it’s in their cultures.  
 
In Sarah’s narrative, the reality that there are material, structural reasons why victim-survivors 
from Fijian communities might be less willing to reach out for help than their British counterparts, 
such as the insecure visa status that makes many particularly dependent upon their serving 
spouse (see Chapter Six), is obscured. This focus on the individual, or on a ‘culture’ portrayed as 
static and unchanging, makes it more difficult to imagine campaigning work which targets and 
undermines these structural inequalities.  
 
In addition, given that ‘culture’ within such narratives is something that only applies to 
minoritised people and which is not considered relevant to the abuse experiences of white 
majority victim-survivors (Ahmed et al. 2009: 11; Narayan 1997: 84), abuse among Fijians can be 
treated as ‘other’ from the mainstream community, something exotic and bearing little relation 
to the mainstream ‘us’. While the choices of Fijian perpetrators and victim-survivors are 
explained with recourse to (often unexamined) cultural factors, those of their British counterparts 
are attributed to individual ‘reasons’: perpetrators may abuse because of jealousy, stress, or 
alcohol; victim-survivors may stay in the relationship because of fear or low self-esteem (Narayan 
1997: 115). In addition to invisibilising the epidemic levels of abuse which occur within British 
society, this discourse masks the structural factors which shape the experiences of abuse in 
British and Fijian communities in both similar and divergent ways, and thus the possibility for 
comprehensive political analysis and action is lost. Within this, the potential impact that military 
culture, however defined, has on abuse (Harrison 2006) is also obscured. That is, by othering the 
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experience of Fijian victim-survivors, and individualising those of their British counterparts, and 
by separating the experiences of the two, the space for identifying the common structural and 
discursive factors which shape victim-survivors’ experiences of abuse specifically as a civilian 
women married to a British serviceman are lost; and so, therefore, is an opportunity for 
highlighting the connections between such women’s particular vulnerabilities to abuse and the 
gendered underpinning of militarism.  
 
I do not want to suggest that cultural differences have no impact on the ways in which domestic 
abuse is perpetrated and responded to - indeed following scholars who recognise the 
intersectional formulation of abuse (e.g. Bograd 1999; Crenshaw 1991; Sokoloff and Dupont 
2005), it is likely that it does. However, the notion of exceptionalism which emerged from many 
of my interviews in relation to Fijian personnel is deeply problematic and colonial, and functions 
to ‘other’ the violence and abuse which takes place within relationships between Fijian personnel 
and their spouses. It works to produce both a two-dimensional subject of violence and a form of 
violence which is inexplicable and therefore does not need to be explained. This has parallels with 
much contemporary analysis on sexualised violence in conflict zones; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 
have suggested that much analysis of such violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
particular is informed by a “backwards glance to the classic colonial story of evolutionary 
development” (2013: 91) and in which calls to ‘save’ the Congolese woman specifically and only 
from rape obscure the complex and overlapping needs and hardships experienced by many 
Congolese women (ibid., 2013: 94-95, 101). This abstracts the rape from its broader context and 
from the broader needs of victim-survivors, casting it as something alien which could never 
happen ‘here’ and which in one way or another requires the intervention of a western saviour 
figure to once again save “brown women from brown men” (Spivak 1988: 297). Similarly, the 
narratives of ‘culture’ in relation to Fijian women’s experiences of domestic abuse in the British 
military context produces their experiences of violence as separate from the norm - something 
specific and ‘other’ - which requires the sympathy of the mainstream military, but does not signal 
any need for comprehensive and deep changes in the interlinked structures and power relations 
of everyday life and of militarised geopolitics. 
 
 
"They all go through this stage  [...]  it will settle down" 
Another depoliticising discourse which emerged from my interviews frames abuse in the military 
community as caused by factors related to military deployment: both those associated with post-
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deployment reintegration into family life and those associated with combat-induced trauma (in 
particular post-traumatic stress disorder [PTSD], a condition which was often used as a short-
hand expression for broad experiences of combat trauma). Despite the fact that PTSD in 
particular may emerge some time after the original traumatising event has occurred
101
, many 
participants made explicit links as well as unintentional slippages between the stresses and 
traumas of combat and the immediate post-deployment reintegration period, and as a result I 
consider the two issues together in this section.  
 
PTSD, seen as the apex of the mental health problems caused by military service, is an anxiety 
disorder caused by very stressful, frightening, or distressing events such as violent personal 
assaults or ongoing abuse, natural disasters, serious road accidents, and military combat. 
Symptoms can include nightmares, flashbacks, insomnia, and difficulty concentrating, as well as 
feelings of guilt, isolation, and irritability, and can have a significant and debilitating impact on the 
sufferer’s day-to-day life
102
. That there exist connections between trauma/PTSD, post-
deployment reintegration, and abuse in military families is widely assumed and is, as I explore in 
Chapter Two, a central theme in much of the research into military domestic abuse in the US and 
British context. Similarly, web resources for military families in the US
103
, and media reports in 
both the US and the UK
104
 also tend to assume a connection between the two issues. The 
assumption of a connection between reintegration and abuse is also reflected in the military’s Tri-
Service Policy on Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Ministry of Defence 2011b: 9), which 
states that “Commanders need to be aware that a propensity to perpetrate domestic abuse may 
be exacerbated by stressful situations, notably the time immediately before and after major 
deployments.”  
 
This chapter sets out to reflect on the depoliticising impacts of narratives of causality rather than 
to debate whether or not they are ‘true,’ and as such it is beyond its scope to dwell on whether or 
not deployment-related factors are causal in domestic abuse. However, given the ubiquity and 
the power of these assumed connections it is worth noting that the empirical evidence collected 
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in this study does not lend support to the existence of a causal connection between the post-
deployment reintegration period and/or combat-related trauma and domestic abuse. None of the 
victim-survivors interviewed reported a relationship which had previously been free from abuse 
becoming violent after their partners’ deployment, either immediately or after a period of time. 
The majority clearly stated that deployment was not a relevant factor, either because their 
partner had never deployed to a war zone or because the abuse had begun long before they did. 
Moreover, a number of participants also felt that perpetrators of abuse deliberately used ideas 
about deployment as an excuse to avoid taking responsibility for their behaviour. 
 
Despite this, the assumption of a connection between deployment-related factors and domestic 
abuse was reflected in the understandings of the causes of abuse in the military community 
which arose from many of the interviews carried out for this study. Several victim-survivor 
participants - even those who did not attribute their own experiences to the impact of 
deployment - did assume that a large proportion of domestic abuse in the military setting 
revolves around reintegration and/or combat induced mental health problems. Victim-survivor 
participants Jessica and Isabella both suffered physical as well as psychological abuse from their 
husbands throughout their marriages, which began in both cases before their husbands had 
joined the military. Despite this, when asked about the causes of abuse, they made the 
connection with deployment to a combat zone: 
 
Jessica: From what I’ve heard, and I’ve done my research on it ‘cause I wanted to 
find out […]  when the men go away, it’s more, there’s a lot of that […] he’s from this 
world of, you know, it’s fighting, it’s constant, you know, all the time, but he’s gotta 
come back and readjust to being that family man. Some of those men can’t, they 
can’t take that, that fighting. 
 
Isabella: I don’t think he was emotionally stable enough to be out there 
[Afghanistan] in the first place, but the Army didn’t pick up on that […] It’s no wonder 
these guys come back and do the things they do to the wives because they don’t 
have an outlet for it. At all.  
 
Even though their own experiences of abuse began long before their husbands deployed, Jessica 
and Isabella’s both suggest that domestic abuse in the military setting is largely attributable to 
the effects of combat. Isabella’s statement that it is “no wonder” that servicemen who experience 
 184 
 
combat abuse their wives is particularly interesting here, as it points to a lack of agency and of 
responsibility on the part of the perpetrators as well as to a simplistic and unmediated causal 
relationship between combat and abuse.  
 
Perpetrator participant Joe shared a narrative which did seem to connect his perpetration of 
abuse with his combat experience, but which also seemed somewhat confused on the issue. 
While he initially suggested that his experiences in Afghanistan were a cause of his violence, he 
also admitted that the pattern of abuse had begun before his first deployment and followed a 
pattern of escalation which was not related to tours of duty. He said: 
 
Joe: I know from personal experience that when you first get back from tour […] 
you’re at a different level of […] awareness […] there’s already some aggression 
inside you already, you know, that’s been built up over the, over the tour […] when 
you get back it’s, that’s how it is, that’s how you see everything that’s how you 
approach everything, it just comes natural […] Well, to be honest, when I got back 
from, when I got back from tour my violence didn’t actually start […] But it did 
progress […] But then again, [when] I think about it, I was slightly abusive before I 
joined the Army, it just got worse. 
 
Joe seems to be attempting to draw upon dominant narratives of combat experience in 
explaining his perpetration of abuse, but finding that the narrative fails to fully explain his 
behaviour because of the timeline on which his abuse began. Joe’s turning to this narrative 
despite its failure to fully reflect his experiences suggests that deployment-centred narratives of 
abuse have significant influence - and perhaps also the capacity to excuse abusive behaviour to 
some extent (a suggestion which was backed up by perpetrator participant Dean, who argued 
that PTSD constitutes a “convenient excuse” for military perpetrators of domestic abuse).  
 
Connections between abuse and PTSD may be further engrained by some support workers. 
Although these narratives were by no means reproduced by all the support workers in the study, 
there was some evidence that discourses which connect abuse and trauma/reintegration may not 
be uncommon. Civilian support worker Jackie, for example, told me:  
 
Jackie: [Y]ou’ve had 6 months, you’ve managed the home, you’ve been trying to 
cope on your own, you know, and it’s quite stressful […] and then of course you’ve 
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got somebody coming back in who might be quite traumatised by what they’ve been 
through, so they might actually, probably, need some time to calm down, and to 
relax, or, you know, wind down, etcetera…. It kind of needs you to leave them, you 
know, let the people kind of, settle back down […] But again you’ve got that 
overwhelming urge to kind of dive in, you know. So I think it’s more about that really.  
 
Reflecting these assumptions, victim-survivor participant Amy explained to me that her attempts 
to approach a health visitor connected to the military for support around her experiences of 
abuse were ineffective: 
 
Amy: I did approach the health visitor and she said "they all go through this stage  
[...]  it will settle down." 
 
The connection between abuse and trauma/PTSD and the reintegration period is thus deeply 
engrained and widely accepted in discourses which circulate both within and about the British 
military community.  
 
Interestingly, or perhaps frustratingly, ideas around reintegration and around trauma seem at 
first glance to have significant potential to inspire overtly political engagements with the broader 
processes of militarism, by drawing attention to the connections between ‘extraordinary’ 
experiences of war and the impacts of everyday militarism experienced by ‘ordinary’ military 
families. As such, associations between trauma, reintegration, and abuse may have the potential 
to reveal the flaws within what Shaw (2013: 29-30) describes as the “new Western Militarism”, 
which, in order to cultivate public support, “avoids, above all, any deep social costs for the West’s 
own societies.” We might therefore expect that public awareness (whether we accept the 
causality embedded in this awareness or not) of the negative impacts of the wars in which British 
Armed Forces are participating ‘elsewhere’ upon everyday life within the UK itself might 
encourage increased attention to and recognition of the political nature of the everyday 
gendered practices and relations upon which militarism relies.  
 
Looking at the narratives which have emerged from my interviews, however, this does not seem 
to be the case. Rather, one of the key elements of these narratives is a medicalised approach to 
abuse, which serves to abstract it from the social context in which it takes place. Medicalisation is 
a term used to refer to the process by which “a medical frame or definition has been applied to 
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understand or manage a problem”(Conrad 1992: 211). In stating that narratives surrounding 
domestic abuse have become in some ways medicalised, I am highlighting the tendency to 
understand such abuse not as a social and political issue rooted in gender inequalities, but as 
caused by individual cases of mental illness. That is, when the perpetration of domestic abuse is 
understood to be caused by a mental health condition such as PTSD, we can say that discussions 
of domestic abuse have become medicalised.  
 
Scholars including Edkins (2003) and Howell (2011, 2012) have suggested that a process of 
medicalisation can be identified in the ways in which experiences of combat deployment are 
understood, because the negative emotional response of servicemen to their experiences of 
combat violence are increasingly understood as pathological disorders rather than as a normal 
response to negative experiences. This has important political implications. For Edkins (2003: 9, 
51-52) the medicalisation of combat trauma allows the state to reinsert its survivors back into its 
structures of power and thus to mask the violence which underpins the construction and 
maintenance of the state. Survivors of trauma, she suggests, can tell us something about the 
workings of political power; and it is this which necessitates their disciplining in the interests of 
state power. In Edkins’ (2003: 52) words, “the diagnosis and treatment of trauma survivors can 
serve to discipline their memories and render them politically powerless.” Trauma is 
individualised and subjected to medical treatment, abstracting it from the social and political 
context in which it was produced, and rendering it appropriately responded to by medical cure, 
not political action (Edkins 2003: 50; Howell 2011: 4). In this way, the trauma itself is abstracted 
from the political conditions that created it, and in the process the relevance of questions around 
geopolitics, militarism, gender and masculinity, and violence are erased.  
 
Following Edkins and Howell, while I do not deny the very real pain and hardships which sufferers 
of PTSD experience, it is important to draw attention to the social, political, and historical 
processes by which we conceptualise, define, and respond to the diverse spectrum of human pain 
and suffering at a given moment in time, and to the political impacts which this might have. 
Foucault (1987: 64-74; 1989) famously charts the development of the Western understanding of 
those considered ‘mad’, from their exile along with other social pariahs, via their confinement as 
moral undesirables along with criminals and the poor, to the development, in the nineteenth-
century, of the pathologisation of madness through ‘scientific’ psychiatry. Foucault’s analysis 
undermines the assumption that the mediatisation of ‘mental health’ represents a history of 
linear progress; of the discovery, increased understanding, and better treatment of always-
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existing mental conditions. Instead, it draws attention to the social and political processes by 
which particular understandings of madness and mental health are constructed. Diagnoses are 
invented rather than discovered; they come into being at particular political moments and fade 
into disuse at others (Howell 2012: 214-26; Summerfield 2001: 97). As Edkins (2003: 45) suggests, 
“The term ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ did not just name a pre-existing complaint; it produced 
a syndrome that people could then be said (and feel themselves) to suffer from. This result has 
specific political outcomes and in turn results from a particular political configuration.”  
 
Following this, we need to pay attention to the political forces behind, and the political 
implications of, the medicalisation of domestic abuse in the British Armed Forces. When it is 
understood as a symptom of a medical problem, domestic abuse is largely assumed to be beyond 
the control of the perpetrator. As such, it is something which cannot be fully attributed to the 
choices which that perpetrator makes and is best responded to with understanding and perhaps 
with treatment, but not with blame or with punishment. Crucially, this narrative centralises the 
vulnerabilities and needs of the perpetrator of abuse and not of the victim-survivor - her needs 
and the hardships she faces are often largely sidelined. In this study, victim-survivors who 
attributed the abuse they experienced to deployment related factors often found it difficult to 
blame the perpetrator for the abuse, and hoped that the abuse would eventually stop on its own 
as their husbands recovered from their experiences of deployment. As I discuss in Chapter Five, 
these factors delayed the timeframe in which many sought help; and in other cases, delimited the 
kinds of help made available to them, making it more likely that they would pursue support 
services centred on the perpetrator’s mental health needs rather than on the victim-survivor’s 
need for safety.  
 
Of more direct relevance to the discussions in this chapter, when domestic abuse is assumed to 
be an unusual and disordered response to the extraordinary experiences of war, domestic abuse 
is abstracted from the social context in which it takes place. For example, in the interview extract 
cited above, Isabella reflected on her husband’s deployment to Afghanistan and suggested that 
he was not “emotionally stable enough to be out there in the first place.” The focus of Isabella’s 
narrative on her husband’s individual lack of the personal capacity of emotional strength masks 
the connections between her experiences and broader social and political inequalities. 
Furthermore, this individual weakness did not emerge, in Isabella’s narrative, in everyday life, but 
was triggered by the extraordinary and time-bound experience of deployment to Afghanistan. As 
such, the understandings of abuse embedded in this narrative abstract it from everyday life in the 
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military community in two ways - by pointing to individual rather than social factors, and by 
locating it within the exceptional as opposed to within the normal and the everyday. The 
everydayness of abuse and its connections with the gendered inequalities which characterise life 
in the Armed Forces - as well as the everyday structural and discursive factors which shape 
responses to abuse, discussed in the previous two chapters of this thesis - are obscured from the 
picture. Individual victim-survivors are therefore distanced from one another, and the structural 
precarity which underpins their experiences goes unnoticed (Klinenberg 2004). This forecloses 
particular types of political analysis and political interventions by obscuring the everyday socially 
constructed inequalities which underpin abuse.  
 
Moreover, despite attributing domestic abuse to deployment-related factors, the narratives cited 
above do not generally entail a critique of war itself. In Isabella’s suggestion, for example, that her 
husband was not “emotionally stable enough to be out there [Afghanistan] in the first place,” her 
critique is not aimed at the invasion of Afghanistan itself, and there is no suggestion that 
traumatisation might be a commonplace or even a reasonable response to the horrors of war. 
Rather, narratives such as these take for granted the (unfortunate) inevitability of war and the 
necessity of sacrifice in order to protect the national good. Furthermore, several of the narratives 
discussed above also frame domestic abuse as an unfortunate, but sometimes inevitable, 
consequence of these extraordinary circumstances - for Isabella, for example, “It’s no wonder 
these guys come back and do the things they do to the wives because they don’t have an outlet 
for it.” In this way, domestic abuse is framed as a form of ‘collateral damage’ - the terrible, but at 
times inevitable, price that is paid by military wives in the name of protecting national security. As 
such, these assumptions are likely to re-entrench the pressures on civilian women married to 
servicemen to fulfil their duties as military wives by supporting their husbands even throughout 
domestic abuse, as discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
The wide-spread assumption that deployment-related factors are causal of military domestic 
abuse has numerous implications, both for the responses of individual victim-survivors - as 
discussed in Chapter Five - and for broader political engagements with domestic abuse in the 
military context. The three main assumptions embedded in these narratives - that domestic 
abuse is beyond the control of the perpetrator; that it is an individual problem rooted in out of 
the ordinary experiences; and that domestic abuse may therefore be understood as a form of 
‘collateral damage’ sustained in the pursuit of national security - work to obscure what domestic 
abuse is. Their focus on isolated, ‘accidental’ incidents obscures the patterns of controlling 
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behaviour which constitutes abuse. Moreover, by abstracting abuse from the social context in 
which it occurs, these narratives obscure the role of everyday social and political inequalities in 
shaping the ways in which abuse is both perpetrated and, as explored in this thesis, responded to. 
In these discursive processes, the idea of abuse and militarism/war as political, interconnected, 
gendered, everyday social processes, ones that are best countered by political means, is lost.  As 
such, these narratives contribute to the depoliticisation not only of domestic abuse, but of the 
gendered social relations of militarism more broadly. That is, because these narratives abstract 
domestic abuse from the everyday gendered social relations which underpin it, they undermine 
an opportunity to draw attention to the harms engendered by these social relations and, in the 
process, further naturalise these relations themselves. This will be expanded upon further in the 
concluding section of this chapter.  
 
 
“We’re not gender specific [...] it could be a him, it could be a her” 
The final set of depoliticising narratives to which I want to draw attention in this chapter are 
those underpinned by the notion of gender neutrality - those which suggest that gender is a 
largely irrelevant factor in making sense of and responding to domestic abuse. This emerged most 
strongly in interviews with military welfare providers, many of whom were keen to emphasise the 
inclusiveness of their domestic abuse policies and support services. Military support worker Fiona 
stated that:  
 
Fiona: All of the same support systems are open to a male victim [the same] as a 
female. And actually we [...] often do yearly training for Unit Welfare Officers which 
is frequently about domestic abuse and we do, we’re very, very clear, we’re not 
gender specific there, it’s very much always, it could be a him, it could be a her. 
 
Military support worker Diane noted that even though military policy on domestic abuse (Ministry 
of Defence 2011b) sits within the government’s Violence against Women and Girls Strategy, it is 
important that this should not prevent male victim-survivors from seeking support: 
 
Diane: [Although] it’s the Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy we’re very, 
making sure that it is gender neutral and that in theory anyone can follow the 
strategy and hopefully get the services that they provide.  
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Finally, military support worker Eddie emphasised the importance of this gender neutrality for 
ensuring that the policy is inclusive:  
 
Eddie: [Domestic abuse policy is gender neutral] to mirror society. I think, to show 
that we are inclusive and we are, everyone, equality and diversity in the truest 
possible sense. That is the thing.  
 
In these narratives, the gender-neutrality which underpins the military welfare approach to 
domestic abuse is presented as centrally important in ensuring that support practice is inclusive 
and that it promotes equality for all. This gender neutral stance is further reflected in the Tri-
Service Policy on Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (JSP913) (Ministry of Defence 2011b: 5), 
which follows the Home Office in defining domestic abuse as “Any incident of threatening 
behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between 
adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or 
sexuality” and goes on to note that “Domestic violence occurs irrespective of actual or perceived 
ethnicity, class, sexuality/sexual orientation, age, rank, religion, gender, gender identity and 
mental or physical ability.”  
 
Despite this widespread assumption that domestic abuse is a gender-neutral issue, with the 
exception of Fiona who argued that men and women perpetrate abuse at comparable levels, it 
was recognised by military welfare worker participants that statistically, the majority of victim-
survivors remain women. Military support worker Zoe, for example, noted that abuse 
perpetrated by a serving man against his female partner:  
 
Zoe: would generally be the majority. You know, and of course there’s always 
exceptions and things [...] but the majority would be a serving [male] soldier and a 
non-serving spouse, that would generally be the majority of what we would get.  
 
Similarly, for military support worker Frederick, when it comes to victim-survivors of abuse “it’s 
primarily women, of course.” This recognition is also reflected in Tri-Service Policy on Domestic 
Abuse and Sexual Violence (JSP913). As noted in Chapter One, while the JSP913 uses gender 
neutral language and draws attention to the victimisation of men, it also sits within the 
Government’s Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy and acknowledges that “the vast 
majority of these violent acts are perpetrated by men on women” (Ministry of Defence 2011b: 3).  
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On the whole, while military support workers recognised the gender disparity, they did not seem 
to think it was particularly relevant or remarkable - for many, it was an aside, something rooted in 
timeless and essentialised gender characteristics which they could not hope to undermine, or a 
mildly interesting but largely incidental quirk which they both did not understand and did not 
think it particularly important to try to understand. Military support worker Lily, for example, in a 
narrative which was reflected in several other interviews, was open about her lack of knowledge 
around the gendered inequalities of domestic abuse, and did not seem to think it a particularly 
pressing question:  
 
Lily: I think it is easy to stereotype all perpetrators as male, however all our literature 
is purposely gender-neutral and further highlights that anyone can be a victim (or 
indeed perpetrator) - male or female [...]. however, bearing in mind the 
Government's [Violence against Women and Girls report] it would appear that the 
problem is primarily men abusing women - as to why - I just don't know. 
 
In summary, while the participants cited above largely accepted, or even took it for granted, that 
women are more likely than men to become victims of abuse, few of them had really reflected on 
why this might be the case or thought it was important in understanding and responding to 
abuse, and the majority were committed to the notion that because both men and women can be 
victims, support services should be gender-neutral in approach. While there was one exception 
among the military support workers in the form of Zoe, who suggested that gendered identity - 
the ways in which men are brought up to be dominant and women to be dependent - was a likely 
causal factor in the gender disparity of abusive perpetration, the majority of these participants 
expressed sentiments similar to the ones above. 
 
Certainly, domestic abuse support services should be made available to male victim-survivors 
when necessary - support for such individuals, as well as for those who experience abuse within 
same-sex relationships, is hugely important. It is also the case that such support has often not 
been forthcoming in the British context, and that both public awareness and the availability of 
support services are seriously lacking (Mankind Initiative 2007). However, it is deeply problematic 
to suggest that because domestic abuse can happen to anyone, it is therefore not gendered. I 
explore the gendered nature of domestic abuse in Chapter Four and I do not repeat it here, 
except to re-state that domestic abuse is not only considered gendered because women are 
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disproportionately its victim-survivors and men disproportionately its perpetrators - rather, it is 
perpetrated, experienced, made sense of, legitimated, and responded to through socially 
constructed, gendered material structures and discourses in fundamentally important ways. For 
Anderson, to ignore gender in analyses of domestic abuse is to ignore “the way women and men 
are positioned differently as both victims and perpetrators of violence [...] it is not only what men 
and women do that matters but also what their behaviour means in a context of structural 
gender inequality” (Anderson 2009: 1455). That is, despite the fact that abuse does happen to 
men as well as to women, gender remains highly relevant to its perpetration and to the responses 
it engenders.   
 
In the dominant narratives which emerged from military and quasi-military support workers 
interviewed for this study, then, it is not that gender is never spoken about - rather, it is both 
present and absent in narratives of abuse in a way which leads, I suggest, to the critical potential 
being drained from the term. There are useful parallels which can be drawn to Whitworth’s 
discussions of the mainstreaming of gender into work of the United Nations (UN), in particular its 
peacekeeping work, which can help to illuminate my arguments here. For Whitworth, although 
calls to include a gender perspective in UN work have met with some success and the term 
‘gender’ has been appearing increasingly within UN work, the largely instrumental, problem-
solving way in which this has occurred has significantly limited its critical potential. She argues 
that:  
 
while attention to gender has made some of the issues more visible within the UN 
and other formal venues, the  manner in which it has done so has largely emptied 
gender concerns of their critical content. Gender critiques have been forced to fit the 
UN’s “way of doing business” without transforming how that business is done. This 
kind of incorporation of gender is ultimately an effective way of silencing critique 
rather than straightforward dismissal because it ensures that deeper critical 
questions, those that look, for example, at militarised masculinity, do not end up on 
the formal agendas for discussing gender and peacekeeping.  
(Whitworth 2007: 17) 
 
That is, when ‘gender’ is taken up in a depoliticised way which reproduces ideas of essentialised 
difference between women and men without drawing attention to inequalities and to power, it 
can function to silence the potential for political activism that more critical approach to gender 
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might be expected to bring about. In this process, the possibility that a gender analyses might 
usefully challenge, for example, the militarism embedded in international relations, is lost 
(Whitworth 2007: 109, 25-26). For Whitworth, this approach “narrows dramatically the 
possibilities for gender to be a transformative analytical and political concept” (ibid.: 109). 
 
Similarly in this study, it is not the case that the narratives cited above make no mention of 
gender, or that the British military institution itself has not made efforts to counter violence 
against women. Gender is present in these discussions of abuse, albeit often only in the 
presupposition of the greater statistical victimisation of women: as military support worker 
Frederick put it, “it’s primarily women, of course.” However, while gender is present in these 
ways, it is largely absent from the dominant discourse as a structure of power through which 
domestic abuse is enacted. That is, domestic abuse is understood as gendered only insofar as 
women happen to be its primary victims, and no real critical attention is paid to why this might 
be. Nor is any recognition granted to the unequal social distribution of power between women 
and men which underpins domestic abuse or to the structures and discourses in which this 
distribution of power is embedded. This has the effect of reinforcing the notion, important in the 
gendered logics of militarism, of women as essential victims - not as subjects who are positioned 
as vulnerable to abuse through socially constituted inequalities, but rather as subjects who are 
innately vulnerable to abuse because of their very identities as women (see, for example, Peterson 
2010; see also Chapter Six).  
 
Without a systematic analysis of gender as a social construct, domestic abuse becomes an 
individual and problematic anomaly - a crime perpetrated by deviant men against innately 
vulnerable women - rather than a matter of broad social inequalities. Perpetrators of abuse are 
therefore problematic individuals who need to be brought back into line, their relationships 
brought back to ‘normal.’ Within this, it becomes possible to talk about domestic abuse and to 
seek to prevent it in a manner which does not call for the transformation of society, but rather 
results in “ad hoc” responses to individual instances of men’s violence (McCarry 2007: 405). So, 
for example, when Eddie states above that a gender-neutral response is essential in order to 
achieve “equality and diversity in the truest possible sense,” he relies on an assumption of a social 
structure which is essentially equal in gendered terms, one where a particular focus on gendered 
violence against women produces a gendered imbalance rather than tries to correct one which 
already exists (for a similar argument in the civilian context, see Harvie and Manzi 2011: 89-90). 
What is obscured within this narrative is the ways in which the disempowerment of the civilian 
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wives of service personnel is, as explored in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis, a social product 
which is deeply embedded within the ‘normal’ of the British military community. This approach 
therefore strips gender of its critical potential in relation to domestic abuse, obscures the 
necessity of broad social change in order to truly deal with the problem, and neutralises the 
potential of a feminist informed engagement with domestic abuse for providing the basis for 
political engagement with abuse and with militarism more broadly.  
 
 
Concluding remarks   
This chapter, the third and final one to be organised around a thematic analysis of the interviews 
conducted for this thesis, engaged with the following questions:  
 
• How is the causality of domestic abuse perpetrated by servicemen in the British military 
perceived by participants in this study? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in these 
perceptions? 
 
The British military’s rhetorical stance on domestic abuse is fairly strong. As I note in Chapter One, 
relevant policies and support materials repeatedly state that domestic abuse is “not tolerated” 
within the military institution (British Defence Film Library 2012; Ministry of Defence 2011b;  
British Army 2014)
105
. However, while the institution may not tolerate acts of violence and abuse 
perpetrated by its personnel, I want to argue that by failing to draw the connections between 
domestic abuse and gendered inequalities, the military institution effectively does tolerate and 
allows to persist the very inequalities upon which domestic abuse is based.  That is, while the 
institution may not tolerate the weeds, I suggest that it does tolerate the roots which allow them 
to grow. In this chapter, I have explored three clusters of narratives through which domestic 
abuse is abstracted from the gendered inequalities which underpin it. These clusters - the 
racialised othering of abuse through ideas about Fijian culture, its pathologisation and removal 
from the realm of the everyday through discussions of the stresses associated with deployment, 
and the erasure of the gendered social inequalities which shape it through narratives of gender-
neutrality - depoliticise discussions of abuse by masking the everyday social and political factors 
through which it is underpinned. Within these depoliticised framings, the space in which to 
highlight or to challenge the widespread structural and discursive factors which produce the 
                                                           
105
 www.gov.uk/government/collections/domestic-abuse-guidance-and-support-for-the-armed-forces-
community, last accessed 22 July 2015. 
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vulnerability to abuse of civilian women married to servicemen in particular ways is significantly 
limited.  
 
Moreover, I want to argue that the depoliticising discourses identified in this chapter also work to 
neutralise the political threat which could be posed by more political understandings of abuse in 
the Armed Forces community to the naturalisation of wider processes of militarism itself. As I 
argue in Chapter Four, the gendered enactments of militarism which operate on multiple ‘scales’ 
from the intimate to the geopolitical rely upon and are constructed through one another.  The 
everyday relations and enactments of militarism, such as the production of oneself as a gendered 
militarised subject or one’s interactions with one’s serving spouse, are thus fundamentally 
relevant to the functioning of its more remarkable manifestations such as armed conflict, because 
the broad economic, social and political structures of military life which shape people’s daily lives 
provide the basis through which the use of geopolitical violence becomes thinkable. They provide 
the background within which acts of war can be understood as “an inevitability, something good, 
or even a source of moral satisfaction” (Butler 2010: xi).  
 
An overtly political analysis of military domestic abuse which places centre-stage its gendered 
enactments, then, would threaten the naturalisation of militarism by drawing attention to the 
politically and socially constructed nature of the gendered everyday configurations of power 
which constitute it. Edkins (2003: 6) describes the modern state as “a contradictory institution; a 
promise of safety, security and meaning alongside a reality of abuse, control and coercion.” While 
Edkins is referring more directly to the violent experiences of service personnel who participate in 
military violence, her analysis can illuminate my discussions here. The subversive potential of 
political analysis of the everyday underpinnings of military abuse is that it draws attention to the 
socially and politically constituted inequality and pain which underpins the normal, which is 
masked and sidelined through the sanitised, linear stories which constitute the dominant strains 
of national and military mythology. It draws attention to the violence which underpins the very 
social order which claims to provide us with security and safety from violence (Edkins 2003: 5-6, 
17, 52). The processes of depoliticisation discussed in this chapter dissolve the potential for 
political analysis which draws the links between militarism as it operates in all contexts, from the 
battlefield to the everyday of militarised gender and beyond into the everyday of civilian life, and 
in the process shuts down the space for effective political critique. Moreover, by severing the 
links between domestic abuse and the military gender order, these depoliticising narratives also 
contribute to the reproduction of the social relations of militarism by normalising and naturalising 
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the gendered status quo. In this discursive process, the idea of abuse and militarism/war as 
political, interconnected, gendered social processes, and the space for analysis of the gendered 
inequalities which underpin militarism in all its forms, is lost.     
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion  
Militarism in the Everyday 
 
This thesis posed the questions:  
 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by discourses of 
gender identity? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
• How are responses to domestic abuse in the British military shaped by the material 
structures of life in this context? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in this? 
• How is the causality of domestic abuse perpetrated by servicemen in the British military 
perceived by participants in this study? How, if at all, is militarism implicated in these 
perceptions? 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, these questions were formulated through an identification of the 
gaps in the existing academic literature. As well as identifying the lack of literature concerned 
specifically with domestic abuse in the British military, I also drew attention in Chapter Two to the 
failure of much of the literature which does exist on domestic abuse in various military 
institutions to take into account the learnings of broader feminist and critical military studies 
literatures on domestic abuse in civilian contexts and on forms of sexual and gender-based 
violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings. That is, I showed that much of the 
scholarship on domestic abuse in military institutions is ignorant of the insights of these two 
bodies of literature and, as such, does not in general apply either a gendered lens or a feminist-
informed, critical approach to militarism to the study of domestic abuse in military institutions. As 
such, I identified both empirical and conceptual gaps in the literature, which this thesis has begun 
to contribute towards filling. In this concluding chapter, I draw together the key findings and 
arguments of the thesis, highlight the ways in which they begin to fill the identified gaps in 
knowledge, and offer some reflections upon their wider implications both for scholarship and for 
policy and support practice.  
 
The chapter is organised around three main clusters of findings. I begin by discussing the 
contribution which my study makes towards the understanding of responses to domestic abuse in 
the British military community - in particular, towards understanding the barriers to help-seeking 
experienced by victim-survivors and towards understanding how domestic abuse is perceived in 
this context. My study provides in-depth, qualitative data about barriers to help-seeking in the 
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British military, which can help scholars, support practitioners, and policy-makers to better 
understand responses to abuse and in particular, the difficulties which victim-survivors face in 
trying to seek help and to make themselves safe. Next, I discuss a key conceptual intervention of 
my study. Learning from feminist-informed, critical studies of sexual and gender-based violence in 
conflict and post-conflict settings, I have argued in this thesis that the specific barriers to help-
seeking experienced by victim-survivors of abuse in the military context are deeply woven into 
the gendered social relations which constitute militarism. That is, in contrast to much of the 
literature on domestic abuse in military institutions, I have argued that the specifics of the 
experience of abuse and the ways in which it is responded to in this context are not merely 
something inevitable to be worked around, but rather, are political and social constructs which 
are produced through the political project of militarism itself. Finally, I discuss a further 
conceptual contribution made by my study, which is to identify the depoliticisation of domestic 
abuse in the British military context as something which contributes towards the naturalisation 
and the reproduction of the gendered social relations of militarism. As a result, I argue that 
domestic abuse in the military context should not be understood only as something which is 
shaped by militarism or indeed by war, but rather as something which is implicated in the 
reproduction of militarism - and therefore of war - itself. The chapter finishes with a reflection on 
some of the questions raised by the study, the gaps it leaves, and the opportunities for future 
research which it presents.  
 
 
Barriers to help-seeking  
The key empirical contribution to the literature made by this study centres on the previous lack of 
qualitative data, identified in Chapter Two, on domestic abuse in the British military context and, 
in particular on the ways in which it is responded to. My empirical contributions towards 
understanding the ways in which the causality of abuse is perceived in this context are discussed 
in a later section of this chapter; first, I reflect upon my empirical focus on the “barriers” which 
limit victim-survivors’ ability to seek help in this particular context. In Chapters Five and Six, I 
presented empirical findings which highlighted specific barriers faced by victim-survivors in this 
context - both “internal” and “external” (Dunn and Powell-Williams 207: 987-989). In Chapter 
Five, I focused on “internal” barriers to seeking help:  the ways in which responses to abuse are 
shaped or limited by idealised discourses of military gendered identity. I discussed the ways in 
which victim-survivors of abuse in this study were “held accountable” (West and Zimmerman 
1987) through forms of disciplinary power to the gender ideals in circulation in the military 
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community throughout the process of making sense of and responding to domestic abuse. In 
particular, I focused on the norms of stoicism and strength, and on the expectation that civilian 
women married to servicemen will show various forms of support for their husband’s career - 
factors which victim-survivor participants identified as particularly pertinent to their identities as 
‘military wives.’ I argued that when victim-survivors are held accountable to these ideals as they 
respond to abuse, some responses - in particular those which may entail repercussions for the 
perpetrator - become more difficult. Because gender is relational, and there can therefore be no 
femininities without masculinities (Connell 1995: 72), I also discussed the impact which 
hegemonic ideas about the military masculine identities of abusive servicemen had upon the 
responses to domestic abuse of participants in this study. In particular, I focused on the three 
dominant, although somewhat contradictory, ways in which servicemen have been understood in 
contemporary Britain - as “heroes,” as “victims,” and as “villains” (McCartney 2011). I argued that 
when perpetrators of abuse are simplistically understood as heroes, their abusive actions are 
likely to be overlooked; and when they are defined as victims, abuse may be understood as the 
result of psychological trauma and therefore as beyond their control. In both of these cases, it can 
become difficult to name the abuse as abuse, and thus it can be difficult for victim-survivors to 
obtain support which prioritises their safety and well-being over that of the perpetrator. I 
suggested that while approaching servicemen as villains may sidestep some of the definitional 
problems thus produced by hero and/or victim narratives, some victim-survivors who understand 
their abusers as particularly ‘villainous’ on the basis of their experiences as servicemen may 
experience heightened fear as a result, which may itself produce particular barriers to help-
seeking.  
 
In Chapter Six I expanded the focus of my discussion to consider the structural barriers to help-
seeking encountered by the victim-survivor participants in my study - what Dunn and Powell-
Williams (2007, 987-989) refer to as “external” barriers. I argued that civilian women married to 
servicemen are positioned by the structures of military life in liminal space on the borders of the 
military community - they are neither fully part of the military, nor are they fully external to it. 
Using the examples of housing and of welfare provision, I illustrated the ways in which civilian 
women married to servicemen are drawn into the military community by the institution’s 
provision of services. I suggested that while these women do not have to utilise these services, 
many feel compelled to do so by various factors. In relation to housing provision, I argued that 
the geographical mobility of many military careers encourages personnel and their families to live 
in the housing which the institution provides, as doing so becomes the most practical and 
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financially savvy choice as well as the one which minimises the social isolation which a mobile 
lifestyle can engender. In relation to the provision of welfare services, I pointed to a number of 
factors - including identification with the military community, a lack of information about 
alternatives and/or military signposting processes which centre around the institution’s own 
service provision, and, in some cases, victim-survivors’ lack of recourse to public funds - which 
encourage civilian women married to servicemen to seek welfare support within the institution. 
At the same time, I demonstrated that the ways in which these services are provided also exclude 
civilian women married to servicemen from full participation and equal status in the communities 
in which they live. Civilian women married to servicemen who live in Service Family 
Accommodation do not have any individual claim to the homes in which they live, and moreover 
because military forms of welfare support are largely orientated towards the needs of the 
institution itself, they may fail to prioritise the self-defined needs of victim-survivors of abuse. I 
argued that the liminality of the space in which civilian women married to servicemen are 
positioned by the structures of life in the military community produces them as precarious 
subjects, disempowered within their communities by forms of structural violence. For many, this 
produces limitations upon the ways in which they can respond to abuse. Many participants in this 
study discussed how their precarious position in relation to housing discouraged them from 
reaching out for help or from ending their relationships, because of the threat of homelessness 
that such decisions would entail. Others shared stories in which their attempts to seek help were 
stymied by interactions with welfare staff who did not foreground their self-defined needs as 
victim-survivors of abuse.  
 
This study is the first to collect in-depth, qualitative data on the responses to domestic abuse in 
the British military and, therefore, the first to discuss many of the barriers to help-seeking 
outlined above. It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis to offer discussions of how 
policy-makers and support workers might begin to assuage these barriers to help-seeking: this is 
something which needs to be reflected upon at greater length in a different format. I do, 
however, want to make two main points here which need to be taken into account in the 
consideration of policy and of support practice. First, studies such as this are important because 
policy discussions need to be rooted in an in-depth understanding of the lived experiences of 
victim-survivors of abuse if they are to be able to improve support for this group of women. That 
is, approaches to both policy and to support practice need to draw upon research in order to 
ensure that they are best equipped to make sense of the various responses to abuse in this 
context and to support victim-survivors in their efforts to seek help and to make themselves safe. 
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Second, reflecting the “critical” rather than “problem-solving” approach of this study, my findings 
do not lend themselves to easy or to quick ‘fixes,’ as the barriers to help-seeking I have identified 
are, in general, unlikely to be easily resolved through superficial tweaks of policy or of support 
practice. There are some relatively simple ways in which some elements of these barriers could 
be improved upon - lifting the restriction on the spouses of Foreign and Commonwealth 
personnel accessing the Destitution Domestic Violence Concession until their husbands have 
been serving for four years, for example, would immediately make it easier for women affected 
by this limitation to seek a wider range of support. However in the main, the barriers to help-
seeking which I have identified in this thesis are – as I argue below - produced by inequalities 
which are too systematic, too deeply woven into the foundations of militarism to be remedied by 
tinkering with legislation or through the introduction of surface-level changes to support practice. 
At its root, what is required is the empowerment of civilian women married to servicemen. As I 
argue throughout this thesis and below, the disempowerment of civilian women married to 
servicemen is woven into the normalised, everyday, gendered social relations of the preparation 
for, and conduct of, political domination and control for which the use of organised violence is a 
viable option - that is, it is woven into militarism itself. As such, it is difficult to imagine what kind 
of policy work would be able to make real improvements to the barriers to help-seeking 
experienced by civilian women married to servicemen without making fundamental changes to 
the social relations which constitute militarism itself.  
 
 
A gendered, critical military studies approach 
This study brings the insights offered by feminist scholarship on domestic abuse, and in particular, 
by critical, feminist-informed studies of forms of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and 
post-conflict settings, to bear on its explorations of domestic abuse in the British military. I 
cannot, of course, claim that I am the only scholar to have done this - as I explore in Chapter Two, 
Harrison and Laliberté’s work in the Canadian military context offers valuable insights into 
understanding the ways in which the patriarchal nature of militarism shapes military experiences 
of domestic abuse. Reflecting my own study, work by Harrison and Laliberté (1994; 2008) and by 
Harrison (2002; 2006) draws attention to some of the ways in which gendered militarism shapes 
responses to domestic abuse in the Canadian military context. Moreover, Harrison goes further 
than the present study in identifying both the patriarchal nature of military communities and the 
control and violence inherent in military training and in military ways of approaching the world as 
causal factors in domestic abuse (Harrison 2002: 14-22) - something which, because of its focus 
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on responses to abuse and because of the make-up of my sample, I am unable to comment upon 
with any authority. However, as I also illustrate in Chapter Two, the majority of work on domestic 
abuse in military institutions - including that which has been conducted in the British case 
(Williamson and Price 2009; Williamson 2011) - does not take a critical approach to gendered 
militarism but rather takes the constitution of the military itself for granted, and thus leaves it 
unexamined. This, I argue, makes it difficult to understand the specific ways in which abuse is 
responded to in this context, or to imagine how it might be responded to differently.  
 
In Chapter Two, I pointed to the body of literature on sexualised and gender-based violence 
(SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict settings, and stated that this work demonstrates the 
importance of paying attention to the interconnections between war, militarism, and various 
forms of SGBV. For example, I noted that scholars have drawn attention to the ways in which 
militarised forms of masculinity may be conducive to rape, because of the “attitudes of 
hypermasculinity, adversarial sexual beliefs, sexual promiscuity, rape myth acceptance, 
acceptance of violence against women, hostility toward women, and sex-role stereotyping” which 
are embedded within them (Morris 1996: 700-701). Similarly, I cited scholarship which attributes 
the increasing prevalence of domestic abuse in conflict and post-conflict settings to the 
“repatriarchalization” of social and gender relations which occurs as a result of war (Albanese 
2001; see also Adelman 2003; Copic 2004; Horn et al. 2014; Korac 1998; Zannettino 2012). That is, 
I demonstrated that scholarship on SGBV in conflict and post-conflict settings has drawn attention 
to the ways in which the perpetration, experience, and meaning of SGBV is shaped in particular 
ways in war and post-war contexts because of the influence of war and/or militarism itself.  
 
Following this insight, and in contrast to the majority of scholarship on domestic abuse in military 
institutions, I argue in Chapters Five and Six that the barriers to help-seeking faced by victim-
survivors of abuse in the British military context which I identify herein are shaped by militarism 
in important ways. Militarism - as the normalised, everyday, gendered social relations of the 
preparation for, and conduct of, political domination and control for which the use of organised 
violence is a viable option - relies at a fundamental level upon a gendered logic of masculine 
protection, in which the masculine is called upon to protect the feminine from perceived external 
threats; and in which the feminine is placed in a subordinate position as a result (Young 2003; 
Peterson 2010).  As I argued in Chapter Four, this gendered logic is integral to militarism because 
it helps to “make war thinkable” (Cockburn 2010: 149); it provides some of the grounds within 
which war can come to be seen as “an inevitability, something good, or even a source of moral 
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satisfaction” (Butler 2010: xi). While the somewhat simplistic gendered dichotomy contained 
within the notion of masculine protectors and feminine protected may belie the diversity in the 
roles which men and women take on in military institutions, the logic of masculine protection 
remains important in legitimating militarism and military institutions in the contemporary world 
(Belkin 2012; Kovitz 2003) and in the biopolitical “production of identity and difference that is 
central to who fights and dies in modern conflicts” (Basham 2013: 50; see also Pin-Fat and Stern 
2005: 44). Following this, as I noted in Chapter Four, the British military institution is a 
heteronormative space which relies upon and is structured around the idea of male and female 
difference (Nielsen et al. 2000; Woodward and Winter 2007: 5, 53-56), and which relies upon and 
functions through particular ideals of masculinity and femininity (Hale 2012: 705). The gender 
norms which I identify as shaping responses to domestic abuse in Chapter Five, then, are not 
merely coincidental; they are integral to militarism itself. That is, the expectations of stoicism and 
of support for the military career to which victim-survivors in this study were held accountable as 
they responded to abuse - and the norms of masculinity through which they made sense of the 
identities of their abusive husbands’ identities and behaviour - are deeply rooted within the 
political project of militarism. Similarly, the material structures of military life through which 
civilian women married to servicemen are both brought into the military community and 
prevented from taking a full and equal position within it - through which they are positioned in a 
liminal space on the borders of the military community - are likewise formulated through 
militarism.  
 
As such, domestic abuse in the British military institution - like the various forms of sexual and 
gender-based violence which occur in conflict and post-conflict settings - is a form of violence 
against women which is shaped and experienced in particular ways, and which takes on particular 
meanings, because of the militarised context in which it takes place. To be clear, war, of course, is 
not militarism, and militarism is not war - as I argue in Chapter Four, militarism is the set of social 
relations which makes war possible. I am not arguing, then, that forms of domestic abuse which 
occur in conflict and post-conflict settings are the same to those which occur in military 
institutional settings such as the contemporary British military; rather, these are different 
expressions of gendered militarism which occur along a “continuum” (Kelly 1987; 1988) of 
militarised violences against women. While, as I note above, Harrison and Laliberte’s work in 
particular is an example of scholarship which recognises the role of militarism, as I demonstrate in 
Chapter Two most of the scholarship on domestic abuse in military institutions does not take a 
critical, gendered approach to militarism or identify it as a central factor which shapes 
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experiences of domestic abuse in military settings. In the British context, for example, Williamson 
and Price’s (2009) work recognises the potential impact of military service upon domestic abuse 
without following this through with a gendered-conscious critical discussion of militarism or of 
the military institution itself. That is, while Williamson and Price recognise the role of civilian 
women married to servicemen within the military institution as something specific, they offer no 
reflections on why this might be or what this might mean in relation to militarism itself, and as a 
result, the depth of understanding which the study is able to produce is limited. My own 
approach to military domestic abuse as formulated through militarism thus makes a conceptual 
contribution by bringing the insights of feminist-informed scholarship on sexual and gender-based 
violence in conflict and post-conflict settings to bear on this study - a conceptual approach which 
is absent from work in the British context if not from all scholarship worldwide. This is a useful 
approach because it enables a deeper, more self-consciously political analysis than that provided 
by studies which do not take militarism into account. By drawing the connections between the 
barriers to help-seeking experienced by victim-survivors of abuse and the social and political 
relations which constitute militarism, I am able to draw attention to the social and political 
context through which these barriers are produced.  
 
 
The depoliticisation of domestic abuse as reproductive of militarism  
Moreover, the analysis offered in this thesis does not only consider the ways in which responses 
to domestic abuse in the British military context are shaped by militarism in a unidirectional 
fashion; I also suggest that the depoliticising ways in which this form of abuse is responded to is 
one of the many sites at which the gendered social relations of militarism are reproduced on an 
everyday basis. Domestic abuse is always political - as, indeed, is militarism. In Chapters Five and 
Six, I discuss domestic abuse in the British military as a specific political issue which is shaped by 
the gendered political project of militarism. In Chapter Seven, however, I draw attention to the 
ways in which domestic abuse in the British military is depoliticised in many of the narratives 
about it which were shared by my participants. That is, I suggest that the dominant perceptions of 
the causality of domestic abuse which emerged from the interviews conducted for this thesis 
serve to obscure the everyday gendered inequalities through which it comes into being and which 
- as I argue above - are central to the gendered project of militarism itself. The clusters of 
narratives which I identify - the racialised othering of abuse through ideas about externalised 
‘culture’; its pathologisation and removal from the realm of the everyday through a focus on 
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deployment-related stress; and its individualisation through narratives of gender-neutrality -mask 
the everyday social and political factors by which it is underpinned; thus, they depoliticise abuse.  
 
As Edkins suggests, a political analysis of militarism has the potential to expose the inequality and 
the violence which underpin the very social order which claims to provide subjects with security 
and safety from violence (Edkins 2003: 5-6, 17, 52). Following this, I suggest that a political 
approach to domestic abuse in the British military - such as the one offered in this thesis - has the 
potential to challenge militarism more broadly by drawing attention to the politically and socially 
constructed nature of the gendered everyday configurations of power upon which it relies.  The 
depoliticising narratives discussed in Chapter Seven, however, obscure the social inequalities 
which underpin domestic abuse and, in so doing, make it difficult to engage politically with this 
issue. As such, these narratives function to neutralise the political threat which could be posed by 
more critical understandings of abuse in the Armed Forces community to the naturalisation of 
wider processes of militarism itself. Within these narratives, the military gender order - the 
normalised, everyday, gendered social relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, political 
domination and control for which the use of organised violence is a viable option - is absolved of 
responsibility for domestic abuse and, as such, is naturalised and reproduced. That is, by severing 
the links between domestic abuse and the military gender order, these depoliticising narratives 
contribute to the reproduction of the social relations of militarism by normalising and naturalising 
the gendered status quo.  
 
As I discuss in Chapter Two, while the majority of existing scholarship on domestic abuse in 
military institutions generally does not engage with gendered militarism, a significant portion of it 
points to the experience of combat deployment as causal in abuse - either because of the stresses 
of post-deployment reintegration, or because of the longer-term mental health problems which 
combat can cause (e.g. Byrne and Riggs 1996; Carroll et al. 1985; Chemtob et al. 1997; Finley et al. 
2010; Glenn et al. 2002; Hoge et al. 2007; Jordan et al. 1992; Klostermann et al. 2012; Monson et 
al. 2009; Orcutt et al. 2003; Savarese et al. 2001; Sherman et al. 2006; Taft et al. 2011; Taft et al. 
2013; Verbosky and Ryan 1988; Williamson and Price 2009). Mirroring this, scholars who have 
discussed domestic abuse in conflict and post-conflict settings - even those who centre a 
gendered analysis of militarism by arguing that war leads to increased levels of abuse through the 
“repatriarchalization” of gender relations (Albanese 2001; see also Adelman 2003; Copic 2004; 
Horn et al. 2014; Korac 1998; Zannettino 2012) - have generally also approached domestic abuse 
as something which is caused by conflict - something which is a result, an off-shoot, an impact of 
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war itself. In opposition to this, by discussing the depoliticisation of domestic abuse in the British 
military context as something which reproduces the social relations of militarism, I want to make 
a point about timelines and about causality. While domestic abuse is generally treated in the 
literature as something which is caused by combat, my analysis here suggests, rather, that it can 
play a role in reproducing the social relations which make combat thinkable - which necessarily 
pre-date conflict. The social relations of inequality in which domestic abuse is embedded are not 
only produced by war - they are part of the ways in which war itself is produced.  
 
While this may seem, perhaps, a somewhat pernickety point, it is important because it opens up a 
space to think about domestic abuse and the ways in which it is responded to in the military 
space as an enactment of gendered militarism; as part of the gendered practices through which 
wars are fought. As I discus in Chapter Four, militarism is much broader than war itself: if war 
were the tip of an iceberg floating above the surface of the water, I suggest, then militarism is the 
part below the waves, which is largely invisible, but without which the top-most part would not 
be able to float. I argue in Chapter Four against the notion of a firm divide between the intimate 
and the geopolitical, theorising the two as intrinsically intertwined, co-constructed, and co-
dependent (Basham 2013: 14-15; Pain 2015). My definition of militarism as the normalised, 
everyday, gendered social relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, political domination 
and control for which the use of organised violence is a viable option draws attention to the ways 
in which war is made possible by the everyday arrangements of social life (Basham 2013: 20; 
Dowler and Sharp 2010; Dowler 2012; Sjoberg and Via 2010; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). What 
this means is that in order to understand war, we need to pay attention not only to the acts 
which one ethnic or national collective perpetrates against another, but to the arrangement of 
social life within a given collective. We need to understand the ways in which forms of violence 
within particular collectives reproduce the social hierarchies through which war is made 
conceivable. That is, the violences which take place within a given collective - how they are 
perpetrated, responded to, and made sense of on a broader scale - are also part of how wars are 
fought. As such, while “rape as a weapon of war” - something which the men of one collective do 
to the women of another - is widely understood as a part of the gendered practices of war 
fighting (e.g. Benshoof 2014; Buss 2009; Cain 1999; Card 1996; Diken and Lausten 2005; Goldstein 
2001; Kirby 2012; Maedl 2011; Meger 2010; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002; Salzman 1998; Trenholm et al. 
2011), I want to suggest that the failure to holistically address domestic abuse in the British 
military is part of the process through which the social relations which make war possible are 
naturalised and reproduced and, therefore, that this too is part of the gendered processes of war 
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fighting. This blurs somewhat the broad divide which I identified in Chapter Two between 
literatures on forms of sexual and gender-based violence in war perpetrated against ‘enemy’ 
women - which are generally recognised as a gendered enactment of militarism - and literatures 
on forms of sexual and gender-based violence in war which are perpetrated against the women of 
the ‘same’ collective - which are generally not. With Hyndman (2001: 214), I therefore argue that 
scholars need to rethink their ideas of “what counts” in geopolitics - it is not only violences 
against the enemy which are part of how a nation goes to war, those violences which occur within 
the nation are also relevant, because they shape that nation in such a way that war itself 
becomes possible.  
 
My argument here is, of course, limited by the narrow scope of my study and by its specific 
context, as well as by its focus not on causality but on the responses to abuse which occur within 
this particular space. This is a discussion which could, I don’t doubt, be further extended and 
supported through a more in-depth consideration of the perpetration of abuse and of the 
experiences of perpetrators themselves. However, my discussions in this thesis expose responses 
to domestic abuse in the British military community which do not engage with it politically or 
holistically as part of the multiple processes by which the gendered structures and discourses 
through which militarism functions are reproduced on an everyday basis.  This discussion aligns 
my work with feminist scholarship which draws attention to the blurriness between ‘military’ and 
‘not military,’ and between ‘war’ and ‘peace,’ and which takes seriously the ways in which the 
roots of war are embedded within ‘peace’ (Enloe 2007: 4; Sjoberg and Via 2010: 7). More 
specifically, it allows me to open up a space to begin to understand domestic abuse in military 
institutions - the ways in which it is perpetrated, experienced, responded to, and made sense of - 
as part of the gendered practices through which wars are fought; as a gendered enactment of 
militarism.  
 
 
Gaps in the study and areas for future research 
While this study has begun to fill the gaps in literature I identified in Chapter Two, it has also 
opened up new areas for study and presented new questions. This study has taken a qualitative 
approach, one which has enabled me to provide in-depth information on the lived experiences of 
this under-researched group. However, a large scale statistical study - informed by the insights of 
this exploratory qualitative work - would now be useful to contextualise these findings and to 
strengthen the knowledge base for the development of policy. Looking to the future, it would also 
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be interesting to see how the experiences described in this study are changed, if at all, by the 
adjustments occurring under the Future Force 2020 plan. Particularly, the New Employment 
Model for the Armed Forces included as part of this plan - which promises a reduction in the 
frequency of geographical moves and includes programmes encouraging personnel to buy their 
own homes rather than to live in Service Families Accommodation
106
 - may reshape the position 
of civilian women married to servicemen within the military community and may, therefore, have 
interesting impacts upon responses to domestic abuse in this context. Research to track any 
changes which occur could be valuable.  
 
In addition, as I discuss in Chapter Three, the sample used in this study had some limitations, and 
the findings of the study could be complicated and advanced through conducting additional 
research with a greater diversity of participants. Victim-survivors whose abusive partners were of 
officer rank may have different experiences from my participants, and it would be interesting and 
useful to gather further empirical data on what these might be. In addition, while this study has 
begun to shed light on the experiences of women who enter the UK as the spouses of Foreign and 
Commonwealth personnel, my sample did not include any spouses of members of the Brigade of 
Ghurkhas - who have a distinct status in the British Army and in the UK - and further research to 
find out whether experiences are different within this subset of military personnel would also be 
valuable. All of the victim-survivor participants in my sample experienced abuse in marriages to 
regular personnel, and I think it is likely that the partners of abusers who are reservists would 
have different experiences as they are less likely to be brought within the institutional space of 
the military in any significant way. In addition, as I discuss in Chapter Three, because of ethical 
and safety concerns this study only sampled victim-survivors of abuse who had already left the 
relationship in which they were abused. This is likely to have had significant implications for the 
data I was able to collect. In particular, victim-survivor participants in this study tended to focus in 
their discussions of their responses to abuse upon their access to official services and the 
processes by which they ended their abusive relationships, and I suspect that interviews with 
victim-survivors who remain in the abusive relationship might offer more insight into the more 
informal, everyday ways in which women manage and cope with the abuse, and in which they 
seek to end the abuse without ending the relationship. Moreover, as I note in Chapter Six, most 
of the victim-survivor participants in this study were fairly critical of the military institution and of 
their experiences of seeking help within it. Given that I argue that the process of ending a 
relationship with a member of the military often also entails leaving the institutional space itself, I 
                                                           
106
 www.gov.uk/new-employment-model, last accessed 24 July 2015. 
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wonder about the impact which moving away from their identities as ‘military wives’ may have 
had upon my participants’ perceptions of these interactions, and whether the views of those who 
remain within the military space might be different. Of course, the safety and wellbeing of 
participants must remain paramount, but if a way to learn about the experiences and views of 
victim-survivors who remain within the abusive relationship both safely and ethically could be 
identified, such research could complicate the knowledge produced through this study in valuable 
ways.  
 
More fundamentally, further research is required to find out about the experiences of male 
victim-survivors of abuse, of LGBT victim-survivors of abuse, and of victim-survivors of abuse who 
are themselves serving in the military. This study has made sense of my participants’ experiences 
through an analysis of power as it is experienced through gender; it has approached the military 
as a masculinised space in which the feminine - and women themselves - are marginalised. While 
this approach has been useful in making sense of the experiences of the civilian women married 
to servicemen who have been involved as victim-survivor participants in this study, it is likely that 
sustained attention to the experiences of a more diverse sample of victim-survivors would 
complicate and challenge this picture somewhat. This does not necessarily mean that it would 
undermine the analysis presented in this thesis. Gender is a complex and relational social 
construct, and it is experienced differently by subjects who are differently located in relation to 
gender as well as in relation to race, class, and sexuality. To suggest that civilian women married 
to servicemen are disempowered by the structures and discourses of gender in the British 
military is not to suggest that all women are equally so, or, indeed, that all men are empowered 
by these same structures and discourses. For example, I would expect that as much as the victim-
survivor participants in this study have found that their responses to abuse are limited by the 
gendered ideals of ‘military wifehood’ to which they were held accountable, servicemen abused 
by their partners are also likely to find that their responses are limited by the ways in which they 
are held accountable to the ideals of “warrior masculinity” (Atherton 2009: 824). Moreover, while 
victim-survivors of abuse who are themselves serving are likely to have different relationships to 
the structures through which civilian women married to servicemen are disempowered, it is not 
clear, without conducting further research, how this will shape their lived experiences of abuse 
and of help-seeking, or what this would mean for our understandings of gendered militarism in 
the British military context. Research focused on differently gendered experiences of domestic 
abuse in the British military would not undermine the basis for arguing that domestic abuse is 
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gendered; rather, it would provide a different angle on how experiences of abuse are gendered 
that would complicate and deepen our understandings.   
 
Finally, there is a need for further research which investigates the various ways in which domestic 
abuse can be understood as part of the gendered practices of war fighting. While I have begun to 
make these arguments in this thesis through drawing attention to the ways in which the 
depoliticisation of military domestic abuse can lead to the reproduction of the gendered social 
relations of militarism, as I note above, I am limited in the depth to which I can explore these 
arguments by the sample and the focus of this study. As Shepherd (2008: 51) points out, sexual 
and gender-based violence is “both gendered and gendering”, and as such, men who perpetrate 
domestic abuse are engaged in the performative construction of themselves as masculine 
subjects. Following this, further research which pays attention specifically to the ways in which 
servicemen construct themselves as soldierly subjects through the perpetration of abuse would 
be very valuable, and would help to draw attention to the ways in which military domestic abuse 
plays a role in the enactment of gendered militarism. In addition, there would also be value in 
studies of domestic abuse in conflict and post-conflict settings which pay focused attention to the 
ways in which such abuse serves to reproduce the gendered everyday social relations of 
militarism within the context of war itself. It would be interesting to see whether, as I suspect, the 
perpetration and/or the depoliticisation of domestic abuse in times of war might play a role in 
reproducing the ‘home front’ in particular ways which reinforce and legitimate the use of forms 
of militarised violence at the ‘front line.’ 
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